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Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
Law Under Federal Energy Price
Regulation
Jacqueline Lang Weaver*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade federal intervention into the oil and gas in-
dustry has grown at an unprecedented rate. This surge has been
particularly marked in the pricing and allocation of oil and natural
gas, as a consequence of the federal government's struggle to cope
with both the energy shortages and price increases resulting from
the economic and political power of the Middle Eastern oil-pro-
ducing countries. Federal intrusion into all facets of domestic oil
and gas pricing has generated much political debate over the wis-
dom of such a policy and much litigation and legal commentary on
its meaning and enforcement through the administrative and judi-
cial processes. The impact of the new legislation on the relation-
ship between the lessee and lessor under an oil and gas lease, how-
ever, has received relatively little attention. Although few courts
have addressed the subject, the probable impact of this federal reg-
ulation on the doctrine of implied covenants in oil and gas law is
important to lessees and lessors alike.1
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston. B.A., 1968, Harvard University;,
J.D., 1975, University of Houston. The author is grateful for the able research assistance of
David E. Cowen. The author also wishes to acknowledge funding from the Energy Lab of
the University of Houston for secretarial assistance with this Article.
1. Despite the recent deregulation of crude oil price controls in fulfillment of Presi-
dent Reagan's campaign promise, the issues discussed in this Article are of continuing sig-
nificance. Crude oil is subject to a windfall profits tax through 1990 that affects producers
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This Article seeks to determine whether the federal pricing
regulations have imposed new duties on the lessee in his relation-
ship to a lessor, and, if so, the nature, scope, and consequences of
those duties. The Article contends that the federal pricing schemes
in oil and gas will lead to a renaissance of certain implied cove-
nants that the law has traditionally recognized-albeit now framed
in a new setting. The Article focuses on those issues that are likely
to require resolution under both the implied covenant to market
and the less well-known implied covenant to seek favorable admin-
istrative action.
II. THE FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The federal response to the energy crisis, which former Presi-
dent Carter once called the "moral equivalent of war," forged legis-
lative armaments along a broad front that included energy
production, pricing, allocation, transportation, conversion, and
conservation.2 The fusillade of greatest concern to the lessee/lessor
relationship, because of its immediate impact on revenues received
by both parties, is that which aimed at direct federal control over
the prices of oil and gas. This part of the Article, therefore, briefly
describes the basic regulatory framework for crude oil and natural
gas pricing under which implied covenants in oil and gas law are
likely to arise. Within this federal framework of price regulation,
the Article then examines the relationship between the oil and gas
lessee and lessor under implied covenant law.3
A. Crude Oil Pricing
The price of domestic crude oil was subject to almost continu-
ous mandatory federal controls from August 15, 1971-when Presi-
and royalty owners in much the same way as crude oil price regulations. The existing federal
regulation of natural gas prices is likely to continue, perhaps with some modification, for
several more years. In addition, the re-imposition of price controls on crude oil and their
further extension to natural gas are possible if another embargo or a drastic change in
American political fortunes occurs. Even if all oil and gas is deregulated by the end of this
decade, many of the issues discussed in this Article are relevant to other types of state and
federal laws that affect the industry such as environmental permit regulations.
2. For a listing of 35 major energy laws passed in the 1970s, see [1981] 1 ENERGY
MNGM'T (CCH) 229.
3. The Article focuses on natural gas pricing because the well determination process
under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. I 1979),
clearly requires administrative action to receive the benefits of incentive prices. The Act is
thus likely to force explicit attention to the implied covenant to seek favorable administra-
tive action. Nonetheless, most of the principles that this Article discusses apply to the pric-
ing of both crude oil and natural gas.
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dent Nixon first imposed a general wage-price freeze as an anti-
inflation measure-until January 1981 when President Reagan
eliminated the controls." The federal pricing system was intended
to protect the consumer from rapid price increases by establishing
maximum lawful prices on oil discovered before the "energy cri-
sis," while still maintaining price incentives for producers to ex-
plore for new reserves, to keep marginal wells in existence, and to
rework existing fields with new technologies to increase recovery
rates. The inevitable tension between these two objectives resulted
in an increasingly complex system of price controls and incentives,
under which the price of a barrel of domestic crude oil could range
from seven dollars to almost forty dollars depending on its
classification.5
4. For a general history of the federal crude oil pricing system, see [1981] 1 ENERGY
MNGM'T (CCH) 1 3001-3018 and sources cited in note 5 infra. The Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act of 1975 (EPCA), Pub. L. No. 94-163, §§ 1-552, 89 Stat. 871 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15, 42, 50 U.S.C.), controlled the weighted average price of first sales of all
domestic crude oil through May 31, 1979. 15 U.S.C. §§ 753(a)-(e), 757 (1976). Since June 1,
1979, the President has had authority to control oil prices in any manner desired until Sep-
tember 30, 1981. Under President Carter, crude oil decontrol was to have been accomplished
by October 1, 1981; President Reagan simply speeded up the process. 15 U.S.C. § 760g
(1976). Many enforcement actions and lawsuits involving past compliance with the crude oil
pricing regulations are still in the process of being adjudicated by the federal agencies or the
courts. Despite the Reagan Administration's commitment to reducing the federal budget,
funding for crude oil pricing compliance was increased from $12-20 million for fiscal 1982.
Energy Management Newsletter (CCH), Oct. 6, 1981, at 1.
5. The average refinery cost in June 1980 for nine categories of crude oil illustrates the
range of prices:
Category Cost Per Barrel
Newly discovered $37.69
Stripper well $34.98
Alaskan exempt $34.41
Heavy and market $33.51
Naval reserve $33.46
Tertiary $27.49
Alaskan upper tier $23.97
Upper tier $15.03
Lower tier $ 7.20
Energy Management Newsletter (CCH), Sept. 9, 1980, at 4.
The pricing rules for all categories of crude oil appear in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions. 10 C.F.R. §§ 212.51-.78 (1981). For more details on federal crude oil pricing regula-
tions, see [1981] 1 ENERGY MNGM'T (CCH) 3008-3019; Alott, Crude Oil Deregulation, 25
RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 15-1 (1979); Beck, Crude Oil Issues, 30 INsT. OM & GAs L. &
TAx. 1 (1979); Lang, DOE Organization: The Limits of Regulatory Power, 30 INsT. OM &
GAS L. & TAx. 119 (1979); Mode, Federal Petroleum Regulation in the Courts, 29 INST. OM
& GAs L. & TAx. 39 (1978); and Richardson, Crude Oil Pricing-Current Regulations and
Practices, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 803 (1977).
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The crude oil pricing scheme was largely self-policing. No firm
could charge a price for crude off that exceeded the maximum per-
mitted by law." Crude oil producers were required to file reports
with the federal government and to prepare and maintain records
of prices, production volumes, and the data used to classify the
oil.7 Producers also had to furnish, for each separate property, a
written certification, with supporting data, to each purchaser of
crude oil that stated the category for which the property qualified.8
No firm could sell domestic crude oil unless it provided the re-
quired documentation and no firm could knowingly purchase do-
mestic crude oil that lacked certification.9 The Economic Regula-
tory Administration (ERA) of the Department of Energy (DOE)
was responsible for enforcement of the crude oil pricing regula-
tions,10 and both civil and criminal sanctions could be levied for
violations of either the price ceilings or the reporting
requirements."'
Not surprisingly, the crude oil regulatory machinery that the
federal government established failed to run smoothly. The price
6. 10 C.F.R. § 212.10 (1981).
7. Id. §§ 212.126-.128.
8. Id. § 212.131.
9. Id. § 212.131(c).
10. The regulations for crude oil pricing investigations, violations, sanctions, and judi-
cial actions appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. Id. §§ 205.200-.204. The responsibili-
ties and internal structure of the ERA are explained in [1981] 1 ENERGY MNGM'T (CCH) 1
2532, at 2534-35. Under the Department of Energy Organization Act (DOE Organization
Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7375 (Supp. 1I 1979) and the Department of Energy Delegation
Order No. 0204-4, 10 C.F.R. app. § 1001.1 (1981), the ERA replaced the Federal Energy
Administration (FEA) as the primary agency for crude oil pricing compliance. The DOE
Organization Act also created the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which is
a five-member independent commission within the DOE that shared some of the authority
over crude oil pricing with the ERA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7172(c)(1), 7193, 7194 (Supp. HI
1979). See also Craven, New Dimensions in Federal Regulation of Crude Oil and Petroleum
Products Under the Department of Energy, 29 INST. OIL & GAs L. & TAX. 1 (1978); Lang,
supra note 5.
11. 10 C.F.R. § 205.203 (1981). While the largest vertically integrated petroleum com-
panies were subject to intensive investigation by the ERA's Office of Special Counsel for
Compliance, enforcement Iolicy towards smaller petroleum reselling and retailing firms was
more relaxed. Audits were not performed on these firms except on suspicion of a willful
violation. [1974-1981 Transfer Binder] ENERGY MNGM'T (CCH) 15,400A. Small crude oil
producers, however, were not so favored. An inventory of FEA audits of energy projects in
the Southwest District (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas) from Jan-
uary 1, 1977, through May 1979, for example, showed that crude oil producers were involved
in two-thirds of the audits (1,069 of the total 1,598 audits). Adequacy of the Administra-
tion's Anti-Inflation Program: Hearings Before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary
Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1979)
(statement of Herbert F. Buchanan).
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regulations originally were forged as a temporary, emergency, anti-
inflation-and then anti-embargo-defense measure. They were
poorly designed to cope with the long-term nature of the Organiza-
tion of Oil Exporting Countries' (OPEC) power over oil prices and
supplies or with the complexities of the petroleum industry. Crude
oil prices became one of the most sensitive and volatile political
issues the nation had ever faced. 12 Crude oil pricing legislation,
therefore, was erratic and unpredictable: temporary price control
authority would expire and then be extended, only to expire
again;13 certain oil production was uncontrolled, controlled, and
then uncontrolled;"4 and congressional price rollbacks and Presi-
dential price freezes caused instability in producers' price expecta-
tions and business planning.'" In addition, the political pressures
on the successive federal pricing agencies were enormous and
sometimes irresistible, and often resulted in violations of the prin-
ciples of fundamental fairness and due process to firms in the in-
dustry.16 Numerous committees and task forces investigated and
12. See Mitchell, The Basis of Congressional Energy Policy, 57 TEx. L. REv. 591
(1979). Mitchell documents the dominant role of ideology in the determination of energy
policy, especially natural gas deregulation. Ideology of congressmen, measured by the lib-
eral/conservative ratings of the Americans for Democratic Action, could be used to predict
correctly a congressman's vote on natural gas deregulation 90% of the time. Id. at 598.
Indeed, votes on oil and gas decontrol were more ideologically oriented than votes on abor-
tion and welfare policies. Id. at 605-06.
13. Crude oil prices were controlled first in Phases I and II of the general wage-price
freeze that began on August 15, 1971. In January 1973 Phase III commenced, in which Con-
gress relied upon the oil industry to exercise voluntary restraints on price increases. Two
months later, however, mandatory controls were reinstated. Finally, from January 1974 to
January 1976, the FEA controlled crude oil prices under the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-
tion Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976), which Congress had to extend three
times-twice after a hiatus. [1981] 1 ENERGY MNGM'T (CCH) 3001.
14. The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976),
expressly exempted oil that was drawn from "stripper wells" (i.e., oil from properties that
produced less than 10 barrels/day/well). Id. § 757(i). The EPCA, see note 4 supra, however,
placed controls on stripper well prices from February 1976 to September 1976, when Con-
gress reversed itself again and exempted stripper well oil in the Energy Conservation and
Production Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-385, § 121, 90 Stat. 1125, 1132-33 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 757 (1976)).
15. The EPCA forced the weighted average domestic crude oil price down to $7.66 per
barrel in February 1976, and limited future price increases to no more than 10% per year.
The Ford Administration froze prices at their June 1976 level through August 1976 because
of miscalculations in the schedule of allowable price increases. Rollbacks and freezes con-
tinued under President Carter; prices did not begin rising again until September 1977.
[1981] 1 ENERGY MNGM'T (CCH) It 3007-3018.
16. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FEA, 453 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd sub noam.
Standard Oil Co. v. DOE, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). The court in Stan-
dard Oil Co. invalidated the FEA's interpretation of the refiner's cost sequence rule because
of a lack of procedural safeguards. In tracing the history of the FEA's erratic interpretation
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frequently sustained congressional charges of inadequate enforce-
ment policies.17 Moreover, judicial review provided an inadequate
check on the federal price control agencies' discretion, since the
agencies' legislative charters were far too vague and broad to pro-
vide meaningful standards for the courts to apply."8
The complexity, size, and enormous importance of the petro-
leum industry simply defied easy regulatory or political formulas
to reconcile the conflicting goals of encouraging domestic energy
production and protecting consumers from rocketing price in-
creases for such an essential commodity. The permanence of the
regulatory apparatus required that the rules be sufficiently defined
and detailed to apprise regulated firms of the law and still be suf-
ficiently flexible to accommodate individual situations. The regula-
tors, however, often were not knowledgeable enough about the in-
dustry to accomplish these dual goals.19 In sum, legislation and
regulations passed in haste and ignorance were poorly understood
by the regulators and ambiguous to the regulated.2 0 The agency
of this rule, the court found that the political pressure exerted by Congressman Dingell as
chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce had caused the FEA to reverse its previously announced course. 596
F.2d at 1038. See also Cockrell, Invalidation of Federal Petroleum Regulations on the Basis
of Procedural Rulemaking Deficiencies, 57 Tax. L. REv. 535 (1979); Elkins, The Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 1978
DUKE L.J. 113; McMillin, Principled Fairness in the Regulation of Petroleum Prices, 57
Tax. L. REv. 573 (1979); Note, Retroactivity and Pricing Regulations, 29 BAYLOR L. REv.
1033 (1977).
17. See, e.g., FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION: TASK FORCE ON COMPLIANCE AND EN-
FORCEMENT (1977) (also known as SPORKIN REPORT) (detailing major shortcomings in the
FEA's compliance and enforcement program); TASK FORCE ON REFORM OF FEDERAL ENERGY
ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION REGULATION REPORT OF THE PRESIDEN-
TIAL TASK FORCE (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977). See also Trowbridge, Enforcement of Criminal
Sanctions for the Violation of Federal Controls on the Prices of Crude Oil and Petroleum
Products, 17 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 201-03, 212-13 (1979).
18. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1) (1976) (nine objectives specified to guide the FEA's
regulatory efforts, under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, all of which are
broadly drawn and inherently contradictory). See also Elkins, supra note 16, at 144-51.
19. Congress had a vehemently negative reaction to the FEA's hiring of former petro-
leum industry employees whose experience and knowledge would have aided the regulatory
effort. See The Relationship Between the Department of Energy and Energy Industries:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
1-161 (1978); Johnson, Why U.S. Energy Policy Has Failed, in ENERGY SUPPLY AND GOVERN-
MENT POLICY 299-304 (R. Kalter & W. Vogely eds. 1976).
20. See, e.g., Longview Ref. Co. v. Shore, 554 F.2d 1006 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977). The court in Longview described the plight of small refiners
who were unable to understand and comply with the regulatory price formulas. The Tempo-
rary Emergency Court of Appeals noted, "It is difficult, even for experts, to understand
these complex regulations, as is evidenced by the frequent correction, modification, change,
and clarifying rulings. .. ." Id. at 1023.
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was not staffed to provide the legal guidance necessary either to
ensure fundamental fairness to the firms under scrutiny or to as-
sure the public that their interests were being protected by proper
enforcement of the pricing regulations.
The recent decontrol of oil prices does little to alter this regu-
latory framework. Congress passed the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 1980,21 which is due to be phased out by December
1990,22 to absorb much of the increased profits that would have
accrued to oil producers from price decontrol. To minimize the
tax's adverse effect on producers' incentives, the Act imposes lower
rates on certain classifications of crude oil and even exempts some
types of crude oil.2 3 Congress also levied lower tax rates on the first
one thousand barrels a day of an independent producer's output.24
Thus, the tax rate on a barrel of crude oil now may vary from zero
to seventy percent, depending on the oil's classification under the
former crude oil pricing regulations-incorporated almost in toto
into the tax act-and the status of the producer. Since royalty
owners are also subject to the tax ,2 5 a producer's diligence in seek-
ing a classification with the lowest legally permissible tax rate is of
major financial consequence to lessors. 26 The Windfall Profit Tax,
The very definition of terms that are basic to the regulatory scheme took years to ac-
complish and was the cause of numerous lawsuits. A clear definition for terms such as
"property," "transactions," "posted price," and "base production control level," for exam-
ple, has been essential to crude oil price determinations since 1973; FEA rulings on the
proper meaning of these terms, however, did not appear until 1975 or later. See Beck, supra
note 5, at 1-26; Richardson, supra note 5, at 808-12; Trowbridge, supra note 17, at 214-17.
As another example, the certification procedures allowing tertiary oil to be sold at mar-
ket prices were so complicated that few producers participated in the program. DOE ac-
knowledged this problem and amended the procedures to ease the regulatory burden. Ligon,
Crude Oil Pricing: Current Regulations and the Shift to Decontrol, 31 INsT. OM & GAS L. &
TAx. 1, 19-20 (1980).
21. LR.C. §§ 4986-4998.
22. Id. § 4990.
23. Id. §§ 4987, 4991.
24. Id. §§ 4987, 4992.
25. Id. § 4996.
26. The following example illustrates both this proposition and the complexity of the
Act:
[I]f a producer discovers a new reservoir in 1980 on a lease with an existing reservoir,
the producer for DOE purposes may elect to treat the lease as a single property or each
reservoir as separate properties. This same election also is available for IRS purposes.
Because these elections are independent of each other, the producer, for instance, may
treat the lease as a single property for IRS purposes and as two separate properties for
DOE purposes. These elections might enable the production from the new reservoir to
be sold at uncontrolled prices and result in a lower WPT [windfall profit tax] because
of the impact of the net income limitation.
The significance of the DOE property determination becomes even greater because
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1473
however, not only embodies all of the problems inherent in the
crude oil pricing system, but it also adds new complexities of its
own.2 In addition, producers now face a new enforcement bureau-
cracy-the Treasury Department-that is likely to be less familiar
with the oil and gas industry in general and the DOE regulations
in particular. Until the tax phases out in 1990, price decontrol has
simply added to the regulatory maze confronting oil and gas
producers.
B. Natural Gas Pricing
Serious natural gas shortages in the last decade forced Con-
gress and the executive branch to focus their attention on the re-
form of natural gas pricing.2 After much rancorous debate, the
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) was enacted in late 1978.29
Since the NGPA also attempted to balance the consumer's interest
in low prices against the need for adequate incentives to producers,
strong parallels exist between the NGPA and the crude oil pricing
of the impact of the WPT. For pricing purposes, stripper-well oil and newly discovered
oil both are exempt from price ceilings; but, the WPT will be greater for stripper-well
oil not qualifying for the special independent producer rates. By effective evaluations
of property definition alternatives, producers may be able to classify oil production into
WPT tiers with lower tax rates.
ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., CRUDE OI. WINDFALL PROFIT TAX: TAx AND BusINESS STRATEGIES
20 (1980).
27. For additional examples, see Ligon, supra note 20, at 4-5.
28. The federal government has regulated the price of natural gas sold in interstate
commerce since 1954, when the Supreme Court held in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin,
347 U.S. 672 (1954), that the Federal Power Commission (FPC) had such authority under
the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (Supp. III 1979). The FPC's authority
also extends to end use controls and allocation of natural gas. Id. § 717 f. Thus, the OPEC
embargo of 1973 did not necessitate immediate congressional intervention into the natural
gas industry like it did into the crude oil industry. For the history of natural gas regulation
before 1978, see Breyer and MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of
Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARv. L. Rnv. 941 (1973); Nordhaus, Producer Regulation and
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 19 NAT. Rs. J. 829, 829-41 (1979); Comment, Indepen-
dent Natural Gas Producers, the FPC and the Courts: A Case of Judicial Intermeddling,
53 Tax. L. Rlv. 784 (1975).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. 1I 1979). The rancor and length of the debate pri-
marily were due to the large differences between the Senate and the House bills. The Senate
bill would have deregulated all new natural gas within five years and significant amounts
within two years. The House bill, on the other hand, would have established a permanent
ceiling price for new natural gas at the price equivalent of domestic crude oil and extended
this ceiling to the unregulated intrastate market. One study concluded that, in the first eight
years, the cost to consumers of the Senate's proposal would have been $52 billion more than
the cost of the House's program. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY AND PowER OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF NATURAL GAS POLICY ALTERNATVES 8 (Comm. Print 1977).
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scheme. These parallels include: Continuation of price controls on
already discovered natural gas to prevent windfall profits to pro-
ducers; 0 incentive pricing for newly discovered gas, for stripper
wells (to prevent their abandonment), and for certain categories of
high cost gas;81 eventual price decontrol of certain categories of
natural gas;3 2 and extensive recordkeeping and filing requirements
for producers."3 As a result, the NGPA has twenty-seven different
categories of wells with twelve different ceiling prices.' Thus, as
with crude oil, a well's classification can make a substantial differ-
ence in the amount of royalties that a lessor receives.
The NGPA pricing framework, however, differs from crude oil
regulation in several respects. First, certain categories of natural
gas are never decontrolled. 5 Second, the NGPA requires a more
30. Certain NGPA categories set ceiling prices based on either the just and reasonable
rates under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 or previous contract prices. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3314,
3315, 3316, 3319 (Supp. I 1979).
31. Certain NGPA categories established incentive prices to encourage certain types of
production. See id. §§ 3312, 3313, 3317, 3318.
32. The government has already deregulated certain categories of high-cost natural
gas. See id. § 3331(b). Deregulation of new natural gas, certain natural gas from new on-
shore wells, and certain gas sold under intrastate contracts is scheduled for January 1, 1985;
an additional category of new onshore gas is scheduled for decontrol in July 1987. Id. §
3331(a)-(b). Either the President or Congress may reimpose price controls on natural gas
after July 1, 1985, and before June 30, 1987, for a maximum 18-month period. Id. § 3332(a)-
(d).
One commentator has discussed the probability that the NGPA incentive prices will
raise natural gas prices to market clearing levels by 1985, which would obviate the pressure
for continued controls thereafter. See MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 19
NAT. REs. J. 811, 824-28 (1979). See also note 89 infra and accompanying text.
33. The NGPA requires detailed information on a well's geophysical characteristics
and production history in order to qualify for an incentive price. 18 C.F.R. §§ 274.201-.207
(1980). To qualify as new natural gas from a new onshore well under the NGPA's §
102(c)(1)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. I 1979), for example, the applicant
must present, among other things, a location plat that identifies the new well. The plat also
must identify all other wells that presently are producing natural gas--or which produced it
after January 1970-and that are within a 2.5 mile radius of the new well. Also, the appli-
cant must furnish the agency with a list of the deepest completion locations for all these
wells. 18 C.F.R. §§ 274.202(c)(2)(iii)-(iv) (1980). In developed fields this may entail checking
the location and depths of hundreds of wells. Charles Curtis, Chairman of FERC, has ad-
mitted that the information required for determining section 102 eligibility will be "a record
development task that will go on for a number of years." Impact of Natural Gas Prices on
Consumers: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979) (Statement of Charles B.
Curtis) [hereinafter cited as NGPA Impact Hearings].
34. See Erck, Current Major Developments in Federal Natural Gas Legislation and
Regulation, 30 INsT. On. & GAs L. & TAX. 155, 159, 178 app. I (1979). As of December 1978
maximum lawful prices in these categories ranged from $.332 per million British thermal
units (MMBtu) to $2.224 per MMBtu. Id. at 191-92 app. II.
35. All categories of gas that are not deregulated under 15 U.S.C. § 3331 (Supp. HI
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complex scheme for classifying wells in particular price categories
than the crude oil self-policing apparatus of recordkeeping, certi-
fied sales, and compliance audits. Thus, to take advantage of in-
centive pricing, a producer must file under oath specific forms 6
that document the legally required characteristics of each well for
which he is seeking an incentive price. Two administrative agen-
cies, the relevant state jurisdictional agency and the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission (FERC), must review these classifica-
tion forms for accuracy.3 7 Third, rather than delegating the
responsibility to an agency's discretion, Congress itself defined the
natural gas categories and set their maximum allowable prices.
This strategy alleviated somewhat the problem of agencies being
subject to the intense political pressures that they had encountered
in administering crude oil prices. 8 Last, Congress devoted sub-
stantial attention to the enforcement, compliance, and penalty fea-
tures of the NGPA in an attempt to avoid charges that the Act was
a sell-out to the gas producers.8 9
1979), remain price-controlled indefinitely. These include stripper well gas, as well as several
other categories of gas. See Pierce, Producer Regulation Under the Natural Gas Policy Act,
31 INST. Om & GAS L. & TAX. 99, 103-10 (1980). The categories of gas that will be price-
decontrolled in the 1980s, however, still must be qualified through agency determinations.
In other words, all gas will remain regulated under such nonprice provisions of the NGPA as
the reporting and record retention requirements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3331, 3371-3375 (Supp. HI
1979).
36. The oath required in filing for a well determination for natural gas produced from
a new onshore reservoir, for example, includes the following statements:
(1) That the applicant has made, or has caused to be made pursuant to his instruc-
tions, a diligent search of all records (including but not limited to production, State
severance tax, and royalty payment records and records of jurisdictional agency deter-
minations) which are reasonably available and contain information relevant to the de-
termination of eligibility;
(2) Describing the search nade, the records reviewed, the location of such records,
and a description of any records which the applicant believes may contain information
relevant to the determination but which he has determined are not reasonably availa-
ble to him;
(3) That the applicant has no knowledge of any other information not described in
the application which is inconsistent with his conclusion that the well qualifies for the
well category determination sought.
18 C.F.R. § 274.202(e) (1980).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 3413 (Supp. IH 1979); 18 C.F.R. §§ 274.201-.207 (1980).
38. See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra. As the Chairman of the FERC has
stated, "In short, the Congress has replaced the Commission in determining the balance
between the consumer and producer interests and it has placed that balance at the maxi-
mum lawful prices contained in this act." NGPA Impact Hearings, supra note 33, at 8. But
see text accompanying note 49 infra.
39. A proposed draft of the NGPA was circulated for comment and received vociferous
criticism from the FERC's Office of Enforcement. See note 44 infra. As a result, significant
changes were made in the NGPA, including stronger enforcement and penalty provisions
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Despite Congress' efforts to structure natural gas pricing and
compliance procedures to avoid some of the major problems that
had arisen under crude oil regulation, the NGPA has been criti-
cized as vociferously as the crude oil pricing scheme. Because of its
complexity, the Act was denounced immediately as unenforce-
able. 0 Legal commentators billed the Act as perhaps "the most
complicated and ambiguous statute ever enacted"'41 and predicted
that small producers might find the NGPA pricing and filing re-
quirements so burdensome that they simply would ignore them. 2
Industry trade journals are replete with diatribes against the mas-
sive paper work and regulatory costs imposed on firms under the
and the requirement of state and federal determinations of qualifications to collect incentive
prices. Chairman Curtis concluded that with these changes the NGPA could be effectively
administered and enforced. See Letter from Chairman Curtis to Senator Henry Jackson
(Sept. 8, 1978), reprinted in [1979] 1 NGPA INFO. SERV. 11 21-23 [hereinafter cited as Let-
ter]; Correspondence from Sheila Hollis, Director of the Office of Enforcement, to Chairman
Curtis (Sept. 7, 1978), reprinted in [1979] 1 NGPA INFO. SERV. 1 26. The administrative and
enforcement provisions of the NGPA are codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 3411-3418 (Supp. III
1979). Both civil and criminal penalties can be levied either for selling natural gas at a first
sale price that exceeds any applicable maximum lawful price or for violating any other pro-
vision of the NGPA. Id. § 3414. For a description of FERC's enforcement procedures and its
commitment to vigorous pursuit of NGPA violations, see Morgan & Garrison, Enforcement
Policies and Procedures of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 15 TULSA L.J. 501
(1980). See also NGPA Impact Hearings, supra note 33, at 8 (Chairman Curtis' comments
on enforcement).
40. See note 39 supra.
41. Moody & Garten, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978: Analysis and Overview, 25
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 2-1, 2-1 (1979).
42. Morgan, Application and Enforcement of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978:
Administrative and Legal Problems, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13-1, 13-11 (1979). This
response may be especially prevalent among those intrastate producers who were never sub-
ject to federal price regulation of natural gas under the Natural Gas Act of 1938. This group
could be numerous, since about 40% of the natural gas flowing before the enactment of the
NGPA was uncontrolled. Erck, supra, note 34, at 156. See also Leufven, The Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978: What It Means to the Independent Producer, 20 S. TEx. L.J. 19 (1979).
Leufven states that
[m]any independent producers, unfamiliar with federal regulation of gas sold to intra-
state pipelines, may consider the reporting and other regulatory requirements of the
FERC to be low priority and unworthy of legal planning, counseling, and fees. Rather
than stressing the civil or criminal penalties for non-compliance with the Act, counsel
for independent gas producers should stress that serious legal consideration of the pro-
ducer's present and planned operations may result in a higher maximum lawful selling
price than would otherwise apply.
Id. at 42. Counsel should also recognize that a failure to seek the highest lawful selling price
may subject the producer to a suit for breach of an implied covenant. See text accompany-
ing notes 140-53 infra.
Other commentators have predicted that the NGPA's complexity will force many small
producers to go out of business. NGPA Impact Hearings, supra note 33, at 51, 82-83 (state-
ments of James F. Flug and William W. Winpisinger speaking as a panel).
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NGPA.43 Judicial recognition of the Act's complexity and ambigu-
ity has already occurred, 44 and the Chairman of FERC has pre-
dicted many more lawsuits.45 Furthermore, several states have en-
acted laws that restrain prices below the NGPA's ceilings, which
adds to the regulatory burden. 46 Thus, two years after the passage
of the NGPA, the areas of uncertainty in legal rights and duties
created by the Act have come to outnumber the areas of clarity.
4 7
In spite of all the detail and definition that Congress imposed
on natural gas pricing through the long months of debate and com-
promise, Congress failed, to avoid the two basic problems that were
inherent in the crude oil pricing regulations-complexity and am-
biguity. The complexity arises from the very nature of the task to
be performed-regulating the details of an economically vital,
technically sophisticated industry comprising thousands of produc-
ers.48 The ambiguity stems from the inability of Congress to under-
stand all the details of the industry and also, perhaps, from the
purposeful delegation to FERC of those issues over which a com-
43. See, e.g., Om & GAS J., Nov. 19, 1979, at 207. In this article Sun Gas Company
stated that in the first year of operation under the NGPA, it had filed 4,500 pounds of paper
to receive price determinations for 1,500 producing wells at a cost of $1.5 million. Sun offi-
cials said that it had delayed the drilling of eight wells because of backlogs in state agency
approval proceedings. See also Thomas, Oil Exploration: Booming Again as Wildcatters
Return to Fields, Hous. Bus. J., Oct. 1, 1979, at 1. Thomas quotes an independent pro-
ducer's one firm rule on crude pricing: "If there is a cloud over it, we don't touch it. We saw
a beautiful deal, a re-entry on a gas well. But there was a question about the gas already
being dedicated, so we walked away."
44. In Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 470 F. Supp. 532
(E.D. La. 1979), the court stated,
A model of clarity the NGPA is not. It was assessed by the Office of Enforcement of
the FERC (successor to the FPC) on August 14, 1978, as being ". . . so complex, am-
biguous and contradictory that it would be virtually impossible for this Commission to
enforce it in a conscientious and equitable manner."
Id. at 548 (quoting 124 CONG. REc. H13108 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978)).
45. The NGPA will undoubtedly engender a significant number of court actions
before the full expression of the statutory requirements are defined and understood.
One must recall that this is a highly litigious subject and many millions of dollars and
substantial volumes of one of this Nation's most precious resources are at stake.
Letter, supra note 39, at 21.
46. Section 602 of the NGPA specifically authorizes states to restrain prices below the
federal ceilings. 15 U.S.C. § 3432 (Supp. II 1979). New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas have
done so. Pierce, supra note 35, at 113.
47. For a description of some of the many difficult interpretative provisions that face
producers attempting to apply the NGPA well classification rules, see Pierce, supra note 35,
at 118-27.
48. Complexity is enhanced because producers were subject to interim regulations
before the final regulations were promulgated and therefore must struggle with two sets of
regulations.
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promise was simply too difficult to reach.49
III. FRAMEWORK OF IMPLIED COVENANTS IN OIL AND GAS LAW
The law of implied covenants is well established, yet its doctri-
nal origins and continuing vitality and validity in light of changing
public policy are still a matter of some controversy. This part of
the Article briefly describes the development of implied covenants
in oil and gas law, the different principles that courts use to resolve
implied covenant disputes, and how these principles may affect the
use of implied covenants in the oil and gas business today.
Implied covenants developed in oil and gas law primarily be-
cause of two constants in the oil and gas business.50 First, it is im-
possible to specify in a lease contract all of the details of explora-
tion, production, and development that will be required of a lessee
in the future. Despite the marvels of modern engineering and tech-
nology, it is still not possible to know whether a drilling operation
will result in a "gusher" or a "duster." For this reason, lessees are
unwilling to commit themselves to a program of development in
the lease contract that subsequent information may indicate to be
an unprofitable venture. Lessors are also wary of express lease pro-
visions that might unduly limit the lessee's obligations. Thus, the
typical oil and gas lease passes to the lessee the exclusive right to
49. The area rate clause controversy is an example of this type of delegation. FERC
has experienced great difficulty in determining whether contracts in existence when the
NGPA became law authorize producers to collect NGPA ceiling prices through the opera-
tion of area rate price escalator clauses in the contracts. Literally billions of dollars are at
stake in this single unresolved issue. One authority states that the resolution of this issue
may not occur for at least a decade. Pierce, supra note 35, at 117. See also Ligon, Problems
of Contractual Authorization to Collect NGPA Wellhead Prices, 57 TEx. L. REV. 551
(1979); Moody & Garten, supra note 41, at 2-16 to 2-22.
Another source of complexity in this area is the interaction of the Crude Oil Windfall
Profit Tax Act of 1980 with the NGPA of 1978. I.R.C. § 44D(e). The difficulty that this
interaction poses for producers is well illustrated by the requirement in the NGPA that
producers elect-within 30 days after passage of the Act or before well drilling commences,
whichever is later-to take advantage of the provisions on either incentive prices or tax
benefits for § 107 high-cost natural gas; producers are not allowed to take advantage of both.
15 U.S.C. § 3317(d) (Supp. III 1979). The tax credit under the Windfall Profit Tax Act is
insubstantial; many producers, however, have overlooked the necessity of filing the required
election forms. As a result, they will not be able to claim the incentive price for high-cost
gas without legislative relief. Letter from the Texas Independent Producers and Royalty
Owners Association (TIPRO) to Jacqueline Weaver (July 21, 1980).
50. See generally 2 E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES §§ 16.01-.05 (2d ed.
1977); R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OI. & GAS §§ 8.1-.13 (1971); E. KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL &
GAS §§ 54.1-62.5 (1978); M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL & GAS LEASES (2d ed. 1940
& Supp. 1964); W. SUMMERS, OIL & GAS §§ 371-472 (1959); 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL
& GAS LAW §§ 800-899 (1980) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS & MEYERS].
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explore, produce, and develop the property and often specifies lit-
tle else.
The second constant is that the lessor's primary consideration
for granting an oil and gas lease is usually the right to receive a
royalty, which is a cost-free, fractional share of any oil and gas pro-
duced. If the lessee does not develop the property, the lessor wil
receive little in return for his grant.51 Under the typical oil and gas
lease, lessees bear all the costs of exploring, producing, operating,
and developing the property. Thus, while lessees and lessors have a
strong mutual interest in finding and producing oil and gas, con-
flicts between them are inevitable because they have different in-
terests in the cost factor.
These inherent characteristics of the lessee/lessor relationship
commanded the early attention of the courts to resolve controver-
sies between the two parties, and, as a result, the common law of
implied covenants was born. The Eighth Circuit's landmark deci-
sion in Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co. 52 is cited most often as the
embodiment of the principles of implied covenant law:
It is conceded, as indeed it must be, that the lease contains no express
stipulation as to what, if anything, should be done in the way of searching for
and producing oil or gas after the first five years; but it does not follow from
this that it is silent on the subject, or that the matter is left absolutely to the
will of the lessee. Whatever is implied in a contract is as effectual as what is
expressed. Implication is but another name for intention, and if it arises from
the language of the contract when considered in its entirety . . . it is
controlling.
The subject was, therefore, rationally left to the implication ...
that the further prosecution of the work should be along such lines as would
be reasonably calculated to effectuate the controlling intention of the parties
as manifested in the lease, which was to make the extraction of oil and gas
from the premises of mutual advantage and profit.
. The large expense incident to the work of exploration and develop-
ment, and the fact that the lessee must bear the loss if the operations are not
successful, require that he proceed with due regard to his own interests, as
well as those of the lessor. No obligation rests on him to carry the operations
beyond the point where they will be profitable to him, even if some benefit to
the lessor will result from them .... Whatever, in the circumstances, would
be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to
the interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required.5"
Despite general agreement with the reasons enunciated in
Brewster for implying covenants in oil and gas leases, controversy
51. Lessors also typically receive bonus, which is a front-end cash payment, and delay
rentals, which are payable during the primary term to delay drilling.
52. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
53. Id. at 809-11, 814.
1486 [Vol. 34:1473
IMPLIED COVENANTS
still exists among courts and commentators over whether the
courts should recognize additional doctrinal factors to expand or
narrow the application of implied covenants in oil and gas law.
Merrill's classic work on implied covenants acknowledges that judi-
cial recognition of implied covenants has proceeded largely because
of the peculiar nature of the oil and gas lease and the unique rela-
tionship it creates between lessee and lessor.4 Merrill also argues
that the lessee/lessor relationship is by its very nature tainted with
unequal bargaining power, and courts, therefore, should embrace
willingly the doctrine of implied covenants to ensure fair dealing. 5
Professor Walker, on the other hand, found that implied cove-
nants in oil and gas law were restricted in scope because these cov-
enants were implied "in fact" rather than "in law."8 Covenants
are implied in fact only when necessary to give effect to the actual
intent of the parties to the contract-not to promote fair dealing.57
Thus, according to Walker, the lessor's reservation of royalty as
the primary remuneration for the execution of the lease is the only
reason for enforcing implied covenants against a lessee.
Brown acknowledges that the courts generally have accepted
Merrill's wider view of implying covenants "in law" in oil and gas
leases. He, however, asserts that, as a result, "[p]robably there is
no area of contractual law in which one party to the contract is
favored quite so much as the lessor in an oil and gas lease. '8 8 By
emphasizing the mutuality of interests that bind lessee and lessor
rather than the confficts which might divide them, Brown argues
that courts should be extremely cautious in expanding the doctrine
of implied covenants into new and uncharted areas.5 9
54. M. MERRILL, supra note 50, §§ 1-3, 221-23.
55. Id. § 221. The author states that "[ilt must be borne in mind that lessor and lessee
do not usually deal on an equal footing, as two businessmen contracting at arms length. The
lessor is ordinarily of limited education and business experience, unfamiliar with the sub-
ject-matter of the lease." Id. at 468. Merrill, however, would not require the courts to justify
the application of the implied covenant doctrine with a finding of unequal bargaining power.
He believes, "It would impede the administration of justice if the courts were required in
each case to embark upon a calculation of the relative knowledge and of the bargaining
power of the parties. Thus the doctrine applies though the lessor is the government or a
large corporation." Id. at 469 (Supp. 1974) (footnotes omitted).
Kuntz adopts Merrill's analysis that implied covenants derive from the common-law
concept of relation and are implied in law, but he does not accept Merrill's additional factor
of unequal bargaining power. E. KuNTZ, supra note 50, § 54.3.
56. Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease
in Texas, 11 Tax. L. REv. 399, 399-406 (1933).
57. Id. at 402.
58. 2 E. BROWN, supra note 50, § 16.04, at 16-122.
59. Id. at 16-118 to 16-124.
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Much of Brown's opposition to judicial expansion of implied
covenants in the lessee/lessor relationship is directed at the posi-
tion taken by Professors Williams and Meyers, which would infuse
the doctrine of implied covenants with the public interest. Al-
though Williams and Meyers accept the traditional origins of im-
plied covenant law,60 they believe that courts should consider pub-
lic policy as an important factor in the resolution of conflicts
between lessees and lessors. For example, they emphasize public
policy considerations when advocating judicial recognition of an
implied covenant to explore.6 1 This approach marks a wide depar-
ture from the traditional viewpoint, which bases implied covenants
on the nature of the typical oil and gas lease and the relationship it
creates.
The infusion of public policy concerns into the private rela-
tionship that an oil and gas lease creates has also been urged by
those who want to redress the imbalance that Brown perceives to
have resulted from the courts' overly zealous protection of lessors
under implied covenant law. Professor Martin, for example, has ar-
gued recently that courts should be more cautious in finding a
breach of implied covenant duties, so that corporate lessees can
better fulfill their obligations to national energy development and
environmental protection without being constrained by a lessor's
interests in short-term returns.6 2 He contends that the law of im-
60. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, §§ 802-803. The authors argue that implied
covenants in oil and gas law are firmly rooted in the common-law contractual principle of
cooperation, which includes elements of both fact (the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties) and law (the ethical norms of conduct).
61. Id. § 802.2. The authors state that
[t]here can be no doubt that public policy favors exploration: witness the intangible
drilling deduction and the depletion allowance in the federal income tax law and the
discovery allowables in state conservation regulation. . ..
When parties write an open-end contract like an oil and gas lease, they commit to
the courts in advance the resolution of conflicts they cannot presently resolve. It does
no violence to this incomplete bargain that public policy should weigh in the decisional
process; and when the subject matter . . . is a natural resource as vital as oil and gas,
the public interest dictates that it should.
Id.
62. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market
Under Mineral Leases, 27 INST. OIL & GAS L. & TAX. 177 (1976). Martin, for example,
believes that a lessee should have the freedom to follow the Secretary of the Interior's policy
statements that support expanded offshore oil and gas development-even if this delays
onshore drilling on a lessor's tract-if the lessee's decision is made under the good faith
belief that more offshore drilling will forestall congressional proposals to take over develop-
ment of the Outer Continental Shelf. Similarly, Martin would immunize a lessee's good faith
decision not to seek a higher intrastate market price, if this decision is made to forestall
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plied covenants has "ill-served the nation""3 because it has pro-
moted both the rapid depletion of reserves and the wasteful con-
sumption of petroleum. Professor Martin believes that the public
interest in energy conservation demands the subordination of the
lessor's right to self-interested pursuit of private gain through im-
plied covenant litigation.e
The different perceptions of the bases for implying covenants
in oil and gas law may well influence a court's decision to accept or
reject, or to expand or limit, the operation of implied covenants in
a particular instance. Furthermore, the recent extensive federal
regulation of the oil and gas industry in the wake of this decade's
turbulent energy markets is likely to trigger renewed examination
of the proper role of these doctrinal factors in the application of
implied covenant law. The previous discussion suggests that three
different models are used to resolve implied covenant disputes,
which are as follows:
1. The equity model. This model holds that covenants are
implied in law primarily to prevent unfairness to lessors. The
congressional price controls on all natural gas.
63. Id. at 205.
64. Professor Martin's statement echoes the criticism of implied covenant law that
arose several decades ago when most states adopted conservation legislation, such as prora-
tioning, well spacing rules, and compulsory pooling statutes, and thereby wrought pervasive
changes in the oil and gas industry. Commentators argued that the public interest in conser-
vation, which this state regulation evidenced, had supplanted the philosophy of develop-
ment that had nurtured the doctrinal roots of implied covenant law. These commentators,
therefore, contended that implied covenants had been extinguished, or at least severely re-
stricted. See, e.g., Eberhardt, Effect of Conservation Laws, Rules and Regulations on Rights
of Lessors, Lessees, and Owners of Unleased Mineral Interests, 5 INST. OI & GAS L. &
TAX. 125 (1954). Eberhardt argued that the doctrine of implied covenants is inextricably
bound to the common-law "rule of capture," which courts adopted in the beginnings of the
petroleum industry. The rule of capture is the legal rule of nonliability for causing oil or gas
to migrate across property lines. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS 519 (4th ed.
1976). The rule of capture developed because of a lack of scientific knowledge about the
nature of oil and gas reservoirs, including the assumption that oil and gas reservoirs were
inexhaustible. According to Eberhardt, the growth in knowledge about reservoir mechanics
led to the passage of conservation legislation that countered the inefficient effects of the rule
of capture, with the coincident result that implied covenant law was completely abrogated.
Martin reaffirms this reasoning by using language in Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F.
801 (8th Cir. 1905), to show that this seminal case resulted from a fact situation concerning
the migratory nature of oil and gas under the rule of capture. Martin would limit the rea-
sonably prudent operator test to those implied covenant cases that involve drainage, and he
would use the standard of the lessee's good faith in all other implied covenant situations.
Martin, supra note 62, at 200-01.
65. Martin, supra note 62. Martin states, "From a policy standpoint, slow develop-
ment of known formations may be preferable to a more rapid rate of development that
would return the maximum short-term benefits to the lessor." Id. at 208.
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actual language of the lease may be and often is considered evi-
dence of the parties' intentions, but this does not necessarily
control the outcome; whatever is considered fair is determina-
tive. The measure of fairness springs from equitable norms de-
veloped in the common law that need not be manifested in an
express public policy.68 The model often presumes the superior
bargaining power of lessees: that lessors are handed a standard
printed lease form and are simply unequal to the task of pro-
tecting their interests through negotiation.
6 7
2. The contract or relational model. This model closely ad-
heres to the "implied in fact" theory and limits the courts' in-
quiry to what the parties reasonably would have intended given
the nature and purpose of the specific contract and the circum-
stances under which it was made. Considerations of public pol-
icy may enter into the inquiry, but only if the court finds that
the parties reasonably would have expected a particular policy
to serve as the method for defining those rights and duties that
could.not be expressed in advance.6"
3. The policy model. This model allows public policy val-
ues-external to the parties' expectations or to judicial norms
of equity-to influence the outcome of implied covenant litiga-
tion. 9 These policy values are most often ascertained through
an analysis of legislated expressions of national or state
priorities.70
The relative merits of these models are immediately apparent.
66. The cases that deal with a lessee draining his own lessor's tract from a well that is
located on adjacent property are good illustrations of the equity model. See Williams v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Millette, 221
Miss. 1, 72 So. 2d 176 (1954).
67. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. In its extreme form this is a "lessor
always wins" model. When applied more moderately, the model simply may amount to an
analogue of the standard rule that contracts are to be construed against their makers when
doubt exists about the parties' intent. The extreme form should be and generally is avoided
as thb basis of implied covenant law. When overreaching and unconscionability clearly exist
in a lease transaction, contract law can deal effectively with these problems without the
doctrine of implied covenants.
68. Economic efficiency is an often cited policy goal of the American private enterprise
system, but the parties to an oil and gas lease may also have expected that efficiency would
delineate many of their rights and duties. On the other hand, a public policy of reducing oil
and gas prices on behalf of consumers is most unlikely to have been within the parties'
intent in an oil and gas lease.
69. The policy model, in contrast to the equity model, may favor lessees rather than
lessors. For example, a policy favoring economic efficiency would clearly favor lessees.
70. Williams and Meyers point to the federal tax laws and state prorationing rules to
show that public policy favors exploration. See note 61 supra.
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The equity model allows the common law to function as an instru-
ment of justice; it may do so, however, at the expense of stability
in both the law and the parties' expectations from a contract. 1
The contract model is most likely to provide this stability, but per-
haps with unfair results. The policy model allows the common law
to adapt more readily to changing social and political values, yet it
may frustrate either the parties' expectations or judicial norms of
fairness. Each model, however, can claim to be fair: the first be-
cause it expressly considers equity; the second because fairness in
contract law is defined as that which most closely approximates
the parties' intentions; and the third because fairness is best mea-
sured by the norms that are expressed in the political process.
The choice of one model over another is itself a value judg-
ment that can influence-indeed determine-the outcome of a
case. 7 2 One result of the nation's energy crisis is that the equity
and policy models are likely to receive more judicial attention. The
extraordinary events that have occurred in the energy sphere in
the past decade probably will give rise to new facts and circum-
stances that are less easily placed within the parties' contractual
expectations. Without well-worn paths to follow, the courts may
veer more readily from the written words of the contract and base
their decisions in equity.
Given the importance of oil and gas to the maintenance of our
daily lives, the temptation to rely on public policy in making deci-
71. See, e.g., Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.
1964). In Southland Royalty Co. the court allowed the successor to a lessor's interest to
escape from a gas royalty clause that fixed the royalties due at $100 per year. The court
ostensibly relied on the principles of contract interpretation to give lessor the victory. The
dissent, however, saw the majority's rationale as a charade masking a decision based on
equity:
One is tempted to join in the majority opinion solely because of what, for want of a
better term, we sometimes call the equities of the case. The idea that respondents
could produce gas worth millions of dollars and pay as royalty only $100.00 per well per
year is as shocking to my sense of fairness as it is to the other members of the Court. A
judge would perhaps be less than human if he never experienced the desire to patch
up, within what he conceives to be the limits imposed by law, deficiencies in an agree-
ment which later turns out to be a bad bargain for one of the parties.
Id. at 70.
72. The models, however, are not mutually exclusive. The court in Millette v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So. 2d 344 (1950), for example, used state conservation
legislation as well as equity to support its opinion. Similarly, the implied covenant to ex-
plore may be supported on equity grounds, by contract principles-that exploration, even
without the prospect of assured profitability, is within the expectations of the parties be-
cause of the intrinsically risky nature of the oil and gas business-or from a public policy
standpoint.
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sions may be virtually irresistible.7 If so, a clear danger exists that
the law of implied covenants will become as unpredictable and ir-
reconcilable as the energy policy that it mirrors. It is ironic that
the three strongest advocates of factoring public policy into the
resolution of private disputes between lessees and lessors are on
opposing platforms. Williams and Meyers seek to induce more ex-
ploration by strengthening the lessor's hand with a perceived pub-
lic interest in exploration; Martin, on the other hand, believes that
the public interest in conservation demands that greater deference
should be given the lessee's business judgment to delay explora-
tion. The irony is inevitable because opinions of what "the public
interest" in energy policy demands today span a range of values
broad enough to attract polar opposites. National energy policy,
particularly in the area of oil and gas price regulation, is ambigu-
ous, inconsistent, and unstable. 74 This source of contrariety sug-
gests that courts should apply the policy model cautiously lest "en-
ergy policy" and "the public interest" become rubber stamps for
poorly reasoned decisions that ignore bargained-for expectations
and fair dealing between lessee and lessor.
Since public policy probably will be a factor in the resolution
of many implied covenant cases in the future, a threshold issue is
whether the pervasiveness of federal regulation in oil and gas pric-
ing has preempted implied covenant law in this area. Any sugges-
tion of preemption, however, should be rejected for two reasons.
First, the federal energy pricing regulations, as pervasive as they
are, do not expressly preempt the common law of implied cove-
nants. Courts have demonstrated a reluctance to attribute a pre-
73. At least one court seems to have surrendered to this temptation. In Superior Oil
Co. v. Devon Corp., 604 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1979), the court affirmed the lower court's find-
ing of a breach of the implied covenant to reasonably develop. As an additional justification
for its decision, the court stated,
We further note that at this particular point in time the public interest in encour-
aging the prudent development of oil and gas leases is particularly important. The de-
velopment of domestic sources of oil will reduce the amount of oil which has to be
imported and will thereby redound to the national interest by helping to reduce the
deficit trade balance and to render the nation less susceptible to economic dislocations
arising from political disturbances in foreign oil producing nations.
Id. at 1069.
74. See text accompanying notes 4-49 supra. Now that Congress has passed the wind-
fall profit tax and reduced the favorable income tax treatment once given to the oil industry
under the percentage depletion allowance, the proposition that "public policy favors explo-
ration" is not as irrebuttable as Williams and Meyers argue. See note 61 supra. For further
criticism of the Williams and Meyers position, see Williams, Implied Covenants for Devel-
opment and Exploration in Oil and Gas Leases-The Determination of Profitability, 27
KAN. L. REv. 443, 452-53 (1979).
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emptive intent to federal pricing regulations in other contexts, and
this approach is sound.7 s Second, the minimal effect that state con-
servation legislation had on the viability of implied covenants is a
strong precedent for the continuing role of implied covenants
under federal pricing legislation. Courts generally rejected the ar-
gument that this state legislation evidenced a new public ethic
which required the demise of implied covenant law. These courts
held that the conservation legislation preempted implied covenant
law only when the latter expressly and directly conflicted with the
new statutory scheme. 78 Thus, the doctrine of implied covenants
survived virtually unscathed and continued to serve its vital func-
tion of resolving disputes between the lessee and lessor under an
oil and gas lease.
In sum, neither the federal pricing regulations nor national en-
ergy policy should be found to have preempted the doctrine of im-
plied covenants.7" The general principles of implied covenant law,
75. In Intercity Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp., [1980] 1 ENERGY MNGM'T (CCH) 9722
(D. Minn. 1976), the court rejected defendant's contention that the federal petroleum price
regulations so pervasively controlled its pricing behavior that they served as a basis for im-
plied immunity from an antitrust suit for predatory pricing and solicitation. The court
found that the federal pricing regulations were not intended to replace voluntary commer-
cial relationships, and that pricing below the federally allowed maximum price was not im-
mune from antitrust scrutiny.
In Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 566 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 440 U.S. 192 (1979), the court concluded that an extension of FERC's jurisdiction to
encompass the physical activities and facilities of production and development was beyond
FERC's statutory authority and would encroach on areas traditionally reserved to the
states. The court thus held invalid a FERC order that would have imposed a prudent opera-
tor standard, which is derived from implied covenant law, on all certified producers who are
developing and maintaining reserves for delivery into the interstate market. In affirming the
continuing, preeminent role of state authority in these areas, the court's decision arguably
stands for the proposition that the state common law also remains vital.
76. See 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, §§ 865-867; note 235 infra. Somewhat
surprisingly, the issue whether state conservation legislation has preempted common-law
causes of action is still being litigated. In U.V. Indus., Inc. v. Danielson, 602 P.2d 571 (Mont.
1979), defendant-lessees argued unsuccessfully that the Montana Oil & Gas Conservation
Act of 1953 had abolished the common-law cause of action for breach of the implied cove-
nant to protect against drainage.
77. In certain circumstances the specifics of the federal pricing regulations will directly
contravene the application of a particular implied covenant principle, see text accompany-
ing notes 141-42 infra, but this does not prove that Congress intended the wholesale demise
of the doctrine of implied covenants. Indeed, it arguably affirms a congressional intent to
disallow only specific applications.
Implied covenant litigation over the federal crude oil pricing rules may conflict with the
congressional objective of centralized judicial review of these regulations. Under the Emer-
gency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(1) (1976); Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, §§ 211(b)(1)-(2), 84 Stat. 796 (1971) (prior to expira-
tion), a special national court of appeals, which was designated the Temporary Emergency
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which are founded on the nature of the relationship between the
lessee and lessor that an oil and gas lease creates-and embellished
with considerations of equity and public policy-still hold much
opportunity for controversy and discussion in their specific appli-
cation to the new federal regulatory framework.
IV. THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL PRICE LAWS ON IMPLIED COVENANTS
A. Introduction
The implied covenant to act as a reasonably prudent operator
in the Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co.7 8 mold can be classified into
specific categories that the courts have developed. The classifica-
tions differ somewhat among commentators,79 but there is general
agreement on the following categories:80
Court of Appeals (TECA), was given exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising under the
petroleum price regulations. One rationale for establishing this special court was that the
price regulations would then be interpreted consistently on a nationwide basis, which in
turn would allow for a coordinated response to the national emergency in energy. See El-
kins, supra note 16, at 115-19. This congressionally perceived need for consistency in judi-
cial interpretation of federal petroleum pricing regulations has been used to argue against
the application of general federal criminal statutes to alleged violations of the price regula-
tions, since this application could result in the circumvention of TECA's jurisdiction. See
Trowbridge, supra note 17, at 222-26. In this respect, private litigation of implied covenant
disputes over the crude oil pricing rules may result in a judicial interpretation of pricing
rules that is inconsistent with either TECA's or other courts' holdings.
Nevertheless, the benefits of centralized judicial review do not outweigh the arguments
for recognizing the continued vitality of the doctrine of implied covenants. See text accom-
panying notes 50-76 supra. Moreover, congressional dedication to centralized judicial review
of federal energy pricing is hardly absolute. The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, for
example, specifically allowed buyers who were alleging price overcharges in the sale of crude
oil or petroleum products to bring private enforcement actions in non-TECA courts. 15
U.S.C. § 754 (1976). In addition, judicial review of issues arising under the NGPA is not
centralized in TECA, except for the review of certain emergency gas allocation orders. 15
U.S.C. § 3363 (Supp. III 1979). Furthermore, courts that entertain private enforcement ac-
tions under the federal petroleum pricing regulations can minimize the risk of inconsistent
interpretations either through careful application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or
by requiring joinder of the federal agency as a party. See Mode, supra note 5, at 102-08;
Comment, The Private Cause of Action in the Enforcement of Oil and Petroleum Price
Regulations, 27 AMER. U.L. REV. 901 (1978).
78. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); see note 53 supra.
79. The different classification schemes of Professors Merrill, Walker, Summers, and
Williams & Meyers are summarized in 5 WILLAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 804.
80. While the classifications listed here are useful and have become customary in im-
plied covenant litigation and commentary, they do not define the limits of the general duty
of a lessee to act as a reasonably prudent operator. Thus, even though a lessee's particular
action or failure to act under certain circumstances may not fall into one of these four cate-
gories, the lessee is not immunized from a suit alleging breach of the implied duty to act as
a reasonably prudent operator.
Furthermore, classifications may overlap. The implied covenant to protect against
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1. The implied covenant to protect against drainage.
2. The implied covenant to drill additional wells once pro-
duction has been obtained. Some courts and commentators fur-
ther separate this category into two distinct covenants: (a) An
implied covenant to develop in proven territory, and (b) an im-
plied covenant to explore new areas.
3. The implied covenant to market.
4. The implied covenant to manage and administer the
lease with reasonable care, which includes the covenant to seek
favorable administrative action.
Three major characteristics of the federal energy regulatory
framework described earlier in this Article are likely to inspire im-
plied covenant litigation. They may be articulated as follows:
1. Revenues from oil and gas production are tied to statu-
tory price and tax schedules that allow rising prices (or lower
tax rates) and the eventual decontrol of several categories.
2. The pricing rules are complex, ambiguous, and have a
high cost of compliance.
3. The rules often necessitate administrative action to
achieve the benefits of higher prices or lower taxes.
The primary impact of these three characteristics falls corre-
spondingly on (1) the implied covenant to develop and to explore
further; (2) the implied covenant to market; and (3) the implied
covenant to seek favorable administrative action. This part of the
Article examines the relationship between each covenant and its
respective regulatory characteristic. In particular, this part dis-
cusses which issues are likely to arise, what precedents exist to re-
solve these issues, whether the precedents are persuasive, and, if
not, what alternative solutions might be available.
B. The Drilling Covenants: The Effects of Scheduled Price
Rises and Decontrol
Under the drilling covenants, a lessor seeks to impose upon his
lessee the obligation to drill a well, for the purpose of protecting
against drainage, or developing or exploring further an already
producing property. To the extent that public debate both before
and after the passage of the federal energy price laws has fostered
drainage, for example, may also include the duty to seek favorable administrative action to
secure a drilling permit. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 594 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979), afl'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981).
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greater knowledge among lessors of the potential profit in oil and
gas leasing, one can anticipate more litigious lessors to take a more
active interest in the development of their properties. Of course,
when present and projected price increases of oil and gas clearly
indicate that drilling would be profitable, lessees can be expected
to drill many wells without lessors' prodding.8 1 When the two par-
ties' financial interests or opinions on the proper pace of develop-
ment diverge, however, implied covenant litigation is likely to
arise.8 2 Litigation is possible even over lands on which lessors pre-
viously have brought unsuccessful suits to compel performance of a
drilling covenant, since a change in conditions occasioned by
higher oil and gas prices will often render the doctrine of res judi-
cata inapplicable to a previous judgment that oil and gas produc-
tion would not be in paying quantities.8 3
1. The Implied Covenant to Reasonably Develop
The implied covenant to reasonably develop requires that once
a discovery is made on the leasehold, lessees must continue to drill
and develop the property' with the diligence of a reasonably pru-
dent operator.8 4 To establish a breach of this covenant, the lessor
must prove that the desired development wells would be profitable
for lessee to drill. 8 This covenant presents the issue of the timing
of development, which currently is particularly important because
of the rising prices of oil and gas. Few courts have had to address
this issue yet, since the prices of oil and gas were fairly con-
stant-if not declining-in the years before 1970,88 and therefore
81. For example, four geographic areas accounted for almost 90% of the increase in
natural gas drilling activity from 1978 to 1979. These four areas contained gas that was
either deregulated or eligible for one of the highest NGPA pricing categories. Written State-
ment of Dr. Benjamin Schlesinger, Vice-President for Policy, Evaluation, and Analysis,
American Gas Ass'n, before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at the Informal
Public Conference on Gas Supply and Demand (April 2, 1980).
82. In Rush v. King Oil Co., 220 Kan. 616, 556 P.2d 431 (1976), for example, the court
found a breach of the implied covenant to develop based on expert testimony that oil from
additional wells might be classified as new oil and bring $11.00 per barrel, which would have
been a substantial increase over the price of $5.17 per barrel from then existing wells. Id. at
623, 556 P.2d at 438.
83. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 833.4. This possibility may be especially
likely with stripper and marginal wells, since they are given fairly high incentive prices
under both the oil and gas price regulations. See notes 5 & 31 supra.
84. For a general discussion of this covenant, see 5 E. KUNTZ, supra note 50, §§ 58.1-.5;
M. MERRILL, supra note 50, §§ 49-71; WILLIAMS & IMnEYERS, supra note 50, §§ 831-835.
85. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, §§ 832.1, 833.3.
86. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. (1978), at 607; STATSTICMAL ABSTRACT OF THE
U.S. (1971), at 335. The composite price of oil and gas in constant dollars was the same in
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little incentive existed for producers to delay drilling in the expec-
tation that later development would be more profitable than pre-
sent operations. The rapid increase in oil and gas prices since 1970,
however, and their expected upward trend under the price regula-
tions, make it easy to visualize a situation in which an alert opera-
tor would want to delay drilling to achieve greater profitability. In-
deed, one of the major criticisms of the NGPA is that it rewards
past delays in drilling and encourages producers to withhold drill-
ing or marketing of gas because of the price escalator factors al-
lowed for categories of new gas.87 These escalators are statutorily
guaranteed to be equal to or in excess of the inflation rate. 8 The
prospective deregulation of certain natural gas in 1985 also may
encourage a delay in drilling if lessees anticipate a price jump at
that time to parity with world crude oil prices.89
As an example of a situation in which a lessor and a lessee
might disagree over a delay in drilling, consider a lessor who brings
suit in 1980 alleging that his lessee failed to drill development
wells in 1975 that a reasonably prudent operator would have
drilled. The lessor proves that the wells would have been profitable
to drill at the then prevailing long term contract price of $0.50/
thousand cubic feet (MCF) in the interstate market, the only mar-
ket available in that field at that time. Using traditional implied
covenant principles, courts have often granted judgment for the
lessor under these facts and awarded damages or a conditional can-
cellation decree under which lessee must either drill the develop-
ment wells within a specified time or forfeit the lease. If lessee
drilled the decreed wells in 1980, they probably would qualify
under the NGPA for an incentive price of $1.75/MCF (in 1978 dol-
1971 as it was in 1946. OIL & GAs J., Nov. 10, 1980, at 177.
87. NGPA Impact Hearings, supra note 33. During the NOPA hearings, Dr. Paul
Davidson, Professor of Economics at Rutgers University stated, "The Administration-
backed compromise gas bill would legalize the increased value of gas in the ground. Hence
there is a strong incentive to delay production, for with the prospects of deregulation, gas
left in the ground is better than money in the bank." Id. at 101-03.
The NGPA contains provisions that disallow incentive prices for natural gas which was
withheld from the market prior to the passage of the NGPA for the purpose of obtaining a
higher or deregulated price. 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(1)(C)(ii)-(iii) (Supp. III 1979). This "behind
the pipeline" exclusion, however, is fairly narrowly drawn and does not apply at all to wells
that were not drilled until after the passage of the NGPA.
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3312(b), 3313(b), 3317(a), 3318(a), 3319(b) (Supp. III 1979).
89. See note 32 supra. If natural gas were currently priced at parity with oil (accord-
ing to its BTU equivalent), natural gas would be priced twice as high as its current average
wellhead price. PETROLEUM ENGINEER INT'L, Nov. 15, 1980, at 6. This statistic suggests that
some lessees might benefit if they delay drilling until decontrol in 1985.
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lars), escalated by the rate of inflation.90 Under these circum-
stances, the lessor has not necessarily proven his case. Lessee may
be able to show that a prudent operator would have delayed drill-
ing until 1980-or even later-to secure greater returns for him-
self. Under implied covenant law, of course, the lessee is not the
sole arbiter of when drilling should occur; courts also consider the
harmful effects of the lessee's actions on the lessor's interests.91
The lessor might argue, for example, that he would have had ac-
cess to the royalty cash flow much sooner if the well had been
drilled in 1975, and that the higher prices obtained by delaying
production do not compensate for this loss in the use of capital.
The financial interests of a lessee and lessor will often conflict in
this manner.9 2 How the courts should resolve this new source of
conflict between the lessee and lessor is the next problem to be
addressed. s
Because of the current pricing situation, Professor Stephen
Williams suggests that courts should require lessors to prove both
the likelihood of profitability for the development wells sought and
the likelihood that the drilling schedule which the lessor seeks
would be more profitable than development at any other time.9
Since this latter element imposes additional and rather formidable
90. This figure is the NGPA § 103 price for new onshore production wells that were
commenced after February 19, 1977. 15 U.S.C. § 3313(b) (Supp. II 1979). To accentuate the
potential benefit for the lessee, the example also assumes that the § 103 price escalator
exceeds any inflation adjustment that could have been negotiated in a long-term sales con-
tract made in 1975.
91. See text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
92. In some instances a lessee may be able to argue that the lessor cannot prove any
actual damages from the lessee's delay in drilling. One could certainly construct a mathe-
matical example in which the expected price of gas from a well drilled in 1980 is so much
higher than the price which would have been realized under an earlier contract that the
lessor as well as the lessee profits from delay. The lessor, however, is unlikely in this exam-
ple to bring suit for breach of the drilling covenant. Moreover, a fact situation in which the
time/price differential is so large is probably not common. In most situations the lessor does
not share the lessee's financial advantage in delay. The lessor also may experience difficulty
and incur significant expenses if he attempts to sell his interest and secure an earlier cash
flow. See Williams, supra note 74, at 443 n.1, 453-54.
93. The conflict is not entirely new. Some courts have recognized that they must bal-
ance the lessor's interest in having the minerals produced sooner by drilling additional de-
velopment wells against the lessee's interest-and the public interest-in producing the
minerals at a slower rate and at a lower cost by using fewer wells to drain the tract. See, e.g.,
Temple v. Continental Oil Co., 182 Kan. 213, 320 P.2d 1039, on rehearing, 183 Kan. 471, 328
P.2d 358 (1958). These cases, however, do not consider the additional complication of
delayed production being more valuable to the lessee than current production because of the
projected price increases.
94. Williams, supra note 74, at 445-48.
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burdens of proof on the lessor, an attractive alternative to Wil-
liams' proposal would be for courts to transfer some of this burden
to lessees who are better able to bear it. Clarity and judicial econ-
omy would be served if the lessor did not have to refute the supe-
rior profitability of an almost unlimited number of alternative
drilling plans. Thus, once a lessor has proven a traditional prima
facie case of a breach of the development covenant, the lessee
should have the burden of proving that his delay in drilling was
warranted under the reasonably prudent operator standard be-
cause the development plan he had mapped out for the leased
premises was more profitable than the lessor's desired plan. Thus,
in the illustration above, if the lessee showed that he had made an
annual study of the profit potential of the leased premises since
1975, and that based on reasonable projections of estimated oil and
gas prices-including forecasts of the effects of federal price laws
and regulations-these studies supported a delay in drilling to
maximize profits, then this showing might well rebut lessor's prima
facie case and result in judgment for lessee. 5 This type of planning
and analysis would demonstrate that lessee had taken an active
interest in attending to the leased property and that he had been
sufficiently diligent under the reasonably prudent operator stan-
dard to justify the delay in drilling.9
Although some precedent does support Williams' approach, 7
95. Other factors that courts traditionally analyze in implied covenant to develop
cases may also be relevant and could either weaken or strengthen the lessee's rebuttal. See 5
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 832.2. But see Williams, supra note 74. Professor
Stephen Williams argues that the lessee's successful rebuttal should result in a judgment in
his favor so that the benefits to society of economic efficiency are realized.
96. A lessee, of course, cannot delay drilling forever. If the lessee fails to drill wells
according to the planned schedule that was described in court, the lessor should be able to
bring another suit-without prejudice-for breach of the development covenant. See, e.g.,
Clayton v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 150 F. Supp. 9 (D.N.M. 1957). If the court determines that the
potential burden of bringing multiple lawsuits is too heavy for the lessor, it may want to
retain jurisdiction over the case until the wells that the lessee plans to drill actually are
completed.
97. In Blythe v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 271 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1959), lessee's plan to
drill a deeper test well in the near future defeated a finding of a breach of the implied
covenant to develop. Professors Williams, Meyers and Hemingway have collected other
cases in which courts have held that a lessee's planning and exploratory activity (short of
actual drilling) evidenced sufficient interest in the development of the premises to justify a
delay in drilling. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 50, at 374 n.32; 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 50, § 843.8.
Careful trial preparation is essential in cases in which the lessee alleges that planning
and information-gathering activity justifies delayed drilling. Compare Petersen v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 462 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Okla. 1978) with Vetter v. Morrow, 361 So. 2d 898
(La. App. 1978). In Petersen lessee proved to the court's satisfaction that a prudent opera-
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many courts would view this delay as "speculation" and grant
judgment for lessor.98 Authority for this result may have been
sound in an era of expected constant prices when a court could
easily find that a delay in drilling violated the reasonably prudent
operator standard, since lessees would have difficulty rationalizing
the delay in terms of greater profitability. Under these circum-
stances, a lessee's failure to drill a well that would be profitable
probably was due to incompetence, neglect, inability to perform, or
a vague hope that prices and market conditions would improve
sometime in the indefinite future. Neither equity, contractual ex-
pectations, nor public policy would justify holding the lessor's roy-
alty hostage to such a lessee. Courts, therefore, rightly condemned
lessee's failure to drill as an attempt to hold a lease for "mere spec-
ulation," rather than for development, which is the intended pur-
pose of an oil and gas lease. This situation, however, is a far cry
from the actions of an alert, profit-minded lessee whose delay in
drilling is rationally based on statutory price schedules and market
shortages, both of which foretell rising prices with great certainty.
No doubt this lessee is "speculating" when he awaits a price rise,
but a prudent operator might do precisely the same thing. Specula-
tion of this type no longer warrants automatic judicial disapproval.
Thus, past cases that give short shrift to the reasonableness of the
lessee's "speculation" are poor precedent for today's conditions
and should be applied with great caution.
On the other hand, just because the lessee's delay in drilling is
based on strong profit-maximizing considerations does not man-
date an immediate judgment in his favor under implied covenant
principles. The ultimate resolution of the conflict between the
landowner and his producer will depend largely on the doctrinal
model of implied covenant law chosen by the court. Professor Ste-
phen Williams emphasizes public policy in his argument that the
lessee should always prevail when he can show that his develop-
tor would have awaited the results from the wells being drilled nearby because existing wells
in the field were not very profitable, drilling costs were high, and lessee had participated
actively in 21 other wells in the field, which showed his diligence rather than "indifference"
to the development potential of the reservoir. In contrast, lessor in Vetter proved that the
well at issue would probably be quite profitable. Lessee seemed to agree, but argued that his
delay was justified because he was waiting for the results from a well he was drilling on
another section. Lessee, however, failed to produce appropriate geological or economic evi-
dence that a reasonably prudent operator also would have waited, and the court granted
judgment for the lessor.
98. See 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERs, supra note 50, §§ 842-842.4.
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ment plan is more profitable than lessor's.'" The policy objective of
Professor Williams is to maximize the value of the oil and gas re-
source to society, and allowing the efficiency-minded lessee to pre-
vail is the best way to achieve this goal.' 0 Williams' argument is
persuasive as an economics lesson, but it does not derive from the
traditional origins of implied covenant law, which are based on
contractual expectations and ethical norms of fair dealing. The
proposition depends instead on the courts' adoption of the policy
model of implied covenant law, and, as discussed above, courts
should disfavor this model in resolving implied covenant dis-
putes.101 Courts, however, could reach the same result under the
contract model and thereby achieve efficiency without having to
rely on public policy. The rationale under the contract model
would be that in a private enterprise economy the parties to a
commercial transaction such as an oil and gas lease can reasonably
be held to expect that profit-maximizing behavior will delineate
the scope of their implied duties, including the timing of drilling
decisions. 02 Of course, under traditional implied covenant princi-
99. Williams, supra note 74.
100. If society values oil and gas more highly in the future than it does now, which the
expectation of a price rise for these products evidences, then oil and gas should be produced
later rather than now to maximize social welfare. To economists, a delay in drilling and
production due to rational expectations of higher prices in the future is an efficient response
that maximizes the value of the resource to society as a whole and not just to producers. See
G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 91-102 (1966); Williams, Running Out: The Problem of
Exhaustible Resources, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1978). To noneconomists, however, the re-
sponse is usually termed "speculation" and is the subject of frequent opprobrium.
101. See text accompanying notes 60-75 supra. The nation clearly has not chosen effi-
ciency as the paramount goal of energy policy. The equitable concepts of protecting consum-
ers from large price increases and preventing windfall profits to producers have been impor-
tant legislative concerns. See text accompanying notes 4-27 supra. See also J. GRIFFIN & H.
STEELE, ENERGY ECONOMICS AND POLICY 243-53 (1980). Griffin and Steele show that the con-
sumer protection rationale for price controls on oil and gas results in a misallocation of
resources and social welfare losses of several billion dollars.
102. By using the contract model rather than the policy model, courts could avoid
what seems to be an error in one of Williams' arguments. Professor Williams argues that in
circumstances in which the lessor fails to prove the expected profitability of drilling and the
optimum time pattern for it, he should nonetheless be entitled to conditional cancellation
"if it can be shown that immediate development is better for society than development at
any other future time." Williams, supra note 74, at 457-58. The reason that the lessor may
be able to demonstrate a societal benefit-in the sense of maximizing the value of the oil
and gas resource-which is different from lessee's profitability is that the lessor's cost-free
royalty causes a discrepancy between society's standard and the lessee's standard of maxi-
mizing benefits. A reasonably prudent operator is guided by whether his share of the well's
expected proceeds after the deduction of the landowner's royalty is greater than the well's
expected costs, all of which the lessee must bear. As far as society is concerned, however, the
royalty is simply a transfer payment between the lessee and lessor and is irrelevant to effi-
ciency. Thus, a well may be unprofitable to a prudent operator, but if the royalty were not
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ples, equitable considerations are also relevant, and if a long delay
in drilling imposes an unusual hardship on a lessor, courts may
hold in his favor. The courts would emphasize the contractual real-
ity that a lessor's primary consideration for the lease is his royalty,
and therefore fair dealing demands that this compensation is made
to the lessor as soon as it is profitable for the lessee to do so, re-
gardless of the lessee's interest in later and greater profitability.10
If judgment for the lessor is granted, courts then must find the
appropriate remedy. Generally, the value of royalties that a devel-
deducted from the expected value of the well's production, the well still might be profitable
to society as a whole. Williams argues that if the lessor can prove this point, then the public
policy of maximizing resource values dictates conditional cancellation of the lease.
This reasoning assumes that the traditional lease form, which is based on a fixed frac-
tional royalty, is of no inherent utility. Since this lease form has withstood the test of time
for almost a century, this proposition is difficult to accept. Many alternative leasing systems
such as profit-sharing between the lessee and lessor, sliding scale royalties, and variable bid
royalties are available, but they have not replaced the traditional form.
The advantages of the fixed royalty lease are several. First, the fractional royalty is a
hedge against uncertainty for both the lessee and the lessor. If the entire compensation for
an oil and gas lease were paid at the outset, one party eventually would conclude that he
made a bad deal. If the land proves very productive, the lessor would feel cheated because
he did not have a share of the pot of gold; if the land proves to be barren, on the other
hand, the lessee will complain that he paid a large bonus "for nothing." Of course, risks
could be shared more equally between the two parties if the compensation were stated in
terms of profit-sharing rather than a cost-free royalty to the lessor. Profit-sharing, however,
essentially puts the lessor in partnership with the lessee. To check on the accuracy of his
payment, lessor must monitor all the financial records of the lessee, including prices, output
levels, and costs. This relationship not only invites lessors to "second-guess" the lessee's
business decisions and makes lease management more difficult, but also promotes litigation.
As Merrill states in his discussion of the relational origins of implied covenant law in its
attempt to assure "fair dealing" between the lessee and lessor,
[T]here are claims on the part of the operator to freedom of decision as to management
and operation and to be secure against unreasonable demands of the lessor, founded
upon the extent of the investment, the hazards of the business and the need for secur-
ity in property rights, which ought to be given effect so far as possible.
M. MERRLL, supra note 50, § 223, at 473-74. See also R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 50, § 5.1,
nn.20-27 (citing cases on the problems of accounting to nonjoined cotenants, which is a
situation that is analogous to profit-sharing).
The longevity and near universality of the fixed royalty lease show that its utility out-
weighs the efficiency loss which Williams emphasizes. See S. McDoNALD, THE LEASING OF
FEDERAL LANDS FOR FOSSIL FuELs PRODUCTION 95-120 (1979). While the courts are not likely
to adopt Williams' suggestion that leases be conditionally cancelled in the circumstances he
describes-because the underlying analysis is so complex and extended from both an eco-
nomic and legal standpoint-it is nevertheless reassuring to know that the court's failure to
adopt this standard is also the wiser course.
[Ed. Note: Professor Williams subsequently has changed his position to coincide with
the views that the author expresses in this Article. See Williams, Implied Covenants in Oil
and Gas Leases: Some General Principles, 29 KAN. L. Rnv. 153, 164-72 (1981).]
103. See, e.g., Temple v. Continental Oil Co., 182 Kan. 213, 320 P.2d 1039, on rehear-
ing, 183 Kan. 471, 328 P.2d 358 (1958).
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opment well would have produced had it been drilled diligently is
the measure of damages in an implied covenant dispute.10 4 If the
lessor, however, proves a breach and is awarded damages under
this measurement, he ultimately will receive a double recovery: Im-
mediate royalties as damages and future royalties when the miner-
als are produced. The better measure of damages, therefore, is the
interest on the royalties that would have been paid if no breach
had occurred, but the courts have rejected this measure as too
complex.105 Some courts have turned instead to the equitable rem-
edy of conditional cancellation to avoid the problems inherent in
the damages remedy.1°0 This remedy may have been appropriate in
the past, but today conditional cancellation would be likely to re-
sult in inefficiently timed drilling. 0 7 If the lessee refuses to drill
and the lease is cancelled, the lessor is free to lease to another pro-
ducer and obtain a new bonus payment, which might have the ef-
fect of eliminating the lessor's cash flow problem. The second
lessee, however, is probably no more willing than the first to drill
the wells on the lessor's desired schedule.
One possible solution to the remedy problem is to award the
lessor the royalties that he would have received had the well been
drilled earlier, but allow the lessee a credit for these royalties if the
oil and gas actually is produced later. 0 8 This advance royalty mea-
sure of damages would provide the lessor with his expected cash
flow without requiring the lessee to drill prematurely or to pay
double royalties.109
Providing a remedy that is fair to both parties in implied cove-
nant to develop cases is difficult, and the uncertainty about how
courts will resolve the timing conflict compounds the problem.
This difficulty suggests that the parties negotiating a lease today
should make every effort to draft provisions that either expressly
104. 5 WILLAmS & MEYaRs, supra note 50, § 834.
105. Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 151 IM. App. 102, 109-10 (1909), afl'd, 263 IlM. 518, 105
N.E. 308 (1914); Midland Gas Corp. v. Reffitt, 286 Ky. 11, 17, 149 S.W.2d 537, 540 (1941);
Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 434, 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1037 (1928).
106. 5 WILLuLms & MEzRs, supra note 50, § 834.
107. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
108. The court in Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 438-39, 6 S.W.2d
1031, 1039 (1928), suggested this solution, and the Supreme Court of West Virginia adopted
it in a marketing covenant case. Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W. Va. 484,
502-03, 128 S.E.2d 626, 638-39 (1962).
109. Advance royalties typically are paid under leases for hard minerals such as coal.
Some advance royalty clauses allow crediting the payments against later production royal-
ties. See, e.g., Buchanan, Near Surface Minerals, in OIL & GAs LAW FOR THE GENERAL PRAC-
TrTONER, at G-31 to G-53 (State Bar of Texas Institute 1981).
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address the timing of drilling or expressly protect a lessor's interest
in an early cash flow when the latter is important to him. Advance
royalty clauses, minimum royalty clauses, or larger cash bo-
nuses-each negotiated in exchange for a smaller royalty fraction
or for an express clause allowing the lessee's good faith business
decisions to determine the pace of drilling-are some of the possi-
ble solutions.
2. The Implied Covenant to Explore Further
The implied covenant to explore further imposes a duty on the
lessee of a tract that is currently under production to drill addi-
tional wells into either new, potentially productive strata or areas
covered by the lease that are as yet unproven and unexplored. 110
Whether this covenant is a separately recognized duty is a subject
of much debate.1 ' The debate, however, is largely academic be-
cause regardless of whether the covenant is given a name that is
distinct from the implied covenant to develop, the courts have rec-
ognized that the duty to act as a reasonably prudent operator may
in some circumstances require the lessee to drill wells that the les-
sor has not been able to show would be profitable."' The lessor has
the burden of proving that the stratum is potentially productive
and that a reasonably prudent operator would explore it, but the
lessor need not, and by definition cannot, prove that drilling would
be profitable. Since it is impossible to measure the value of royal-
ties that the lessor would have obtained had the exploratory well
been drilled, the remedy for breach of the duty to explore is condi-
tional cancellation of the lease.11
The federal pricing regulations are likely to foster litigation
over the implied covenant to explore. Sections of the NGPA and
the crude oil pricing regulations were specifically designed to en-
courage the exploration and development of new deposits of oil
and gas. An example is section 107 of the NGPA, which allows un-
regulated prices for certain high cost natural gas." 4 Lessors who
110. See generally E. KuNTz, supra note 50, §§ 62.1-.5; 5 WHLIAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 50, §§ 841-847.
111. The debate is especially intense between Brown and Professors Williams and
Meyers. See 2 E. BROWN, supra note 50, § 16.05; 5 WiLIAms & MEYERS, supra note 50,
§847.
112. See 5 W.LLAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, §§ 842, 845 and cases cited therein.
113. Id. § 844.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 3317 (Supp. I1 1979). One commentator has traced the legislative
history of this section of the NGPA. See Note, Regulatory Opportunity and Statutory Am-
biguity in the Search for High-Cost Natural Gas, 57 Tax. L. REv. 641 (1979).
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reside in or near areas of section 107 potential-such as the tight
sands of the Rockies or Devonian shale in the Appalachians-may
well urge the courts to force lessees to take exploratory action if
their lessees' drilling does not match the public accounts of other
drilling activity in these areas.115
The same problems that were discussed under the develop-
ment covenant can be anticipated in implied covenant to explore
cases, but these problems are magnified because of the already
controversial nature of this covenant. For example, the same con-
flict between the lessee and lessor over the optimal time for drilling
may arise, but since the anchor of profitability no longer exerts
stability on the law, an even greater risk exists that public policy
and inapposite precedent will be used to direct judicial resolution
of the conflict. The lessor is likely to advance pro-exploration and
antispeculation public policy arguments to support his position, 6
while the lessee will stress proconservation and efficiency consider-
ations.11 7 The contrariety of the policy model and the unsoundness
of its use have already been discussed.11 8
Williams and Meyers have made heroic attempts to give some
stability and predictability to the implied covenant to explore by
isolating and analyzing the various factors to be used in judging
the reasonableness of the lessee's conduct.1 " Nevertheless, this
covenant still defies rational standards for judicial application. 20
More often than not the factors that are used seem to be ex post
115. Section 107 price incentives have received substantial attention in the financial
press. See, e.g., Born, Tight-Sands Gas, Barron's, April 14, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
116. See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra. Professor Martin's fear that the im-
plied covenant to explore will become so infected with a pro-exploration policy that cases
will be decided largely on this public interest factor is a real one. Martin, supra note 62, at
189. Courts foreseeably could find that the incentive prices under the NGPA and the crude
oil pricing regulations manifest a congressional policy of encouraging exploration. While this
congressional intent is undoubtedly real, it does not justify encouraging exploration regard-
less of what a reasonably prudent operator would do.
117. See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra; notes 100-02 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
119. See, e.g., 5 WmLr ms & MEavRs, supra note 50, §§ 843, 847.
120. The search for clearly expressed judicial standards in implied covenant to explore
cases defeated even the dauntless Professor Merrill:
I think we shall have to give up the search for convenient rules of thumb. If there is a
dominant principle, it may be expressed best by the old maxim that equity looks to the
substance and not to the form. In the last analysis, victory will go to the party ivhose
lawyer succeeds in convincing the court that the substance of justice rests with his
client rather than with the adversary.
Merrill, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration in Oklahoma, 13 OKLA. L. REV. 249,
263 (1960).
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facto rationalizations for a decision which is based on the court's
subjective belief that the lessee's behavior either does or does not
evidence speculation.1 2 1 Since courts have ruled that speculation
serves no useful purpose and indeed is contrary to the intended
purpose of the lease, lessees who are "speculators" are held to have
breached their implied obligation to explore further.12 2 As previ-
ously noted, however, a delay in drilling for purposes of specula-
tion in the new pricing context may no longer reflect the lessee's
idle management of resources.
This antispeculation approach is evident in the primary im-
portance that courts have attributed to the length of time which
has expired since drilling in finding a breach of the implied cove-
nant to explore.12 3 Most courts measure the delay from the time
that the last well was drilled, although some date the delay from
either the time that the lease was executed or the date on which
the lessee took the lease assignment.124 How these measures of de-
lay are relevant-much less of primary importance-is unclear.
Production from old wells sustains many leases in existence today,
and no exploratory drilling on these tracts of deeper wells or other
high-cost wells has occurred for many years. The incentive to drill
deeper wells at a higher cost is a fairly recent phenomenon, and
cases that measure delay from the date of either the lease execu-
tion or the last well drilled are poor precedents in this new con-
text.125 Courts should measure any relevant delay from the time
when material changes in economic, regulatory, or geological fac-
tors become or should have become known to a reasonably prudent
operator. 2 6
An even better approach to the timing conflict in implied cov-
121. 5 WMLIAMS & MEYERs, supra note 50, §§ 842.1-.3, 847.
122. Merrill, The Implied Covenant for Further Exploration, 4 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 205, 222-29 (1958).
123. Indeed, in some cases the time factor alone seems to be the determinant of
whether the lessee has breached the implied covenant. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
50, § 843.1.
124. Id. § 843.1 nn.2-4.
125. Even in the past era of nearly constant prices, a lessee's initial decision not to
explore further because of an expected lack of favorable returns might remain prudent for
several decades, absent any other change in conditions. Moreover, the standard for an un-
reasonable delay is terribly vague; the courts have found unreasonable periods of time that
range from 35 years to 5 months. Id. § 843.1.
126. Some precedent exists for this proposal. In Blythe v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 271
F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1959), for example, the court measured the relevant period of delay from
the time that other operators became interested in potentially productive strata near the
lease.
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enant to explore cases is to focus on those factors that relate more
directly to what a prudent operator would do-for example, the
likelihood of profitability from further exploration and the dili-
gence of the lessee in pursuing this matter. Professor Stephen Wil-
liams has suggested that the same type of analysis which is used in
implied covenant to develop cases can be applied in exploration
cases, with the exception that the latter analysis must be specifi-
cally formulated in terms of probabilities and expected profitabil-
ity. Under Williams' scheme, the lessor must prove that the de-
sired exploratory well is expected to be profitable and that the
lessor's timetable for drilling is superior from a profitability stand-
point to any schedule which the lessee has proposed.127
This suggestion is basically sound, but in some exploration
cases a rigorous probability analysis based on numerical values
may be impossible to perform or too hypothetical to be valid. If so,
courts should nevertheless eschew the public policy model and
seek other evidence of factors that are related to expected profit-
ability and the lessee's diligence in pursuing it. Examples of this
type of evidence include the following: The existence of favorable
geological prospects in the area; the cost of exploratory drilling; the
number, depth, and location of other wells on the tract; demon-
strations of the lessee's interest in the tract; and the expected price
of any discoveries.12 In presenting this evidence, the federal regu-
latory environment and the lessee's knowledge of it are particularly
germane. A lessee's "exploratory" legal work to understand the in-
centives that the NGPA offers is as relevant to a determination of
diligence as a lessee's exploratory seismic work. Demonstrated
knowledge of the federal incentives to explore and their possible
applicability to the leased premises is evidence of an active interest
in the land's potential and, if the lessee's plans show that a pru-
127. Professor Williams gives an example of this type of analysis. Suppose a well has a
'/s probability of producing $4 million of revenues; a 2/s probability of $2 million; and a 5/s
probability of zero income. The expected value of the future income from the well is then $1
million. If costs are expected to be $700,000, then the proposed well looks profitable-one
that a reasonably prudent operator would drill-even though it is more likely than not that
the well will be dry. Williams, supra note 74, at 455. Even implied covenant to develop cases
sometimes speak in terms of expected profitability. See, e.g., Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82,
325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).
The burden of proof on the second element probably should be shifted to the lessee.
The lessee would thus be required to prove that his desired drilling plans result in a greater
expected profitability than the schedule that the lessor advocates. See text accompanying
notes 94-95 supra.
128. Courts in implied covenant to explore cases traditionally have utilized some of
these factors. See 5 WILLAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 843.
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dent operator would delay drilling until a more favorable time, this
planning may rebut the lessor's allegations of a breach.12
If litigants and judges in implied covenant cases carefully fo-
cus on those factors that bear on the expected profitability of drill-
ing-and the diligence of the lessee in maximizing that profitabil-
ity by calculating the optimal time for drilling-the law in this
area will be freer of ambiguity and arbitrariness.1 3 0 If, after such
careful analyses, lawyers and judges still wish to add that public
policy supports their position, then theoretically this will be harm-
less rhetoric and dictum, although the danger is obvious that it will
not be.'
When a lessee's lack of exploratory diligence results in a judg-
ment for the lessor, the remedy problem appears again. Damages
under any measure are virtually impossible to award, even if the
court undertakes a rigorous numerical probability analysis of prof-
129. Williams and Meyers state that "in general the courts are reluctant to cancel a
lease when the lessee has shown even minimal interest in exploring the land for new produc-
tive formations." Id. § 843.8, at 321. But see note 97 supra. Planning activity, however,
cannot justify holding the lease indefinitely. See note 96 supra.
130. The ultimate resolution of the conflict under traditional implied covenant princi-
ples will depend on the individual facts and circumstances of each case, as well as on
whether courts follow the contract or equity model. See text accompanying notes 99-103
supra.
131. See Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp., 604 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1979). In Devon,
Superior Oil held an oil and gas lease on 3,440 acres as a result of production from a unit
well drilled in 1961. Fifteen years passed without further development. In 1976 lessors exe-
cuted a second lease on some of the same acreage subject to Superior's lease. Superior
brought a breach of contract suit against lessors, and lessors countered by alleging a breach
of the implied covenant to develop and seeking cancellation of the lease. The district court
found for the lessors on the implied covenant issue, even though evidence supported the
inference that Superior recognized the worth of the lease and was holding it for a better
market. The court may have held as it did because Superior did not present a well-reasoned
argument supporting the profitability of delay. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, how-
ever, viewed the district court's result approvedly based on "the public interest in encourag-
ing the prudent development of oil and gas," id. at 1069, but it found error in the order
cancelling Superior's lease because no notice and demand had been served on lessee. The
dissent rejected the argument that the lessor must serve notice and demand, since "[o]nce
Superior made the decision to hold the lease for speculative purposes, it knowingly assumed
the risk that the lessor would terminate the lease." Id. at 1074 (Heaney, J., dissenting). To
be sure, a second lessee had drilled a new well on the premises that was productive, and this
fact undoubtedly caused the dissent to view Superior's defense that further drilling would
not have been profitable with a jaundiced eye. Nevertheless, hindsight should not guide
courts in applying the prudent operator standard.
The main point, however, is that the courts' and lawyers' analysis in this case falls short
of the type of reasoning that would promote predictability and stability in the law of im-
plied covenants. Reliance upon the "public interest" and "antispeculation" is too often a
shortcut to a judgment that lacks sound reasoning.
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itability.13 2 Conditional cancellation of the lease thus is the best
remedy available.
3. The Implied Covenant to Protect Against Drainage
The last of the drilling covenants is the implied covenant to
protect against drainage. To prevail under this cause of action, the
lessor must prove that substantial drainage from his tract is occur-
ring and that an offset well would be profitable to drill and pro-
duce. 3 3 The timing conflict between the lessee and lessor that is
typical under the other drilling covenants is not likely to arise in
drainage cases, since the oil and gas which belongs to both parties
is being drained and will not be available later on for production.
When the loss in drainage is less than the expected gain from a
delay in drilling because of rising prices, however, the same
problems would arise that were discussed under the other drilling
covenants.
Courts usually recognize monetary damages as the proper rem-
edy for breach of the protection covenant, and some jurisdictions
hold that they are the exclusive remedy in the absence of ex-
traordinary circumstances.13 ' As with the other covenants, how-
ever, this remedy may no longer be appropriate in drainage cases.
Damages for past drainage may be ascertainable, but the problems
of estimating damages for future drainage under the current com-
plex, ambiguous regulatory framework and unstable market condi-
tions may well cause courts to adopt conditional cancellation of the
lease as the proper remedy for future compensation. 13 5 The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court formulated an alternative remedy in a recent
case in which it overturned an award of lump sum damages for
drainage projected twenty years into the future. The court stated
that
132. See note 127 supra. The proposed exploratory well that the lessor seeks more
often than not will be dry, even though a prudent operator would nonetheless drill it since
there is a long shot that it will be profitable. Theoretically, damages could be measured by
the royalty share of the expected value of the well's future income, but this could result in
double recovery for the lessor if production is achieved later. Advance royalties are not a
good solution in implied covenant to explore cases, since only a small probability exists that
the royalties ever will be recouped from actual production. The speculative nature of dam-
age awards based on probabilities militates against their use.
133. See 5 Wi.Lxmis & MEYmts, supra note 50, § 822.
134. Id. § 825.2. Courts measure damages as the amount of royalty that the lessor
would have received on the oil and gas that was drained away, or the amount that he would
have collected on oil produced from an offset well. Which of the two rules is applied de-
pends on the state law.
135. Id. § 825.5.
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the market value of oil and oil products is directly affected, not only by world
economic conditions, but by unpredictable political upheavals and the world-
wide conflicts of nations, as well as by embargoes and tariffs. . . . These and
other factors are rationally unpredictable and are not so clearly foreseeable as
to be reasonably capable of supporting an award of damages extended many
years into the future. 6
The court remanded with instructions that the future damages
award be calculated on a continuing basis as the royalty on one-
half of the production from the draining well-without prejudice
to the lessee to mitigate damages by drilling an offset well. 18 7
C. The Implied Covenant to Market: The Effects of
Complexity and the High Cost of Compliance
1. Introduction
The federal pricing regulations are complex, ambiguous, and
costly to comply with, and they present legal risks that many pro-
ducers previously have not encountered.13 8 Although these traits
are relevant to all of the implied covenants,13 9 they particularly af-
fect the implied covenant to market, which may well experience a
revival because of the importance and difficulty of correctly pricing
oil and gas under the federal regulations. This covenant requires
that a lessee make diligent efforts to market oil and gas after their
discovery so the lessor can realize his royalty. The covenant in-
cludes the duty to exercise reasonable efforts to obtain the highest
136. America Southwest Corp. v. Allen, 336 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Miss. 1976).
137. Id. at 1301. The NGPA has eased the burden of estimating damages for some
cases, since the Act's well classifications determine not only the present price but also the
price escalators to be applied through 1985. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311, 3312(b), 3313(b), 3317(a),
3318(a), 3319(b) (Supp. HI 1979). The burden is only eased, however, if the NGPA regula-
tions relevant to the well at issue are clearly defined, and the courts can readily ascertain
which category the offset well belongs to.
138. See text accompanying notes 4-49 supra. One study estimated that the cost of
the FPC regulation of interstate gas sales was 7% of the base price of the natural gas.
Gerwig, Natural Gas Production: A Study of Costs of Regulation, 5 J. L. & EcoN. 69 (1962).
See also Thomas, supra note 43, at 1, col. 1. This article reports on new methods that small
producers are using to finance the large costs of regulatory compliance-for example, giving
a percentage share of the company's stock to attorneys and accountants for their services
and cost-sharing with other small companies or joint venture partners. Without these de-
vices, the article reports, regulatory costs are prohibitively expensive for small producers.
139. A lessee's decision whether or not to drill often depends on the expected price
classification of the oil or gas that might be found. When this classification is unclear due to
an ambiguity in the regulations, drilling might be forestalled. Similarly, when the cost of
securing data that is needed to justify an incentive price category for a proposed well's out-
put is higher than any expected benefits from drilling the well, the lessee might decide
against drilling at all.
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price possible.14 0
Even though oil and gas are subject to extensive federal price
regulations-including price ceilings-this should not bar the oper-
ation of the implied covenant to market. 4 1 A valid price ceiling
clearly precludes recovery for failure to market oil and gas at a
price exceeding the maximum allowed. The federal pricing laws,
however, do not require producers to sell at the maximum
price-or even at an uncontrolled price, if one is allowed-and this
leaves room for the operation of the implied covenant to market.14
Public policy also should not be used to prevent lessors from alleg-
ing a breach of the implied covenant to market at the maximum
lawful price on the ground that lower oil and gas prices better
serve the perceived "public interest. '1 4 The federal pricing regula-
tions cannot possibly be interpreted to embody a consistent public
purpose that favors either producers or consumers, lessees or
lessors. 44 At most, a court could find that the pricing laws are evi-
dence of a national energy policy aimed at securing a balance be-
tween consumer and producer interests that is specifically mea-
sured by the maximum lawful prices allowed under the acts. 45
This standard of measuring the balance accords a continuing and
important role for the doctrine of implied covenants in oil and gas
law. The question of why this doctrine will be needed to resolve
conflicts between lessors and lessees under the federal pricing reg-
ulations is the next issue to be addressed.
Since both the lessee and lessor benefit, often handsomely,
from obtaining the highest price allowed under law, conflicts
should be rare. Nevertheless, they may occur,16 especially now
140. For general discussions of the implied covenant to market, see E. Kurnz, supra
note 50, §§ 60.1-.5; M. MRmu, supra note 50, §§ 73, 84; 5 WuLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
50, §§ 853-858.
141. Federal energy regulation, though it may be pervasive, does not preempt implied
covenants in oil and gas law. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
142. But see McCue v. Deerfield Gas Prod. Co., 173 Kan. 302, 245 P.2d 1191 (1952) (a
minimum price order enacted for conservation purposes negated the implied covenant to
realize the best return).
143. See text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 4-49 supra.
145. See note 38 supra. In some instances, the pricing regulations may be applied to
favor producers over royalty owners. For example, exceptions that allow producers to price
above the legal maximum generally are granted only to working interest owners who can
prove that operations are not profitable at the maximum legal price. Royalty owners who do
not bear the costs of production, therefore, cannot share in the higher price allowed by
exception. See Ligon, supra note 20, at 18.
146. The complexity of marketing natural gas through long-term supply contracts dur-
ing a time of growing natural gas shortages and federal regulation of interstate gas sales
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that compliance with the NGPA and crude oil pricing and tax
rules is expensive, difficult, and sometimes legally risky. A lessee
acting in good faith, for example, may classify a well in the wrong
category and obtain a lower price than he could have received if he
had understood the regulations.147 Upon considering the complex
and ambiguous laws, a producer simply may refuse to file for a
higher priced well category because he views the risk of an enforce-
ment action by FERC or the expense of protracted litigation to
secure an interpretation of the rule to be not worth the possible
benefits. 148 Alternatively, the producer may decide that the cost of
obtaining data to file for a higher priced category, which can be
substantial,149 is too high to justify the expected increased reve-
nues, even though the category itself is well defined. Finally, a pro-
ducer may disregard opportunities for achieving a higher price be-
cause of ignorance, negligence, or an obstinate refusal to learn new
already has resulted in serious conflicts between lessees and lessors under express lease
clauses which base royalties on a fractional share of the "market value" of natural gas. In
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968) and Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co.,
329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964), for example, the courts held that market value was to be
determined at the time that the gas is delivered to the purchaser, not by its price under a
long-term gas supply contract. Many long-term gas supply contracts have price provisions
that hold the contract price far below the prices of more current sales of similar gas in the
field. Thus, the Vela holding assumed enormous import when natural gas shortages devel-
oped and the price differential widened between sales in interstate commerce under long-
term contracts regulated by the FPC and unregulated intrastate sales (as well as between
intrastate sales themselves). See, e.g., Lightcap v. Mobil Oil Corp., 221 Kan. 448, 562 P.2d 1
(1977); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). None of these cases is an
implied covenant case. Indeed the parties in Vela and Foster stipulated that the gas sales
contracts were as good or better than any that could have been made at the time of con-
tract. The distinctions and interrelationships between these cases and implied covenant to
market cases are important to note. First, cases like Vela arise under leases which specify
that royalties are to be based on market value; implied covenant cases, on the other hand,
can just as easily arise under "net proceeds" leases as under "market value" leases. See
Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), aff'd per
curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980). Second, courts in both "Vela-type cases" and in cases
that find a breach of the implied covenant to market must determine the actual value of the
natural gas at issue to award damages. This problem of measuring damages has required
lessors and judges to expend enormous efforts to determine the meaning and existence of
comparable sales in a market. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir.
1946).
147. A gas well may fit into several NGPA categories. It is entitled to the highest
priced category, but the state jurisdictional agency or FERC is under no duty to tell the
producer what the highest priced category is for his well.
148. See text accompanying notes 40-47 supra.
149. For example, in densely drilled fields-similar to the ones in East Texas-a lessee
may need to search the records of hundreds of wells within a two and one-half mile radius
to qualify for the incentive price under § 102 of the NGPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 3312 (Supp. III
1979). See also text accompanying notes 33 & 36 supra.
1981] IMPLIED COVENANTS 1513
tricks.150
The general elements of the cause of action that a lessor must
prove to establish a breach of the implied covenant to market, once
oil and gas have been discovered, are as follows: 151 (1) That the
lessee failed or delayed in selling the product, or that he failed or
delayed in selling the product at a higher price;152 (2) that a rea-
sonably prudent operator would have been able to sell the product
at a higher price;153 and (3) that the lessor suffered damages as a
result of the lessee's action. If the lessor proves that the lessee has
not marketed oil and gas from a well at the maximum price al-
lowed by law, this does not establish a per se breach of the implied
covenant to market.'" Courts look at all the facts and circum-
150. See, e.g., Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305
(La. App. 1979).
151. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYRs, supra note 50, § 855.
152. The latter is the most likely element under federal pricing regulations. It often
may include the lessee's failure or delay to seek favorable administrative action to secure
the best possible price. See text accompanying notes 227-324 infra.
153. If no market is available at any price or at the maximum lawful price sought by
the lessor, then the lessee has not breached the marketing covenant, even if the lessee has
never made any effort to secure a market. See Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.,
367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966). In Weymouth the court assumed that lessee had indeed lacked
diligence, but it nevertheless upheld the lower court's judgment for lessee on the ground
that lessor had offered no proof that reasonable efforts-if made-would have increased the
amount of gas marketed.
Implied covenant cases should be carefully distinguished from habendum clause cases
on the issue of this second element of proof of breach. In states such as Oklahoma in which
the discovery of oil and gas-rather than its actual production-satisfies the habendum
clause, diligent efforts to market the product may well be necessary to hold the lease in
effect, even if the efforts have little chance of success. To terminate the lease under the
habendum clause, the lessor needs to prove only that the lessee lacked diligence in seeking a
market; he need not prove that a reasonably prudent operator could have marketed the
product. In these states a lessee's long delay in securing a market because of regulatory
problems under the federal pricing statutes may terminate the lease under the habendum
clause, but it will not terminate the lease in a cause of action based on the implied covenant
to market. Nevertheless, a decision in one context may be persuasive precedent for the other
context. M. MERRILL, supra note 50, § 91; 5 WILLMS & MEYRs, supra note 50, §§ 855-
856.2.
154. See, e.g., Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1971). In
Craig the highest price in the field was not conclusive evidence either of a breach of the
implied covenant or of the fair market value of lessor's gas. The court found that the highest
field price was due to special factors, and that lessee's prices were in line with sales to other,
more comparable gas plants. Similarly, in Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d
61 (10th Cir. 1957), the court held that a lower price for gas was justified because of its
lower quality and the necessity to market it immediately to prevent its waste. See also Wey-
mouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966) (discussed in note 153
supra); Newell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 144 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1944) (no breach of the
implied covenant to market when no market exists for additional production, even though
the prorationing order limiting production was invalid); Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist
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stances surrounding both the lessee's actual sales price and the
higher price sought by the lessor. The lessor has the burden of
proving not only that the lessee legally could have received a
higher price but also that a reasonably prudent operator would
have sought such a price and could have sold the product at the
higher price. Thus, the same legal complexities and high costs that
face lessees when they try to fulfill their pricing duties under the
marketing covenant also confront lessors, who must bear the bur-
den of proof to establish a breach of the covenant.
With this background in mind, it is now possible to examine
the issues that are likely to arise in implied covenant to market
cases. One of these issues is what standard of care the lessee owes
to his lessor, and another related issue is the scope of the lessee's
duty to account for royalties owed. Lessors undoubtedly would like
a fiduciary standard to be applied to the lessee's accounting for
royalties in an effort to avoid the difficult burdens of proof that
lessors otherwise must shoulder. Lessees, on the other hand, would
benefit from a good faith standard in the pricing of oil and gas and
would like to find ways to avoid responsibility for marketing-for
example, reliance on in kind royalty clauses to negate implied mar-
keting duties.
One issue that is not likely to be raised, but which is highly
relevant, is whether the lessee should bear all of the regulatory
costs or whether he may allocate a proportionate share to the les-
sor's account. Conventional methods of apportioning these costs
between the lessor and lessee are not helpful in resolving this ques-
tion.155 Strong reasons, however, can be advanced for placing the
costs on the lessee alone. First, trade practices and customs sup-
Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980)
(failure to sell at market value may be probative, but not conclusive evidence of a breach of
the marketing covenant). Certainly, however, the highest price that a purchaser in the area
pays for similar oil and gas is pertinent evidence of a breach, and a lessee would be foolish
not to present rebuttal evidence that, in the lessee's particular circumstances, this price was
not the highest one obtainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence. M. MERRILL,
supra note 50, § 82.
155. Some cases analyze the cost-bearing issue in terms of whether an expense is "ex-
traordinary"; if so, it is to be shared. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 50, § 7.4(E). The meaning
of "extraordinary," however, is difficult to delineate. Merrill's general rule that "[n]o part of
the costs of marketing or of preparation for sale is chargeable to the lessor" is certainly too
broad a statement to be either true or useful, since compression and dehydration costs gen-
erally are shared. 2 E. BROWN, supra note 50, § 6.03; M. MERRILL, supra note 50, § 85.
Kuntz would have the courts decide whether the activity is primarily production, in which
case the lessee should bear all the costs, or whether it is marketing and processing, in which
case the costs should be shared. E. KUNTZ, supra note 50, § 39.4. It is unclear whether the
well pricing classification process is integral to marketing or production.
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port this view, and the case law indicates that lessees generally ac-
cept regulatory costs.156 Second, the very nature of the typical oil
and gas lease, which uses a "cost-free" royalty as the primary com-
pensation for a grant of exclusive management control to the
lessee, argues for placing the costs with the lessee unless the facts
clearly show that the lessor had agreed to bear a share of the ex-
penses. Despite the high cost of compliance and the uncertainty in
the law on this issue, lessees are not likely to bring this issue
before the courts because of custom and their strong desire for ex-
clusive control over the leased premises.
In the other respects noted, however, the costs and legal com-
plexities of the pricing regulations should revive implied covenant
to market litigation. Therefore, analysis of these issues, their likely
resolution under past case law, and the wisdom of the probable
results are discussed next.
2. The Proper Standard for Implied Covenant to Market Cases
The standard that courts generally use in evaluating a lessee's
conduct in implied covenant cases is the reasonably prudent opera-
tor standard.15 7 Substantial support, however, exists for the pro-
position that a more relaxed criterion should be used to judge a
lessee's performance in arranging for the sale of oil and gas. Wil-
liams and Meyers argue, that "[t]he greatest possible leeway
should be indulged the lessee in his decisions about marketing gas,
assuming no conflict of interest between lessor and lessee. '158 They
propose a standard of "good faith business judgment" for cases in
which the lessor complains that the lessee failed to obtain the best
possible market. 59 Professor Martin also argues for the adoption
156. Reese Enterprises v. Lawson, 220 Kan. 300, 553 P.2d 885 (1976) (lessee's operat-
ing costs included license and permit fees; indeed, the cost of the permit fees resulted in
lessee's failure to produce in paying quantities, and the lease was terminated). Producers in
the past typically have accepted the costs of negotiating sales contracts and complying with
state and federal regulations. The costs of NGPA or crude oil pricing compliance are diffi-
cult to distinguish from these types of activities, except perhaps by the larger dollar
amounts. Moreover, the Federal Power Commission expressly included regulatory ex-
pense-the cost of filing required reports, participating in administrative proceedings, and
other activities that state and federal regulation required-in setting producers' rates based
on costs. See Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976). But see Le Cuno Oil Co. v. Smith, 306 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), cert. de-
nied, 356 U.S. 974 (1958).
157. E. KUNTZ, supra note 50, § 60.3; 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 856.3.
158. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 856.3, at 410-11.
159. Id. The authors would continue to use the reasonably prudent operator test in
drilling covenant cases and in marketing cases when either the lessee failed to provide any
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of a good faith standard in implied covenant cases. He fears that
courts might misapply the reasonably prudent operator standard
by failing to look at all the facts and circumstances-particularly
the longer term public policy considerations and regulatory frame-
work-relevant to assess a lessee's conduct.'
Courts, however, should avoid the good faith standard in im-
plied covenant to market cases. No sound reasoning can distin-
guish marketing cases from other implied covenant cases. Williams
and Meyers justify the lower standard by pointing out that the in-
terests of the lessee and lessor usually coincide in the marketing
area and that marketing cases do not seek to impose the large costs
of drilling on the lessee.16e This rationale, however, fails to consider
that the two parties' interests often coincide in preventing drain-
age and developing the leasehold and that marketing expenses can
often be significant. In addition, it is often difficult to separate a
marketing decision from a drilling decision.162 The cases that Wil-
liams and Meyers rely on to advocate the lower standard deal with
specific.circumstances in which a producer is faced with alternative
marketing decisions, all of which appear reasonable.6 3 In this con-
text, the reasonably prudent operator should be free to use his
judgment in choosing the best alternative. Indeed, pricing deci-
sions made under the rapidly changing markets and regulatory
conditions of today require that the lessee be able to use his busi-
ness judgment to assess the risks and costs of alternative market-
ing strategies. The use of a less burdensome good faith test to
achieve this result, however, is unnecessary; properly applied, the
prudent operator test allows the lessee to use his business judg-
market at all or the interests of the lessee and lessor diverged.
160. Martin, supra note 62, at 201-05.
161. 5 WILIAMS & MEavRs, supra note 50, § 856.3.
162. In Gazin v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1962), for example,
lessee's decision to refuse the first offer to buy natural gas coincided with his decision to
continue development drilling in the field to establish proven reserves and attract a better
sales* contract. Similarly, the decision to drill in today's regulatory environment cannot be
made rationally without considering the price classification of the resulting well.
163. 5 WILLIm s & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 856.3. The authors primarily rely on
Gazin v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1962). In Gazin lessee refused to
accept the first purchaser's offer of $.10/thousand cubic feet (MCF) without a "take or pay"
provision. Over three years later, lessee negotiated a contract at $.15/MCF with a "take or
pay" provision. The court held that there had been no breach of the implied covenant to
market even under the standard of reasonable diligence.
Professor Kuntz also would use the good faith test in certain cases in which reasonable
minds could differ about what a prudent operator would do, but he admits that the good
faith test may well be the same as the reasonably prudent operator test when a decision
either way is "prudent." E. Kurz, supra note 50, § 59.3.
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ment to choose among reasonable alternatives, especially since the
burden of proof in implied covenant cases is on the lessor.164 A
good faith subjective standard, on the other hand, invites the need-
less opportunity to abuse the relational basis of the doctrine of im-
plied covenants by allowing lessors' royalties to be determined by
apparently sincere, but nonetheless negligent, efforts of lessees."6 5
Furthermore, the good faith standard is not as well defined as the
reasonably prudent operator measure.166
Professor Martin cites no cases to support his fear that courts
might not consider all the facts and circumstances of the regula-
tory framework that oil and gas producers confront. In fact, the
courts have considered such factors. A good example is Sword v.
Rains,17 in which the court held that lessee's delay of seven
months from the time of well completion to a sales contract was
164. One can, of course, find cases that seem wrongly decided under the reasonably
prudent operator test. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. McCue, 101 F.2d 111 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 564 (1939). This authority, however, does not prove that the standard is wrong.
The court in Hutchinson, for example, seemed to use hindsight to gauge the reasonableness
of lessee's marketing behavior, which is clearly an improper consideration. Thus, the use of
a good faith standard in this case probably would not have helped lessee at all.
165. Several courts have defined good faith to mean the absence of fraud on the part
of the lessee. See M. MERRML, supra note 50, §§ 125-134 and cases cited therein. In these
cases a lessee's error in judgment always prevails, regardless of how egregious the error is.
Deliberate bad faith that amounts to fraud often will be difficult for the lessor to prove, and
thus the standard affords little protection to royalty owners.
166. The definition of good faith in implied covenant cases ranges from the absence of
fraud to an honest, fair, and nonarbitrary business judgment, the latter of which i2 almost
equivalent to the reasonably prudent operator test. Id. When the good faith standard ap-
proximates the prudent operator test, retaining the latter standard is preferable to creating
an apparent exception to it, which would be subject to misuse by the courts. See, e.g.,
Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), afl'd per
curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980). In Amoco the court used the good faith standard to
measure lessee's marketing duties and quoted Williams and Meyers as support. In this case,
however, since a conflict of interest existed between lessee and lessor, even Williams and
Meyers would have disfavored the good faith test. See note 158 supra.
Professor Martin advocates that the courts should adopt a subjective good faith test
which requires that a lessee have a reasonable basis for his belief that he is acting prudently.
Martin, supra note 62, at 202. Martin equates his test to the "business judgment rule" that
courts use to measure the performance of corporate officers and directors; he argues that
lessees should have the same latitude as corporate directors in making management deci-
sions. The courts, however, have for the most part supplanted the business judgment rule
with a duty of care which they express as "that care which a reasonably prudent director of
a similar corporation would have used under the circumstances of the particular case." L.
LA'rm, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 272 (1971). Indeed, many have criticized those courts
that have used the good faith test for corporate managers because it allows directors to act
imprudently without liability. Id. at 274.
167. 575 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1978). The Sword case arose under the habendum clause
of the lease, not under the implied covenant to market, but the issue whether lessee's delay
in marketing was reasonable is the same under either cause of action.
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reasonable. The court placed considerable emphasis on the "rather
chaotic and uncertain market conditions" that had resulted from
litigation over a Federal Power Commission (FPC) order which
was crucial to the small producer's ability to sell at a price in ex-
cess of the then existing FPC area rate.1"8 Many implied covenant
cases have carefully considered the nature of the oil and gas busi-
ness when judging the lessee's performance as a reasonably pru-
dent operator.169 Thus, the courts will probably also consider the
difficulties and costs that producers face under the federal pricing
regulations to be an important factor in assessing the reasonable-
ness of a lessee's delay in marketing or failure to market at the
maximum price allowed under federal law.170
Assuming that the courts reject the good faith standard, the
question remains whether a fiduciary standard is the appropriate
one for the duty to obtain the best possible price under the federal
pricing rules. Brown makes the broad statement that "[iln the re-
sponsibility for marketing the production from an oil and gas lease,
168. Id. at 814.
169. See, e.g., Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1971); Chris-
tianson v. Champlin Ref. Co., 169 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1948); Nordan-Lawton Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Miller, 272 F. Supp. 125 (W.D. La. 1967); Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan.
351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952); Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 517 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1974); Town-
send v. Creekmore-Rooney Co., 358 P.2d 1103 (Okla. 1960). Indeed in States v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 161 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), the court found no breach of the
implied covenant to protect against drainage because lessee had reasonably anticipated the
prospective effect of the Texas Railroad Commission's field classification. See also 2 E.
BROWN, supra note 50, § 16.02 (discussing the effect of trade usages on the implied covenant
to market).
Most implied covenant to market cases deal with natural gas rather than oil because gas
is more difficult to market. Gas is not easily stored above ground and can be transported
only by pipeline. Moreover, gas pipelines require large capital investments and can be justi-
fied only if the pipeline owner has secure sources of supply under long-term gas purchase
contracts.
170. A lessee, of course, must be diligent in presenting to the court the relevant facts
that he claims justify delay or lower prices.
The strongest argument for the use of the good faith or business judgment standard is
that lessees should be free to assess risks and exercise discretion without the courts second-
guessing them because it is their own money and labor-not the lessors'-that is invested in
the business. Oil and gas operations in particular require large amounts of capital in very
risky investments; lessees who bear all the costs and risks must be able to manage these
operations as they see fit, especially considering the politically charged, complex laws and
policy that envelop the oil and gas industry today. Nevertheless, the shortcomings of the
good faith test, see notes 165-66 supra, outweigh these factors. If lessees feel that the rea-
sonably prudent operator standard does not give them the required discretion to adjudge
risks in the federal regulatory context, then they perhaps should negotiate for an express
good faith standard in their leases. If such an express standard is included in the lease,
courts should interpret it to require more than a simple lack of fraud, and they at least
should require that the lessee's honest belief in his own prudence is reasonably based.
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the lessee stands in a fiduciary relationship. 17 1 His authority for
this statement is scant, however, compared to the general rule that
reasonable diligence is the proper standard.7 Moreover, despite
Brown's broad statement, the context in which he argues for a
fiduciary standard is fairly narrow-a lessee's refusal to pay royal-
ties that already had accrued on past oil and gas production.17 .
This situation is readily distinguishable from those implied cove-
nant cases that deal with a lessee's business decisions about how
and when to market oil and gas in today's regulatory environment.
If the courts were to apply a fiduciary standard to such complex
and intricate marketing decisions, they would create a gross imbal-
ance in implied covenant law because the standard would not allow
a court to consider the costs and risks that are inherent in the
lessee's marketing responsibility.
3. The Duty to Account
As previously noted, the lessor ordinarily bears the burden of
proof in implied covenant cases, which includes both the burden of
going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion.17 4
The dearth of decisions that shift this burden in marketing cases
indicates that most courts accept this rule. Some commentators ar-
gue that certain "special circumstances" should trigger a shift in
the burden of proof,175 but generally the courts show firm alle-
giance to lessor's bearing the burden in marketing cases. This alle-
giance follows the general rule that the party with the burden of
pleading a fact generally has the burden of proving it as well; it is
based on the rationale that whoever seeks to change the current
state of affairs naturally should expect to bear the risk of failure of
proof.17' The rule also comports with the well-established principle
171. 2 E. BROWN, supra note 50, § 16.02(4)D, at 16-83 to 16-89.
172. Id. at 16-77, 16-83 to 16-85. The courts expressly have rejected the fiduciary stan-
dard in implied covenant to market cases. See, e.g., Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 435
F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1971). Contra, Young v. West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit, 275 P.2d 304
(Okla. 1954), appeal dismissed, 349 U.S. 909 (1955).
173. 2 E. BROWN, supra note 50, § 16.02(4)D, at 16-85 to 16-89.
174. M. MERRILL, supra note 50, § 91; 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 856.
175. Williams and Meyers, for example, advocate such a shift when shut-in royalty
payments are supporting the lease and also when a lessee's failure to market oil and gas
from the lessor's land results in the lessee himself draining the land by production from an
adjacent tract. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, §§ 856, 856.2. This author suggests a
shift in certain drilling covenant cases to economize the court's time and relieve the lessor of
additional burdens of proof when he has presented a prima facie case. See text accompany-
ing notes 94-95 supra.
176. C. MCCORMICK, McCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337 (2d ed.
1981] 1519
1520 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1473
that assigns the burden of proof according to an estimate of the
probabilities of the situation. Under this principle, the burden is
placed on the party who is contending that the more unusual event
has occurred. 117 Generally, the lessee can be expected to sell at the
highest possible price, so the burden of proving that the price is
too low is placed on the lessor. 17 "8 This placement usually results
even though lessees may have better access to information and su-
perior knowledge about the best price possible under the regula-
tions and market conditions,'179 and even though lessor's burden
may be a difficult one. 80
E. Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
177. Id.
178. Indeed, Merrill argues that the lessor's proof of the failure to market with due
diligence must be clear, since presumably the lessee will do his best to obtain the highest
possible price. M. MERRILL, supra note 50, § 91.
This placement of the burden of proof comports best with the contract model of im-
plied covenants in its reliance on the natural expectations of the parties. Under the typical
lease, the lessor has recognized the lessee's superior expertise and has agreed to accept the
lessee's exclusive control of the property in exchange for a cost-free royalty. The lessor is
thus free of the burdens of running a business, and the lessee is free of this source of "back-
seat driving." The implied covenant doctrine is a guard against the lessee's abusive or negli-
gent use of the exclusive power over the producing property, but it is not a device that is
designed to make the lessor a partner in the business. If the lessor wants to control the
operation, then the lessor should have to prove that the performance could be better.
179. Lessees ordinarily will have the books and records on their own well depths, spac-
ings, and completion dates, and they will be more familiar with similar information on other
wells in the area and business and marketing conditions, including the regulatory
environment.
Courts seldom have held that one party's superior knowledge is the controlling reason
for assigning the burdens of proof. MCCORMICK, supra note 176, § 337. Expanded discovery
procedures have weakened this reason for assigning the burden even further. Nevertheless,
courts that embrace the equity model of implied covenants may feel that fair dealing re-
quires lessees to bear the burden of going forward with the evidence because they have
superior knowledge. See text accompanying notes 189-98 infra.
180. Lessors who pursue a breach of covenant action for failure to price at the maxi-
mum allowed by law must prove all the facts required to classify the well at the highest
possible price, as well as prove that any ambiguities in the law would be resolved to allow
the higher price sought. The expense and difficulty of proving these matters may be the very
reascn that a lessee did not seek the well classification himself; indeed, these problems ulti-
mately may absolve the lessee from a breach of any duty. The lessor also must prove that a
reasonably prudent operator could sell the oil and gas at the higher price, and this proof
requires a solid knowledge of marketing conditions in the area.
Lessors encounter great difficulties of proof in drilling covenant cases. These difficulties,
however, have not persuaded the courts to shift the burden of proof. Thus, lessors in these
cases must learn the intricacies of petroleum geology and engineering-subjects that are
difficult to master and typically more familiar to lessees. This issue of who should bear the
burden of proof has arisen in cases brought by lessors alleging that insufficient royalties
have been paid to them under the express terms of the lease royalty clause. These lessors, in
the absence of any actual transactions by the lessee based on the "market price" or "market
value" that was contracted for in the royalty clause, have had to prove the actual market
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When presented with this situation, lessors may seek to cir-
cumvent the difficulties of proving a breach of the implied cove-
nant to market by alleging that the covenant includes a duty to
account. This duty, according to lessors, would have the following
elements: (1) That the lessee is expressly obligated to pay the les-
sor the fraction of royalty specified in the lease, which impliedly
should be the best that a reasonably prudent operator could ob-
tain; (2) that the lessee must account for this amount; and (3) that
in the accounting the lessee must provide the lessor upon request
with all the relevant records and information that are required to
assure the lessor of the accuracy of the payment. In this way, les-
sors seek indirectly to impose a fiduciary standard upon the lessee
through the duty to account rather than through the broader im-
plied covenant to market and thereby avoid the burden of proof in
implied covenant actions.181
A duty to account is unquestionably an element of the duty to
market.18 2 The parameters of this duty, however, are unclear. Case
law on the subject is minimal probably because recordkeeping in
the past has had little relation to the lessee's ability to sell the
value of the natural gas sold from evidence of other similar sales. Despite the difficulty and
high cost of such proof, the courts generally have required lessors to bear this burden, al-
though not without sympathy for the lessor. See text accompanying notes 189-98 infra.
181. The relationship between the lessor's suit for an accounting and the assignment
of burdens of proof is aptly demonstrated in Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 432 F.2d
165 (5th Cir. 1970). In Williams lessors brought suit under the implied covenant to protect
against drainage and demanded an accounting-for the value of the royalty oil drained
away-rather than damages (in the amount of royalty oil that an offset well would have
produced). The court in Williams, however, refused to allow an action for an accounting and
stated that "[s]ince an order of accounting would require Humble [the defendant-lessee] to
determine the amount of oil and gas drained, it is inconsistent with the rigorous burden of
pleading and proof that Breaux places on aggrieved landowners." Id. at 171. The court,
however, noted in dictum that an action for accounting would lie whenever a lessee unjusti-
fiably fails to pay his lessor royalties on oil produced from wells on a lessor's land. This is
the same situation in which Brown argues that a fiduciary standard should be applied
against the lessee. See text accompanying notes 171-73 supra. This situation, however, is
clearly distinguishable from the cause of action discussed in this Article, which assumes that
the lessee is willing to pay royalties to the lessor on all producing wells, but the lessor alleges
that the price received for the product is insufficient. In this cause of action, the lessee is not
withholding royalties in an attempt to coerce the lessor to accept a certain royalty formula-
tion. To avoid possible accounting actions, however, the lessee should be careful to place
disputed royalty funds in escrow.
It should be noted that the court in Williams refused to grant an accounting and allow
the burden of proof to shift, even though the case dealt with lessee's drainage of his own
lessor's tract, a situation which Williams and Meyers classify as a "special circumstance"
that merits such a shift. 5 WILLIAMS & MaYEns, supra note 50, § 824.2, at 147.
182. M. MERRILL, supra note 50, § 88.
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product at the best possible price. 1 3 Therefore, recordkeeping and
accounting have been relatively simple. As already noted, however,
the federal pricing regulations now require extensive data collec-
tion and recordkeeping on the lessee's wells-and on wells in the
surrounding area that belong to other operators-to qualify for in-
centive prices." 4 Further case law is sure to arise from these re-
quirements, which should define more clearly the scope of the duty
to account.
Case law to date on the duty to account largely has dealt with
the duty to measure the product accurately and to pay the royal-
ties due within a reasonable time.8 5 Several cases also hold that
the lessee must keep adequate books and records to enable the ac-
count to be accurately determined."8 ' When applying these narrow
principles to the new regulatory context, the duty to account
should require the lessee, at a minimum, to keep accurate records
of the physical characteristics and sales proceeds of wells under his
control. For example, if a delay or failure in classifying a well for
the incentive price that is available to NGPA stripper wells was
due to the lessee's failure to keep accurate records of the well's
output levels, a court ordinarily would find a breach of the implied
covenant to market.18 7
Whether the duty to account can be expanded to require the
183. The scarcity of cases on the implied duty to account also may be due to express
provisions in many leases concerning the records to be kept and the lessor's access to them.
See 4 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 671.6.
184. See text accompanying notes 33-43 supra.
185. M. MERRILL, supra note 50, § 88.
186. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson, 155 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1946). In Johnson the
court, on the first motion for rehearing, stated that "as the accounting party [lessee] ought
to have a record of [the royalty proceeds] or bear the inconvenience of its failure to keep it."
Id. at 194. See also Harding v. Cameron, 220 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
Some courts also have held that the lessee must provide lessors with full information
about the condition of the wells and should allow the lessor to check reports that are rele-
vant to determining the accuracy of the royalty payments. Blackstock Oil Co. v. Caston, 184
Okla: 489, 87 P.2d 1087 (1939); Lamp v. Locke, 89 W. Va. 138, 108 S.E. 889 (1921). Indeed,
the difficulty of determining whether the lessee has complied with the prudent operator
standard requires that the lessor be given reasonable access to relevant information in the
lessee's possession. The lessor, however, must bear the expense of his own tests and checks.
Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 117 Kan. 25, 230 P. 91 (1924). Since this record search
often is quite costly, the access to information is little solace for a lessor who is attempting
to verify the accuracy of a well's classification under the federal regulatory scheme.
187. Stripper well natural gas receives one of the highest NGPA incentive prices. 15
U.S.C. § 3318 (Supp. III 1979). Wells qualify for this category only if the well's production
rate did not exceed an average of 60 MCF per production day during the preceding 90-day
period. Production in excess of 60 MCF per day may continue to qualify as stripper well gas
if the increase was due to enhanced recovery techniques.
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lessee to provide the lessor with data about the market value of oil
and gas from other wells in the area, as well as the physical and
legal characteristics of these wells, is still unresolved. If it can, this
duty effectively would shift much of the burden of proof to the
lessee. An example that would arise from this expanded duty is
whether the lessee must provide the lessor with records which
show that the well in question does not qualify for a higher section
102 price because it is not one thousand feet deeper than any other
well within a two and one-half mile radius.'88 Merrill concludes
that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Johnson'89 imposed such an expanded duty to account when it
stated,
It was the lessee's duty to know and to report truly the volume of gas it was
taking out, and the disposition made of it, and the net proceeds if sold, for
the facts were within its own knowledge. This duty greatly reduces the dili-
gence necessary on the lessor's part to inform himself.190
This language, however, does not expand the duty of the lessee to
provide additional information beyond the facts concerning the
proceeds from the lessor's particular well. The holding in the case
still clearly requires that the lessor bear the burden of proof and
use the rules of procedure and discovery to extract additional in-
formation. 19 The court, on the first motion for rehearing, expressly
noted that the market value of the product at issue was a matter
which was equally accessible to both parties. 92
Thus, the case law simply does not support a broad fiduciary
duty to account. 93 This result is both sound and in keeping with
the doctrinal principles of implied covenant law, which considers
the lessee's costs and risks in assessing whether he has acted as a
188. This is the type of data required for new onshore wells under § 102(c)(1)(B) of
the NGPA, 15 U.S.C. § 3312(c)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1979).
189. 155 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1946). This case dealt with allegations of insufficient pay-
ment of royalties under the lease's express royalty clause-rather than under an implied
covenant-but the same issues of the duty to account and bear the burden of proof arise in
both instances. After quoting Johnson, Merrill argues that the basis for a fiduciary obliga-
tion to account for proper royalties lies in the implied covenant concept. M. MERRMLL, supra
note 50, § 88 (Supp. 1964). The sections of his treatise cited to support this statement,
however, do not use a fiduciary standard. Indeed, Merrill's text argues vigorously for the
reasonably prudent operator standard. Id. §§ 145, 223.
190. 155 F.2d at 191.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 194. The Fifth Circuit's statements on the burden of proof issue, however,
are dicta, since the court below had made no rulings on this issue, and the lessor did not
raise it at the appellate level.
193. A fiduciary duty would exist only in the instance in which the lessee is unjustifi-
ably refusing to pay accrued royalties. See text accompanying notes 171-73 supra.
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prudent operator. The cost of obtaining the information that is
necessary to qualify for certain price categories-including the cost
of legal proceedings to resolve ambiguities in the definitions of
pricing categories-should be a relevant factor in judging the
lessee's actions under the duty to account. Undoubtedly, the new
regulatory environment will result in prudent operators investing
greater efforts and funds in data collection and recordkeeping. The
prudent operator, however, presumably would balance the in-
creased opportunities to profit from collecting and analyzing addi-
tional data against their cost, which would include any legal risks
in ultimately using the data to seek a higher price.9 4 The duty to
account in this context is not-and should not-be a fiduciary one,
and suits for an accounting should not be used to achieve this re-
sult indirectly or to relieve the lessor of his burdens of proof.
Nevertheless, the courts may well be sympathetic to the plight
of a plaintiff-lessor who faces the arduous and expensive task of
proving what the proper royalty amount should be in a marketing
case. In a companion case to Johnson the Fifth Circuit stated,
We have not looked with approval upon the action of the defendant in
sitting back and offering no proof to aid the Court in the solution of this
question, and in effect saying to its lessor: "We have taken and used, as we
have seen fit, your 's part of the gas. Now it's up to you to prove, if you can,
what we and other manufacturers pay other people, similarly situated, for
their gas." We have searched for some principle of law that would permit us
to announce that when the defendant takes all the gas from the well and
makes such disposition of it as best suits its purpose under a contract which
does not state a definite sum to be paid for such gas, there arose either a
fiduciary relation or a relation as principal and agent which would place the
lessee under the duty to keep his principal fully informed and to disclose all
facts that came to his knowledge and to fully and faithfully account to the
lessor. But in view of the Texas law that the royalty owner has no title even
to the 1/ part of the gas, and that only the contractual relation of debtor and
creditor exists, we are unable to fasten the obligation to make a full disclo-
sure where it really ought to be.'"
194. Since the implied covenant to market applies to wells that the lessee already has
drilled, the prudent operator test normally would only require evidence that the action
which the lessor seeks would produce revenues over and above operating expenses
-excluding drilling expenses. While this limitation may ease considerably the lessor's bur-
den of proof, the lessee's regulatory expenses and risks incident to marketing in today's
environment are not nominal, and the lessor must still show that these risks and expenses
would not prevent a reasonably prudent operator from trying to secure a higher price. See
Gazin v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 367 P.2d 1010 (Okla. 1961).
195. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bynum, 155 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1946). Judge Mc-
Cord stated in dissent that the burden to go forward with the evidence should shift to the
defendant-lessee. Id. at 200; accord, Comment, Value of Lessor's Share of Production
Where Gas Only is Produced, 25 Txx. L. Rav. 641, 652 (1947).
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Prudent lessees should be aware of this court's tendency to
have sympathy for the plaintiff's plight, as well as its unguarded
threat to lessees who refused to present evidence. 196 While the ar-
guments advanced above for keeping the burden of proof on the
lessor remain sound, lessees would be well advised to present re-
buttal evidence on their diligence in the marketing effort after the
lessor has presented the facts and arguments for a finding of a
breach of the implied covenant. 197 Lessees should be aware that if
judicial experience with these cases indicates that lessors suffer
such a serious handicap in bearing the burdens of proof, courts
may shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to the
lessee once the lessor has presented some proof that a diligent
lessee could have obtained a higher price. While the burden of per-
suasion ostensibly would remain with the lessor, the lessee would
have to present evidence that a prudent operator would not have
sought or achieved the higher price which the lessor has submitted,
or suffer an adverse ruling on the issue.1 98
4. In Kind Royalty Clauses
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' language in Phillips Pe-
troleum Co. v. Bynum,199 which is quoted above, apparently sup-
ports a fiduciary accounting duty and a shift in the burden of proof
when leases contain in kind royalty clauses. The effect of an in
kind royalty clause is that the lessor retains title to and control
over his fractional share of the oil and gas produced from his land.
The oil royalty clause in most leases entitles the lessor to receive
his royalty in kind. Most gas royalty clauses, on the other hand,
provide for monetary payments to the lessor that are based on ei-
196. In Johnson the court, on the second motion for rehearing, stated that "[s]erious
presumptions sometimes arise against a person who is bound to make an account if he keeps
no books or vouchers and produces no other satisfactory evidence of the account. And the
scope of admissible evidence may be thereby widened." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson,
155 F.2d at 195-96.
197. Oklahoma courts hold that the burden of proof shifts to the lessee once the lessor
has made a prima facie case of unreasonable delay in drilling. See, e.g., Crocker v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 419 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1965).
198. This scenario seems to have occurred in Elliott v. Pure Oil Co., 10 Ill. 2d 146, 139
N.E.2d 295 (1956). The Illinois Supreme Court held that to defeat plaintiffs' prima facie
case, the burden of proceeding with the evidence was on defendant. The court stated that
"[t]he defendant possessed technical information concerning the oil underlying the land in
this area, and, within human limitations, knew the capacity of this land to produce oil. ...
The defendant, not the plaintiffs, was in the position to know whether or not further com-
mercial development of this acreage was practicable." Id. at 151, 139 N.E.2d at 298.
199. 155 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1946). See note 195 supra and accompanying text.
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ther market value, price, or proceeds.00 Under gas royalty clauses,
title to all the natural gas passes to the lessee, who simply cove-
nants to pay the lessor his proper amount of the money due from
sales of the gas. The difference between oil and gas royalty clauses
is attributable to the difficulty of storing and transporting natural
gas, which renders the delivery of gas in kind to a lessor economi-
cally infeasible. Many in kind royalty clauses impose the duty on
the lessee at the lessor's option to purchase or dispose of the les-
sor's royalty oil or gas.20 1 Few leases, however, contain express pro-
visions concerning the lessee's obligation to sell, to treat, or to dis-
pose of royalty products; thus, the nature and scope of this
duty-if a court recognizes it at all-is largely undefined.202
Whether the in kind provision imposes any greater or lesser
duty on the lessee to market the lessor's oil and gas is the next
question that needs to be addressed. 203 The question is important
under the federal pricing regulations because lessors who are seek-
ing to avoid the burden of proof and increase their chances of suc-
cess in implied covenant litigation will use the language in Bynum
to argue that a fiduciary standard should be applied to lessees who
dispose of in kind royalty oil or gas. Lessees are sure to argue in
response that the lessor's ability to dispose of and control in kind
royalty oil or gas is a complete defense to implied covenant suits
that allege deficiencies in the lessee's marketing. Under this the-
200. See Heare, Effect of Gathering and Processing on Payment of Gas Royalties and
Similar Interests, 10 INsT. OIL & GAS L. & TAx. 153 (1959). "In kind" royalty clauses for
natural gas became more common in the early 1970s as gas became more valuable because of
natural gas and other energy shortages. Indeed, several states enacted statutes to require or
allow these clauses in leases of state lands. 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 643.1.
An incentive to in kind royalty clauses for natural gas also may have originated from
the Federal Power Commission's efforts to solve the natural gas shortage by exempting
small producers from federal price regulation. Of course, royalty owners who took their nat-
ural gas in kind attempted to qualify as small producers. See W. Hum, M. WOODWARD & E.
SMITH, OIL & GAs: CASES & MATERIALS 713 (2d ed. 1972); H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C.
MEYERS, OIL & GAS: CASES & MATERIALS 42-59 (4th ed. 1979). In a recent decision, Jicarilla
Apache Tribe v. FERC, 578 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1978), the court held that a lessor who
exercises the right to take the royalty gas in kind cannot remove the royalty gas from the
interstate dedication that a lessee had made without FERC abandonment authorization.
The court, however, held that the lessor could benefit from the small producer classification
and receive small producer rates on its interstate sale, even though the lessee originally had
committed the gas to interstate commerce in its status as a large producer.
201. 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 642.5.
202. Id. § 654.
203. The consequences of in kind versus monetary royalty clauses are significant in
other contexts-for example, in determining the burden of taxation, venue, the lessor's abil-
ity to use gas on the premises for fuel, and the necessity of joining lessors in signing division
orders. See E. KUNTZ, supra note 50, § 39.2.
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ory, lessees may seek to avoid all responsibility for marketing the
in kind royalty oil and gas.2 0 Neither argument, however, is per-
suasive, and in kind royalty clauses generally should have no effect
on the operation of the implied covenant to market. As previously
discussed, the argument for a fiduciary standard is unsupportable
either in the case law20 5 or on policy grounds.20
6
Similarly, the proposition that in kind royalty clauses bar any
marketing duty on the part of the lessee to the royalty owner is
difficult to support with either precedent or policy. An in kind roy-
alty clause admittedly provides the lessor who is unhappy with his
lessee's efforts with the self-help remedy of taking his own royalty
product in kind and marketing it himself. Indeed, a desire for
greater control over marketing may have inspired the lessor to bar-
gain for an in kind clause. 07 The courts, however, have held that
the lessor's legal right to market his own product does not negate
the lessee's duty to market with due diligence when the lessor has
not availed himself of the power to take in kind. When the lease
contains a royalty clause that requires delivery of oil and gas in
kind, the lessee discharges this duty by delivering the product to
the pipeline for the credit of the lessor; the lessee has no express
duty actually to make a contract for the sale of the royalty oil or
gas.208 The implied duty exists, however, and this duty provides
the lessee with the authority to sell the lessor's royalty oil or gas
when, as is typical, the royalty clause is silent with respect to sales
and marketing and when the lessor has made no other arrange-
ments.209 The lessee's diligence in this effort includes the duty to
204. See text accompanying notes 286-95 infra (an analogous issue under the adminis-
trative covenant).
205. See text accompanying notes 171-93 supra.
206. See text accompanying notes 173 & 193-94 supra.
207. See Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas
Lease in Texas, 10 Tax. L. Rav. 291 (1932); note 200 supra.
208. McDonald v. O'Meara, 259 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 910
(1959).
209. Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 425 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 553 (1936). The
court in Wolfe stated that "[p]ersons, who enter into a contract in the ordinary course of
business, unless the terms of the contract indicate a contrary intention, are presumed to
have incorporated therein any applicable, existing general trade usage relating to such busi-
ness." Id. at 429. Lessee in Wolfe argued for the application of a trade usage that when
lessor failed either to provide storage for the royalty oil or to sell it, lessee had the authority
to sell the royalty oil along with the working interest oil at the posted price and on the
customary terms. Id. at 430. Similarly, in Wolfe v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 83 F.2d 434 (10th
Cir. 1936), the Tenth Circuit noted,
In the absence of an express provision in an oil and gas lease with respect to mar-
keting the production, there is an implied duty on the part of the lessee to make dili-
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obtain the highest price possible under the reasonably prudent op-
erator standard. 10 Moreover, the lessor's refusal to exercise his
right of self-help by marketing the royalty oil and gas himself does
not bar his cause of action to recover damages for breach of the
implied covenant to market,211 although a court may relieve the
lessee from the implied covenant to market when the terms of the
lease clearly demonstrate that the royalty owner intended to mar-
ket his own oil or gas.212
The refusal of the courts to attribute different treatment to
implied covenant cases merely because of the presence of an in
kind royalty clause is soundly based under either the contract or
the equity model of implied covenant law. In most cases, the par-
ties to the lease, particularly the lessor, are unlikely to have in-
gent efforts to market the production in order that the lessor may realize on his royalty
interest.
Therefore, when Wolfe [the lessor] failed either to provide storage or to arrange for
the marketing of his share of the royalty oil, not only was the Amerada impliedly au-
thorized to sell it as his agent, but it became its duty so to do.
Id. at 437 (footnote omitted). See generally 2 E. BROWN, supra note 50, § 16.02; E. KuNTz,
supra note 50, §§ 39.4, 40.5, 60.5; M. MERRELL, supra note 50, § 84; Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1219
(1960) (duty of lessee or assignee of oil or gas lease to market or deliver to lessor for market-
ing the oil and gas discovered); see also Molter v. Lewis, 156 Kan. 544, 134 P.2d 404 (1943);
Gex v. Texas Co., 337 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
Similarly, the literal provisions of a "proceeds" royalty clause require only that the
lessee pay a royalty based on the sales proceeds. This requirement, however, does not dis-
charge the lessee's duty under the implied covenant to market with diligence. See, e.g.,
Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), afl'd per
curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
210. See note 209 supra and sources cited therein. But see 3 W.LtAms & MEYERS,
supra note 50, § 654(4). See also id. § 654(1). Williams and Meyers unaccountably fall to
use the reasonably prudent operator standard of implied covenant law to analyze the issue
whether the lessee's refusal to sell gas is appropriate when it is due to a reluctance to be-
come subject to Federal Power Commission regulation.
211. The court in Carroll Gas & Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 231 Ky. 284, 21 S.W.2d 445 (1929),
stated,
Conceding that the lessors may have been within their rights in taking possession of
the lease, yet they were under no obligation to do so, and they were within their rights
in standing on the contract as it was written. Lessors are not ordinarily men who are
experienced in the operation of gas wells, and they are not often in position to do that
which is necessary to market the gas, and it would be a harsh rule if it should be held
that the lessees may abandon a producing well to the damage of the lessors, and the
lessors should be deprived of a recovery on the ground that they should have taken
possession of the lease and operated it themselves.
Id. at 289, 21 S.W.2d at 448.
212. Cedar Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Archer, 112 Mont. 477, 117 P.2d 265 (1941). Simi-
larly, when the lessor's conduct evidences an intention to market his own royalty products,
and the lessee relies on this conduct to his detriment, estoppel would be a defense to a suit
alleging breach of the marketing covenant.
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tended that any such difference should exist.2 13 Under the typical
lease, the lessor expects the lessee to exercise exclusive control over
the administration of the premises, which frees the lessor from the
burdens of lease management. Unless a contrary intent is clearly
shown, the lessee's duty to market the royalty oil or gas should
exist in all cases.2 14
In sum, a lessee ordinarily cannot use an in kind royalty clause
as a bar or defense to a cause of action brought for breach of the
implied covenant to market oil or gas diligently under the federal
regulatory pricing scheme. A lessee also cannot use the in kind
clause to relieve himself of the implied covenant to market-and
its inherent risks and costs-by declaring that the lessor must
market the oil or gas on his own. The lessor, on the other hand,
cannot argue for any greater standard than that of a reasonably
prudent operator because of the in kind clause, notwithstanding
the Fifth Circuit's language in Bynum.
5. Defenses and Remedies in Implied Covenant
to Market Cases
Oil and gas leases may contain express provisions that negate
or supersede any implied covenants, although express provisions
dealing with marketing are relatively rare.21 5 The parties may bind
themselves to a standard other than the highest obtainable market
213. Of course, in some instances the parties may have intended just such a difference.
See note 200 supra.
214. Merrill made a similar argument in criticizing a series of California cases that
burdened royalty owners with certain costs:
Too much dependence is placed upon the language of a printed form, in the prepara-
tion of which at least one party has had no part and to the selection of which the other
frequently has given no consideration, if upon a variance in that language a difference
is established in a duty not specifically referred to. The lessor in the normal lease
wants no oil or gas. He would not be prepared to deal with it or to handle it if it were
tendered him. The sole thought associated with royalties in his mind is monetary re-
turn, and it is erroneous to read into the royalty clauses stipulations concerning the
cost of marketing and preparation which are not specifically expressed.
M. MERRILL, supra note 50, § 85.
215. Many in kind royalty clauses, however, do impose a duty on the lessee to
purchase or dispose of the royalty oil. Williams and Meyers give an example of such a
clause: "At said Lessor's option, Lessee will purchase said royalty oil from Lessor, and shall
pay said Lessor therefor the current price paid by the Lessee for oil of like grade and gravity
at the wells of production in the same vicinity." 3 WmLLIAMS & MEYERs, supra note 50,
§ 642.5, at 516. An issue may well arise under this in kind royalty clause over what price the
lessee must pay to the lessor for the royalty oil since oil of like grade and gravity in the
nearby area may not be of the same legal classification and, therefore, may not be
comparable.
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price or a reasonably prudent operator standard if the proper con-
tractual elements are present.216 In general, courts construe express
clauses that purport to negate or limit implied covenants narrowly
and strictly against the lessee. Unless the express clause directly
conflicts with the operation of an implied duty, the duty is likely to
survive.2 17 The lessor's execution of division orders,2 1 and his sub-
sequent acceptance of royalties, generally is not a bar to his bring-
ing an action for breach of an implied covenant.1 9
Absent express provisions on remedies for a breach of any ob-
ligations, courts must choose the proper remedy for breach of the
implied covenant to market. The normal remedy for failure to
216. Brimmer v. Union Oil, 81 F.2d 437 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 668 (1936);
Labbe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 350 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Gex v. Texas Co.,
337 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Coats v. Brown, 301 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App.
1957); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Page, 141 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
217. Thus, a gas royalty clause that expressly bases payment on a fixed dollar amount
per time period would relieve the lessee of the implied covenant to market. The lessee's
payments of shut-in royalty or delay rentals, however, ordinarily will not displace the im-
plied covenant to market. See generally E. KUNTZ, supra note 50, § 60.2; M. MERRILL, supra
note 50, §§ 199-202; 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 858.
218. A division order is a contract of sale to the purchaser of oil or gas that directs the
purchaser to make payment for the value of the products taken in the proportions set out in
the contract. The division order is typically terminable at the will of either party. H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 64, at 159.
219. E. KUNTZ, supra note 50, § 43; M. MERRILL, supra note 50, §§ 209, 209A; 3
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 658.2; 4 id. § 706; 5 id. § 873.
Several courts have held that a lessor's execution of division orders creates a binding
contract with the lessee that may modify the express terms of the lease-at least until it is
revoked by either party. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). In
Middleton the division orders had the effect of transforming a lease's "market value" roy-
alty clause into a "proceeds" clause. The courts, however, are not likely to allow any provi-
sions in division orders to negate the implied covenant to market. The Texas Supreme
Court in Middleton noted,
We should not be understood as holding that the execution of division orders
would prevent relief from fraud, accident or mistake or preclude the correction of
mathematical calculations. Nor do we in any way indicate that relief could not be ob-
tained from unusual or unfair provisions imposed by a party having a superior bargain-
ing power or position.
Id. at 251 n.8. The court in Middleton obviously was concerned with the unfairness to les-
sors that is inherent in allowing seemingly routine documents-whose primary purpose his-
torically has been to arrange for the mechanics of paying royalties-to be transformed into
contracts with major effects on a lessor's right to challenge the royalties that the lessee owes
him. Indeed, the court had held in its first decision in Middleton, which was subsequently
withdrawn, that division orders could never afford a lessee the opportunity to amend a
lease. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, No. B-7979 (Tex. Oct. 1, 1980). Trade customs and usages
support the use of division orders to bind lessors to the proceeds method of accounting, see
Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), but not to negate the
implied covenant to market. See also Amoco Prod. Co. v. First Baptist Church, 579 S.W.2d
280 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (division orders based on net proceeds did not relieve lessee from
implied covenant to market), afl'd per curiam, 611 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1980).
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market at the highest possible price is damages equal to the differ-
ence between the price received and the price a reasonably prudent
operator would have obtained. When the breach consists of an un-
excused delay in marketing, the damages remedy usually is less
preferable, since the lessor is likely to receive a double recov-
ery-royalties now as damages and royalties later when the oil and
gas is actually sold.22 0 Courts have not accepted the solution of
awarding interest on delayed royalties, 22 1 but at least one court did
allow the lessee to credit royalty payments against future produc-
tion to prevent a double recovery.22
Cancellation of the lease is a possible remedy in certain in-
stances, although the courts recognize that it is a harsh punish-
ment since the lessee already has invested substantial funds into
drilling the wells. Thus, outright cancellation generally is not fa-
vored in marketing cases.223 When damages are too difficult to as-
certain 224 and cancellation is judged to be too harsh, courts may
order conditional cancellation, as they commonly do in other im-
plied covenant cases; thus, the lessee must either market the oil or
gas properly within a certain time period or forfeit the lease. Con-
ditional decrees, however, are not common in marketing cases225
and are probably inappropriate when a lessee has demonstrated
such incompetence or negligence in the marketing function that
little would be gained by allowing him more time.2
D. The Implied Covenant to Seek Favorable
Administrative Action
The implied covenant to seek favorable administrative action
often is classified under the more general implied covenant to op-
erate the leased premises with diligence.227 This latter covenant is
something of a "catch-all" for obligations like the duty to use mod-
220. See text accompanying notes 105-10 supra.
221. Id.
222. Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W. Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1962).
The court in Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928), also
suggested this remedy. Moreover, Kuntz advocates allowing such a right under certain cir-
cumstances. E. KUNTz, supra note 50, § 60.5.
223. E. Kukrz, supra note 50, § 60.5.
224. One commentator has collected data that illustrates the lessors' difficulties in
proving damages in implied covenant cases. M. MERRILL, supra note 50, § 157.
225. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 857.
226. See, e.g., Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305
(La. App. 1979).
227. See generally R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 50, § 8.9(D); M. MERRILL, supra note
50, §§ 72-83; 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 861.
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ern production and recovery techniques that do not fit neatly into
the other well-defined covenants. This catch-all covenant may re-
ceive more attention in the future, since lease management now
demands more technologically and legally sophisticated skills.228
The main area of interest, however, is likely to be the lessee's duty
to seek favorable administrative action under the network of fed-
eral and state regulation that now covers the oil and gas industry.
This implied covenant is still in its infancy compared with the
traditional covenants already discussed. It can be expected to grow
to maturity, however, in the current regulatory environment that
places a premium on the lessee's ability to understand and success-
fully pursue the administrative actions that are necessary to secure
the best possible price for production. This section of the Article
briefly surveys the historical background of this covenant. The sec-
tion then examines in some detail the most important issues that
the covenant raises and their treatment in the case law to date.
The section concludes with an analysis of the covenant's relevance
and possible application to cases in the future that are based on
the lessee's duty to secure favorable administrative action under
the federal pricing regulations.
1. Background of the Administrative Covenant
The extensive state regulation of oil and gas production that
was promulgated for conservation purposes in the 1930s and 1940s,
coupled with federal regulations on well spacing that were imposed
during World War H to cope with equipment shortages,2 9 gave rise
in the literature to the implied covenant to seek favorable adminis-
228. Some categories of incentive prices under the NGPA and the crude oil regulations
are designed to encourage advanced technology such as tertiary and enhanced recovery
projects. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3318(b)(2) (Supp. H 1979); 10 C.F.R. § 212.78 (1980). The
reasonably prudent operator certainly should be aware of the financial opportunities that
these price categories offer and the possibilities of applying new recovery techniques to his
leaseholds. Lessees must "develop the leased premises according to the recognized custom
and progressive practices among operators in the field." Wadkins v. Wilson Oil Corp., 199
La. 656, 658, 6 So. 2d 720, 721 (1942). See also Shaw v. Henry, 216 Kan. 96, 531 P.2d 128
(1975); Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305 (La. App.
1979). That a particular process was unknown at the time the lease was executed is no
defense to a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant to operate with diligence.
Wadkins v. Wilson Oil Corp., 199 La. at 658, 6 So. 2d at 721. Clearly, if lessees have a duty
to keep abreast of technological advances in oil and gas production, they also have a duty to
keep abreast of regulatory actions that affect profitability, even if these actions were nonex-
istent and unforeseeable at the time that the parties executed the lease.
229. Note, Effect of Conservation Order M-68 on Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
Leases, 10 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 926 (1942).
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trative action. The leading proponent of this covenant was Profes-
sor Merrill, who first suggested it in 1945 and subsequently advo-
cated it at some length.28 0 The extensive conservation regulations
on the oil and gas industry raised the question whether a lessee
could defend himself against suits for breach of an implied cove-
nant by simply pointing to a law that on its face seemed to pro-
hibit the lessee from acting. Professor Merrill's answer was a re-
sounding "no," which he based on two factors.23  First, most
conservation regulations were administered with a great deal of
flexibility because amendments and individual exceptions to state-
wide rules were as much a part of the regulation as the general
standard itself.213 Second, the lessee's superior knowledge and re-
sources dictated that he be the one to seek the administrative ac-
tion necessary to develop the lease diligently. Merrill described the
scope of the lessee's duty as follows:
It seems obvious that he should be diligent in attempting to procure a proper
formulation of the rules when they originally are promulgated, as well as in
seeking relief from rules which work improperly, whether by way of excep-
tion, revision, amendment or abrogation. If the administrative agency im-
properly refuses to act when its jurisdiction is invoked, it may be necessary to
resort to mandamus to compel the assumption of its duties. The order issued
may be contrary to law or to constitutional limitations. That may necessitate
an invocation of judicial review, perhaps to appellate courts or even to the
highest available tribunal, in order that the lessee may be adjudged free to
carry out his duties as an operator ordinarily prudent. A lessee who has failed
to exhaust his remedies to secure freedom so to act must be adjudged to have
fallen short of his obligation to his lessor, unless he can show by clear and
convincing evidence that the effort would have been fruitless.
33
Merrill later added the duty to participate in rate-setting proceed-
230. The chronology of Merrill's crusade is as follows: Merrill, Current Problems in
the Law of Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases, 23 TFx. L. Rsv. 137 (1945); Merrill,
Fulfilling Implied Covenant Obligations Administratively, 9 OKLA. L. REV. 125 (1956); Mer-
rill, Response to Conn's Connings, 13 OKLA. L. REv. 34 (1960); M. MERRILL, supra note 50,
§ 228 (Supp. 1964); Merrill, The Modern Image of the Prudent Operator, 10 RoCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. 107 (1965).
231. Merrill, Current Problems in the Law of Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
Leases, supra note 230, at 143-44.
232. For example, in Texas exceptions to rule 37-the well spacing regulation-were
so common that the Texas Railroad Commission used a standard printed form to grant
them. The denial of permit exceptions was so rare that a printed form was not justified. In
1971, 1617 exception permits were granted and only 13 were denied. H. WILLIAMS, R. MAX-
WELL & C. MEYERs, supra note 200, at 612-13.
233. Merrill, Current Problems in the Law of Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
Leases, supra note 230, at 145-46 (footnotes omitted). Consistent with this scope, Merrill
asserted that lessees could not rely on federal wartime regulations as a defense against im-
plied covenants unless they first established that the regulations were constitutional. Id. at
146-48.
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ings before the Federal Power Commission so that the viewpoint of
those interested in higher natural gas prices would be represented
and would counterbalance the opposing interests of gas purchasers
and consumers.2 4
The proposition that lessees should, under certain circum-
stances, seek favorable administrative action received general ac-
ceptance, although the grand sweep of Merrill's suggested duties
and his misplaced burden of proof received strong criticism.235
Merrill subsequently suggested that the burden of proof be re-
turned to the lessor in accordance with other implied covenant liti-
gation,23 6 but he otherwise continued to propound the broad duty
to seek administrative action described above. The duty is one
that, in Merrill's terms, would intimidate even the most alert and
active lessees, especially when applied in the current context of
federal pricing regulations rather than the traditional state conser-
vation regulation that Merrill had as his only background. Merrill
advocated not only that the lessee should seek exceptions for his
leasehold when authorized and appropriate, but also that he
should seek amendments to rules of general applicability, partici-
pate in original rulemaking proceedings, and pursue layers of judi-
cial review.23 In this thesis, however, Merrill appears to have lost
sight of the reasonably prudent operator standard; he does not
consider that an operator might be justified in foregoing these ac-
tivities under certain circumstances such as the high costs of pur-
suing administrative relief and the high risks incurred in defying
what may be an invalid order.2  Merrill does not analyze suffi-
234. M. MERRELL, supra note 50, § 228 (Supp. 1964). This section of Merrill's treatise
propounds his view of the scope of the lessee's duty in even stronger terms than is quoted in
the text.
235. Cline, Implied Covenants-The New Look Under Conservation Laws, 6 RocKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 471 (1961); Conn, Trends in the Application of the Implied Covenant of
Further Development, 12 OKLA. L. REv. 470 (1959); Eberhardt, supra note 64; George, The
Impact of Conservation Laws and Decisions upon the Mutual Obligations of the Mineral
Lease, 24 LA. L. Rlv. 571 (1964); Gibbens, The Effect of Conservation Legislation on Im-
plied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases, 4 OKLA. L. REv. 337 (1951).
236. Merrill, Fulfilling Implied Covenant Obligations Administratively, supra note
230, at 126-27. Under Merrill's scheme, the lessee still has the burden of exonerating himself
once the lessor has made a prima facie case that the regulation which the lessee is invoking
as a shield to implied covenant liability is invalid or could have been excused or modified.
Id. at 131.
237. Logically, Merrill's administrative covenant also would include a duty to lobby
the state legislature and participate in hearings on laws that affect the lessee's and lessor's
interests. See, e.g., note 49 supra.
238. Merrill made the comment in his treatise that a court's decision was "grotesque"
in allowing a lessee to excuse his failure to produce after the state commission had ordered
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ciently the role of the administrative agency in the relationship be-
tween a lessee and lessor and whether the existence of an indepen-
dent agency that acts in the public interest, and which is open to
the views of all interested parties, might relieve the lessee of the
duty to represent the lessor-or at least alter the duty in some
fashion. Merrill's position seems to devolve into the simplistic
equation that because the lessee is more knowledgeable about oil
and gas operations and the effects of regulations, he must re-
present the lessor before the agency in all matters affecting the
lessor's interest.23 '
Part of the problem with Merrill's exposition of the adminis-
trative covenant can be traced to the cases he originally used to
support his newly named covenant. Since no precedent directly
supported this covenant, Merrill used case law that indicated judi-
cial recognition of the lessee's role as a representative of the les-
sor.2 40 These cases, however, did not recognize a duty of the lessee
to act in this way, nor did they recognize the lessee's role as a rep-
resentative of the lessor except in very narrow circumstances.
2 41
Merrill's use of these cases caused the administrative covenant to
be phrased as the lessee's duty to represent the lessor's interest
rather than as the lessee's duty to seek favorable administrative
action when a reasonably prudent operator would do so-taking
into consideration the interests of both the lessee and the lessor.
all wells to shut down. The Texas Supreme Court later invalidated the commission's order;
therefore, according to Merrill, the lessee should have disobeyed the order. M. MRRn,
supra note 50, at 237 (Supp. 1964). Merrill would only rarely--"outside of emergency condi-
tions"-allow a lessee to establish that under the facts and circumstances, it would have
been useless for the lessee to try to secure administrative relief. Merrill, Fulfilling Implied
Covenant Obligations Administratively, supra note 230, at 131.
239. Merrill, Response to Conn's Connings, supra note 230, at 38.
240. Merrill, Current Problems in the Law of Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas
Leases, supra note 230, at 144-45.
241. The two principal cases that Merrill used addressed the legal issue whether roy-
alty owners were necessary parties to Texas Railroad Commission proceedings. In both cases
the court found that royalty owners were not necessary parties because lessee fully repre-
sented lessors' interests. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 137 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940); Railroad Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 101 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 133 Tex. 330, 128 S.W.2d 9 (1939). The court, however,
did expressly note that it was not dealing with a situation in which lessors' interests may
have diverged from lessee's. The court stated,
There is no suggestion of criticism by interveners [lessors] of any act done by Humble
[lessee] which to any degree worked to their detriment, or affected their interests dele-
teriously. Whether under other circumstances lessors under mineral leases are neces-
sary parties to proceedings of this character, we are not called upon to decide.
101 S.W.2d at 623.
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2. Issues Arising Under the Administrative Covenant
The increasing invocation of the administrative covenant is
probable because of today's regulatory environment and is likely to
bring many issues concerning the scope and operation of this cove-
nant to the courts. A discussion of these issues, the judicial treat-
ment of them to date, the conflicts that have arisen, and suggested
resolutions of those conflicts is the subject of this subsection.
(a) Judicial Recognition of the Administrative Covenant
One commentator has suggested that the rule of stare decisis
may bar judicial recognition of a new covenant that is substantially
different in nature from the lessee's traditional implied duties.24 2
The latter duties entail physical acts on the leased premises rather
than representation of a lessor's interest in a hearing room or
courthouse. Furthermore, other commentators have criticized the
administrative covenant because it requires the courts to engage in
matters that are entirely too speculative to be susceptible of
proof.24 3 The first suggestion is untenable in light of the widely rec-
ognized implied covenant to market, which requires nonphysical
acts such as negotiating sales contracts. Moreover, the traditional
implied covenants often require some administrative action-for
example, securing drilling permits. The administrative covenant
should not be viewed as a new separate duty, but as part of the
general duties of a reasonably prudent operator to develop, pro-
duce, and market oil and gas. If diligence in these acts requires
seeking administrative action, then the operator should proceed to
do so.
The second suggestion, that proof of a breach of the adminis-
trative covenant requires too much speculation, is also unfounded.
Several courts have recognized the implied covenant to seek
favorable administrative action and have found the problem of
proving a breach entirely manageable. In the leading case of Bald-
win v. Kubetz,2" for example, lessee attempted to defend his fail-
ure to comply with the continuous drilling provision of his lease by
alleging that he was unable to procure a zoning exception which
would permit further drilling. The court rejected lessee's conten-
tion because the zoning ordinance specifically granted exceptions
for drilling whenever it appeared probable that oil existed under-
242. Gibbens, supra note 235, at 354.
243. Conn, supra note 235, at 488; Eberhardt, supra note 64, at 160-61 n.87.
244. 148 Cal. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (1957).
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neath the land, and because the practices of the zoning commission
were flexible enough that the conditions necessary to obtain a per-
mit were easy to meet.245 Indeed, lessee had already obtained per-
mits for other wells nearby. Similarly, in Amoco Production Co. v.
Alexander,4 6 the lessor, Alexander, sued his lessee, Amoco, for
breach of the implied covenant to protect against drainage. Amoco
contended that it could not have drilled protection wells without
securing exception permits from the Texas Railroad Commission,
and that any expert testimony concerning what the Commission
would have done if Amoco had applied was purely speculative and
hypothetical.2 47 The court disagreed with Amoco and pointed to a
number of factors that weighed in its decision: That the Commis-
sion's rule on well spacing specifically provided for exceptions to
protect against confiscation; that the adjacent lessee, Exxon, prob-
ably would not have protested these exception requests because it
also needed protection wells and in fact had been granted
them-despite protests from Amoco; and that the Commission had
granted Amoco exception wells on other leaseholds without protest
from Exxon. 48
Several other courts also have accepted the administrative
covenant without undue concern that it was creating a judicial
nightmare.24 ' In certain cases relief may well be speculative in the
245. Id. at 942, 307 P.2d at 1008.
246. 594 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), aff'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981).
247. Id. at 474.
248. Id. at 476-77.
249. See notes 251-59 infra. The status of the administrative covenant is unclear in
Oklahoma, even though the Oklahoma courts have dealt with the issue more often than any
other jurisdiction. In Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436 (OkIa. 1968), lessees
shut in an oil well because its production would have resulted in large amounts of gas being
flared, and lessees believed that this situation would be contrary to a statute prohibiting
waste. Adjacent operators in the field, however, were producing their wells, which was re-
sulting in drainage of the lessors' tract. The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated,
We cannot establish a rule which requires the lessee to waste oil or gas in violation of a
statute prohibiting waste, merely because drainage is occurring by other operators. On
the other hand we cannot overlook lessees' obligation to use every reasonable measure
to protect from drainage. The remedy or relief in such a case rests in the Corporation
Commission, which is by law delegated to prevent waste and protect correlative
rights....
The question then arises as to the extent of lessors' damages which occurred as a
result of lessee failing either to produce the well as lessor demanded, or seek relief from
the Corporation Commission. Had lessee gone to the Corporation Commission, the re-
lief which would have been accorded appears speculative but in any event the lessee
would have exhausted all legal avenues available. On the other hand had the lessee
produced the well as lessors urged then lessors maximum loss can be ascertained.
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sense that the lessor will be unable to prove exactly what adminis-
trative action a reasonably prudent operator would have obtained,
but in those cases the lessor's cause of action should fail.250 This
situation is no reason to reject the administrative covenant in toto
and preclude the lessor from a forum in which to try his case.
(b) The Scope of the Lessee's Duty Under the Administrative
Covenant
To delineate the scope of the administrative covenant, it is
helpful to analyze its contours in the case law to date. The courts
have discussed the lessee's duty to seek administrative action in
the following contexts:
1. To secure a drilling permit exception to a zoning ordi-
nance as part of the implied covenant to develop.251
Id. at 446-47. The court then ordered a judgment granting lessors damages in the amount of
royalties that were lost during the period when the well was shut in. In a subsequent case,
Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Crews, 448 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1968), the same court refused to recognize
expressly the validity of the administrative covenant; instead, it held that lessee/defendant
need not have appeared before the Corporation Commission on behalf of lessors to protest
an adjacent operator's applications for increased oil allowables under the facts and circum-
stances shown.
In Hall Jones Oil Corp. v. Claro, 459 P.2d 858 (Okla. 1969), lessors/plaintiffs asserted
that lessees/defendants were required to prevent drainage by seeking administrative relief
from well spacing regulations. The court avoided the issue, however, since the facts in the
case showed that lessees had falsified reports to the Commission, which resulted in the par-
ticular well spacing order; the defendants were not to be permitted to benefit from this
wrongdoing.
In Forman v. MacKellar Drilling Co., No. 43818 (Okla. Feb. 8, 1972), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for lessee/defendant. The court held that
lessor/plaintiff had stated a cause of action in his allegation that defendant had the duty to
resist an application by adjacent lessees before the Corporation Commission and had failed
to do so.
250. In Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966), lessor
brought suit against lessee for underproducing gas in violation of the implied covenant to
market with diligence. The Fifth Circuit reversed a judgment for lessors because they had
not proved that lessee could have secured an increase in allowables from the Commission,
and that such an increase, if granted, would have produced more gas. The case was re-
manded to enable lessors to meet their burden of proof. The case thus stands for the pro-
position that when evidence of administrative relief is speculative, the lessor's case will fail.
Indeed, the court's detailed examination of the statewide allowables nomination process in-
dicated little confidence in lessor's ability to prove that relief was not speculative. But see
Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436 (Okla. 1968). See also Simmons v. Pure Oil
Co., 241 La. 592, 129 So. 2d 786 (1961) (lessor's suit dismissed for cancellation of the lease
on the ground that the allegations of injury were pure speculation and incapable of proof).
The Sinclair decision may be criticized because it gives relief to lessors on a speculative
basis without adequate proof of what the Corporation Commission would have done, if it
had been requested to act. See note 249 supra.
251. Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (1957); cf. Stockburger v. Do-
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2. To secure exceptions to a well spacing order to ensure
that the leased tract is protected against drainage and reason-
ably developed.252
3. To seek administrative relief-of an unspecified na-
ture-to prevent drainage of the tract. 5 s
4. To seek an increase in the allowables from the lessor's
tract to fulfill the implied covenant to market with diligence.
5. To resist applications of adjoining lessees for well spac-
ing exceptions and increased allowables that, if granted, would
drain the tract.255
6. To resist invalid statewide prorationing orders in order
to comply with the implied covenant to operate diligently.
256
7. To secure administrative and judicial rulings to invali-
date a gas sales contract that prevented lessees from marketing
their natural gas at the best price.
Ian, 14 Cal. 2d 313, 94 P.2d 33 (1939) (if drilling for oil is illegal under a zoning ordinance,
and the lease is silent on whether the lessee should procure a variance to drill, then evidence
of an oral agreement-made contemporaneously with the lease-that the lessee agreed to
seek a variance, but did not do so diligently, was admissible because it would be consistent
with the lease terms).
252. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 594 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), afl'd, 24
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981); see text accompanying notes 246-48 supra. See also U.V. Indus.,
Inc. v. Danielson, 602 P.2d 571 (Mont. 1979) (the applicable well spacing regulations would
not have prohibited lessees from drilling an offset well if lessees had pursued this action);
Hall Jones Oil Corp. v. Claro, 459 P.2d 858 (Okla. 1969) (lessees not permitted to benefit
from well spacing order issued on the basis of falsified reports); Willingham v. Bryson, 294
S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (lessee defended against breach of an implied covenant by
asserting an additional well could not be drilled under the spacing rules. The burden was on
lessee to prove that he did not breach an implied covenant because an additional well could
not be drilled under the spacing rules; since lessee presented no evidence on the point, lessor
is entitled to judgment).
253. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436 (Okla. 1968); see note 249 supra.
254. Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966); see note
250 supra.
255. Forman v. MacKellar Drilling Co., No. 43818 (Okla. Feb. 8, 1972); Sunray DX Oil
Co. v. Crews, 448 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1968); see note 249 supra. See also Sun Oil Co. v. Potter,
182 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 144 Tex. 151, 189 S.W.2d 482
(1945). These cases only indirectly support judicial recognition of the administrative
covenant.
256. Newell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 144 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1944). In Newell the
court found that defendant/lessee had acted as a reasonably prudent operator in restricting
production to comply with prorationing orders that were later adjudged void. The judgment
for lessee was based on an examination of those factors relevant to determining whether
lessee had acted diligently. The court did not rely on the theory that lessee was protected
solely by the prorationing orders. Thus, the court, by implication, recognized a duty on the
part of lessee to disobey orders or take legal action against orders if a reasonably prudent
operator would. have done so.
257. Fisher v. Superior Oil Co., 390 P.2d 521 (Okla. 1964). The issue in Fisher was
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8. To secure pooling-by compulsory process if neces-
sary-under the implied covenant to protect against
drainage.5
9. To refrain from providing false information to the ad-
ministrative agency that would result in orders which are
harmful to the lessor.259
A common theme in these cases is that the lessee's conduct
falls short of what typically is demanded under the traditionally
recognized covenants because he has failed to take action that is
"incidental" to the major purposes of the lease-the production,
development, and marketing of oil and gas.2 0 Another common
theme is that the cases generally involve securing administrative
action limited to the leased tract-for example, an individual ex-
ception or pooling order-rather than actions that would affect nu-
merous people through changes in statewide or fieldwide rules.2"
whether royalty owners had to contribute legal expenses to pay the attorney who had suc-
cessfully sought a judicial decree invalidating a natural gas contract that provided for no
payment for the natural gas other than for its liquid hydrocarbon content. The court recog-
nized the duty of lessee to protect the interests of royalty owners when marketing the natu-
ral gas and, therefore, would have had the lessees bear all the attorney's fees. Recognition of
this duty is dictum, however, since no attorney's fees were actually awarded.
258. Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970); Breaux v. Pan
Am. Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 1964); see text accompanying notes 277-79
infra.
259. Pan Am. Petroleum Co. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). In
Hardy defendant/lessee had fraudulently led the Railroad Commission to classify two sands
as one reservoir to avoid further drilling. The court held that lessee had breached his duty
to act as a reasonably prudent operator and awarded exemplary damages to lessor in com-
pensation for the expense of employing experts and attorneys to study the geology of the
field and ascertain the truth. Similarly, in Hall Jones Oil Corp. v. Claro, 459 P.2d 858 (Okla.
1969), lessee was draining lessor's tract by operations on adjacent land and filed false re-
ports with the Commission to conceal this drainage. The court rejected lessee's defense to
the implied covenant cause of action that well spacing regulations forbid drilling an offset
well. The court found it unnecessary to determine whether lessee would have been required
to seek administrative relief to secure a drilling exception permit, since lessee's conduct
amounted to oppression, fraud, and malice.
260. One court stated that "it has become accepted law in this state that there is an
implied covenant of diligent exploration and diligent operation of any producing wells. Im-
manent in this implied obligation is that of doing such incidental or subsidiary acts as may
be reasonably necessary to accomplish the major purpose. . . ." Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148
Cal. 2d 937, 943, 307 P.2d 1005, 1009 (1957) (citations omitted). Similarly, in Sun Oil Co. v.
Potter, 182 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 144 Tex. 151, 189
S.W.2d 482 (1945), the court noted that "the lessees are invested with full control over the
leased premises, including the right of possession and to develop and the incidental right to
apply for the necessary drilling permits. These rights import corresponding duties of the
lessees for breach of which they would be liable." Id. at 926.
261. The leading case that addressed the issue of a lessee's failure to resist a statewide
prorationing order held that lessee acted as a reasonably prudent operator in doing so.
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This common scenario is not surprising, since a lessor would find it
difficult to prove that his lessee's participation or nonparticipation
in a general rulemaking proceeding or court challenge of impor-
tance to the entire oil and gas industry was the cause of the lessor's
individual injury. The reasonably prudent operator rule does not
require diligence from a lessee when the effort would be unavailing
or unnecessary because of the actions of others.
Another important feature of these cases is that the lessee and
lessor typically share a mutual interest in the general objective of
the administrative order that is either sought or resisted, although
not in its specific application to the lease at issue. For example, if
their tract of land is being drained, both the lessee and lessor want
an exception to drill an offset well; similarly, both parties generally
desire a favorable allowable formula for their well. The implied
covenant cases arise because under the specific facts of each case, a
conflict between the two parties exists as a result of the lessee's
desire for greater profits-or his reluctance to pursue seemingly
unprofitable ventures262-or as a result of the lessee's negligence. 263
Newell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 144 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1944). See also Weymouth v.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966) (discussing lessor's difficult burden
of proof in cases that deal with the statewide allowables system). The court in Amoco Prod.
Co. v. Alexander, 594 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), aff'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981),
held that the lessee, Amoco, had an implied duty to protect the leased tract against
fieldwide drainage. The Texas Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision that Amoco
had breached its implied covenant duties by failing to seek rule 37 exceptions to drill re-
placement wells on the lessor's tract. In dictum, the supreme court stated that the duties of
a reasonably prudent operator also may include seeking fieldwide regulatory action, includ-
ing voluntary unitization. Id. at 583. In this case, Amoco owned 80% of the production from
the field. If Amoco had been a small operator in the field, its failure to seek fieldwide action
may not have violated the reasonably prudent operator standard.
262. The conflict in implied covenant cases usually arises because of different opinions
about whether an operation-usually drilling a well-would be profitable. Other sources of
conflict of interest, however, also appear in several of these cases. In Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Alexander, 594 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), afl'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981),
plaintiff/lessor's royalty was /e of the oil and gas produced. The royalty owed lessors on
adjoining tracts that the same lessee had leased was 'Is, which created an incentive for
lessee to drain plaintiff/lessor by sweeping oil up the structure, away from lessor's tract. In
Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966), lessee had "take or
pay" sales contracts with pipeline purchasers for gas from adjoining tracts that he leased,
which created an incentive for lessee to underproduce lessor's tract. In Williams v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), lessee was the operator of the well on the
adjoining tract that was draining lessor.
263. Negligence was the issue in Newell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 144 F.2d 338 (10th
Cir. 1944); Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (1957); Sunray DX Oil Co. v.
Crews, 448 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1968); and Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436 (Okla.
1968). See also Continental Inv. Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 156 Kan. 858, 137 P.2d 166
(1943).
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In these situations, courts generally do not allow lessees to use ad-
ministrative rules as a shield against greed or incompetence, if a
reasonably prudent operator would have acted differently.""4
No cases have yet decided the issue whether the lessee should
264. A few cases seem not to recognize the administrative covenant, but a close exami-
nation of the facts shows that these cases are not conclusive on this point. In Chenoweth v.
Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 314 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1963), for example, lessor sued lessee for
breach of the implied covenant to reasonably develop because of an alleged failure to drill
wells into other formations on the leased premises. The court found that a reasonably pru-
dent operator would not have drilled such a well because its costs probably would have
exceeded its revenues. Lessor also objected to the original order of the Oklahoma Corpora-
tion Commission, which found one formation to be a common source of supply. Lessor con-
tended that this order was erroneous because two separate sources of supply existed. The
court concluded that "[a]ppellants [lessors] have not sought to have this order amended by
the Commission as they are permitted to do under Oklahoma law. Thus such an administra-
tive remedy is still available." Id. at 65. Lessors apparently did not plead that the duty to
seek such an amendment was the lessee's under the doctrine of implied covenants.
In Simmons v. Pure Oil Co., 241 La. 592, 129 So. 2d 786 (1961), lessor alleged that
lessee violated its implied obligations by seeking an exception well that, when drilled, of-
fered new geological evidence which caused the Conservation Commissioner to reform a pre-
existing unit in which lessor was participating. The reformed unit included only 20 acres of
lessor's land versus the 60 acres included in the first unit. Lessor contended that lessee
failed to inform him of the possible result of the exception well-and, in fact, actively con-
cealed this possibility from him-because lessee had property adjoining the first unit that it
wanted to include in the reformed unit to lessor's detriment. The Louisiana Supreme Court
dismissed the cause of action because of lessor's failure to prove any injury other than of a
purely speculative nature. The court, however, did observe that lessor should have known
that unitization orders are always subject to change by the Commission-after notice and
hearing-based on new geological evidence. The court seemed to use this observation to
reduce lessee's duty to disclose information to lessor. The court also held lessor's charge that
lessee manipulated Commission processes by concealing his true purpose in seeking an ex-
ception well to be a collateral attack on the Commission's findings and thus not allowable.
Another case in this area, Mims v. Hilliard, 125 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 1960), dealt with
the sale of a lease and thus is not directly relevant to the doctrine of implied covenants.
Mires held that lessee/purchaser was under no duty to tell lessors-in the absence of an
inquiry from lessors-that 14 acres of the tract being bargained for was already in a unit.
The court noted that the existence of the Commissioner's unit was a public matter about
which lessors could easily have obtained information.
Finally, in Savoy v. Tidewater Oil Co., 218 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd per
curiam, 326 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1964), the court upheld a summary judgment for lessee on
the ground that lessor's allegation of breach of the administrative covenant-that lessee
should have requested the Commissioner to place the leased tract in a more favorable
unit-was a collateral attack on the Commissioner's decision. Under Louisiana statutes, les-
sor must exhaust all administrative remedies and seek direct review of the Commissioner's
order.
These cases show that Louisiana statutes may preclude judicial recognition of the ad-
ministrative covenant in circumstances that would amount to a collateral attack on a Com-
mission order. In this event, the lessor must exhaust his administrative remedies by oppos-
ing the order before the Commission and then appealing the order directly. When the lessor
alleges that the lessee failed to take any administrative action-and the validity of a Com-
mission order thus is not at issue-the Louisiana statutes should not preclude judicial recog-
nition of the lessee's duty to seek favorable administrative action.
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be held to represent the lessor when no mutual interest exists in
the general objective of the administrative action that is sought or
resisted. Such a situation, however, may arise. For example, no
mutual interest would exist in state commission proceedings to de-
termine the proper well spacing for fields. In these proceedings, the
lessee generally argues for large drilling units, since he bears the
costs of drilling and obviously wants to minimize the number of
wells that are required to develop a field. The lessor generally ad-
vocates smaller drilling units, since his interest is cost-free and his
time frame generally is shorter; he prefers his royalties now rather
than later.2" Although the interests of the lessee and lessor gener-
ally coincide in federal pricing matters, this is not always the case.
The tertiary incentive crude oil pricing category, for example, al-
lowed qualified producers to sell crude oil at market prices and
recoup up to seventy-five percent of certain expenses incurred in
the tertiary operation.2 6 6 The regulations, however, were silent on
the issue whether royalties were to be paid on the basis of the mar-
ket price without adjustments for that portion of the price which
represents tertiary incentive revenues. If so, the net amount of ex-
penses that the producer recouped would be less than the seventy-
five percent provided in the regulations. Clearly, in a rulemaking
or administrative hearing on this subject, the lessees' interest
would be opposed to the lessors'.
The rights of lessees and lessors are difficult to balance in this
situation. On the one hand, to impose a duty on the lessee to re-
present the lessor's interest in these circumstances appears un-
sound and unrealistic. The administrative agency is charged with
265. This example of a conflict between the lessee and lessor resembles the facts in Oil
& Gas Bd. v. Mississippi Mineral & Royalty Owners, 258 So. 2d 767 (Miss. 1971). Royalty
owners sued the Mississippi Corporation Commission for establishing statewide spacing
units of 80 acres instead of 40 acres. They sought to have the order overturned as arbitrary
and capricious because it was based largely on the profitability of drilling-that is, on the
producers' interests--rather than on the statutory mandate to prevent waste and protect
correlative rights. The majority held that the order was not arbitrary, since one objective of
the conservation legislation was to develop the state's resources; thus, the profitability of
drilling was validly considered. A vigorous dissent argued that the order was arbitrary and
capricious and deprived royalty owners of a valuable right. The dissent pointed out that
these owners did not have the expertise to prove that exceptions to 80-acre spacing should
be granted in particular cases, with the result that lessors undoubtedly would suffer a de-
cline in royalties. Id. at 780. According to the dissent the Commissioner should retain the
40-acre spacing rule and let lessees who have the expertise obtain exceptions for 80-acre
units in deep reservoirs. While this point of view has merit, it does not follow that the lessee
should have the duty to present the lessor's position on statewide spacing before the Com-
mission. See text accompanying note 268 infra.
266. 10 C.F.R. § 212.78 (1981).
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promulgating regulations in the public interest defined by its char-
ter. Lessees and lessors may well differ on how this public interest
should best be achieved. Each party, then, should represent his
own interest. The reasonably prudent operator is not required to
consider his lessor's well-being to the detriment of his own. It
would be asking too much of a lessee to present with equal vigor
both sides of the matter to the administrative agency. 17 Such a
duty could well have a chilling effect on the lessee, with the result
that the commission would be deprived altogether of the benefit of
the lessee's knowledge and expert opinion.265 To hold that the
lessee has no duty to represent the lessor's interests in this situa-
tion, however, does not grant him a license to abuse the adminis-
trative process or fraudulently prevent the lessor's views from be-
ing represented. 69 The effect of limiting the scope of the
administrative covenant in this manner is to impose more respon-
sibility on the lessor to familiarize himself with the regulations of
the oil and gas business and the administrative procedures that are
necessary to protect his interests. This result contravenes Merrill's
view;27 0 the more dispassionate observer, however, may accept it as
the price one pays for owning an interest in a natural resource of
such vital economic importance that the public interest requires its
regulation by an administrative agency.2 7 1
267. See E. KUNTZ, supra note 50, § 59.1.
268. The impostion of such a duty would endanger the lessee under the perjury laws
as well. In Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Crews, 448 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1968), the Oklahoma Supreme
Court overturned the lower court's order that required defendant/lessee to appear before
the state commission and to resist the applications that adjoining landowners had filed. The
court stated,
If defendant herein did in good faith rely on the judgment of its experts in regard to
the application for increased allowables, the judgment of the court below places it in
somewhat of a dilemma. If it had appeared before the Corporation Commission to de-
fend or help defend against the Shell applications, as it was ordered to do, it would
have had either to submit evidence detrimental to plaintiffs' position or to commit or
condone perjury.
Id. at 845.
269. See Hall Jones Oil Corp. v. Claro, 459 P.2d 858 (Okla. 1969); Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (sustaining punitive damages of
$25,000 to punish lessee and to deter others from intentionally giving false information to
the state agency); note 259 supra.
One commentator has suggested the imposition of a duty of fair dealing to measure the
lessee's obligation to the lessor under the administrative covenant when their interests con-
flict. George, supra note 235, at 577-78.
270. Merrill, Response to Conn's Connings, supra note 230, at 38; Merrill, Fulfilling
Implied Covenant Obligations Administratively, supra note 230, at 131.
271. The crude oil windfall profit tax legislation, as originally passed, may have taught
lessors the lesson that protection of their royalty interests requires greater vigilance on their
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On the other hand, to impose no duty on the lessee in this
situation overlooks other important features of the real world and
may reflect an overly complacent attitude towards lessors' ability
to function before administrative agencies. Lessors in fact often
lack the knowledge and expertise required to argue successfully on
their own behalf, and they must acquire this knowledge only at
considerable expense. The state administrative agencies that
govern the oil and gas industry often view their role as advocates
of oil and gas development, and this posture has resulted in a nat-
ural propensity to favor producers.273 The state jurisdictional agen-
cies that administer the NGPA well classification process usually
are the same familiar agencies that have regulated the industry
under the conservation laws. 4 Moreover, judicial review of agency
actions under the arbitrary and capricious standard is lax, which
renders lessors' challenges on appeal of agency decisions that un-
duly favor lessees a virtual nullity. Firmer judicial review of agency
action, or reform of an agency's charter, procedures, or personnel,
in cases in which the agency is deemed too biased towards produc-
ers' interests are long-term political measures that give no relief to
lessors with an immediate problem. Under these circumstances, if
the lessee's duty to represent the lessor when their interests con-
flict on the administrative objective sought is limited to avoiding
fraud on the lessor, 75 then state agencies are not likely to receive a
balanced presentation of all points of view on an issue, and agency
part. At first, royalty owners were not exempted from paying the tax. Only after the receipt
of diminished royalty checks did royalty owners organize to protest the tax. In the words of
one royalty owner, "If we'd had this kind of unity in the first place, we might not be in this
predicament.... When the original bill was being debated the big oil companies looked
after their interests and the independent producers looked after theirs, but nobody looked
after ours." Schlender, Windfall Tax on Little Oil, Wall St. J., July 7, 1980, at 10, col. 4, col.
6.
The royalty owners' organizations that sprang up after passage of the windfall profit tax
legislation convinced Congress to pass a one-time tax credit or refund of $1000 of the wind-
fall profit tax liability by exercising political clout and turning media attention to the plight
of poor widows whose royalty income was severely cut by the tax. I.R.C. § 6429.
272. See, e.g., Oil & Gas Bd. v. Mississippi Mineral & Royalty Owners, 258 So. 2d 767
(Miss. 1971); Pan Am. Petroleum Co. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
273. See, e.g., Oil & Gas Bd. v. Mississippi Mineral & Royalty Owners, 285 So. 2d 767
(Miss. 1971).
274. For example, the Texas Railroad Commission is the jurisdictional agency for
NGPA filings. A list of all the state agencies with NGPA jurisdiction appears in 18 C.F.R.
§ 274.501 (1980).
275. The lessor who questions the lessee about the latter's intended participation in
agency proceedings surely is entitled to truthful answers. See note 259 supra. The lessor
with enough knowledge to ask the lessee these questions, however, is likely to represent only
a select group of lessors.
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decisionmaking is liable to reflect this disparity.
A balance perhaps can be achieved by imposing a limited dis-
closure duty on the lessee. When the lessee proposes to take an
active part in administrative or judicial hearings on a subject that
conflicts with the interests of his royalty owners, the lessee should
disclose the fact of his participation to the lessor, provide a brief
description of his position on the issue, and advise the lessor to
seek his own legal representation if he so desires. This procedure
would absolve the lessee from the impossible two-faced duty of tes-
tifying with equal ardor on both sides of the issue, and at the same
time it would alert lessors to the issue and the possible need to
pursue separate actions.
Support for such a duty to disclose within the scope of the
administrative covenant can be found in Williams v. Humble Oil &
Refining Co.2 77 In this case the court held that the scope of lessee's
implied obligation to protect against drainage included a duty to
unitize. The court then stated,
Indeed, if he [lessee] deems it inadvisable or unprofitable to drill offset wells
or unitize the premises, the prudent administrator should perhaps disclose
the fact of drainage to the lessor so that he [lessor] may apply to the Louisi-
ana Commissioner of Conservation for the establishment of a drilling unit. In
appropriate circumstances failure to make a full disclosure may provide the
basis for a cause of action for damages.
27 8
The Williams case concerned a lessee who was draining his
own lessor's property by production from an adjoining tract. The
duty to disclose language can be restricted to this particular fac-
tual setting, in which the potential severity of the conflict between
the lessee and lessor and the lessee's clearly superior knowledge
about the facts of drainage-and strong incentive to hide these
facts-would justify such a duty.279 The case, however, affords a
clear analogy to the administrative setting in which the lessee
deems it inadvisable and unprofitable to pursue an administrative
objective that would favor the lessor's interests at his own expense.
The duty to disclose is an appropriate mechanism for resolving the
conflicting interests of the lessee and lessor in this setting as well.
276. The administrative agency's notice requirements may not suffice to alert lessors
to the fact or nature of their own lessee's opposing testimony.
277. 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970).
278. Id. at 173.
279. The Williams situation also justifies the elimination of the profitability standard
in determining what a reasonably prudent operator would do, since the lessee's capital al-
ready is invested in the draining well. See Hardy, Drainage of Oil and Gas From Adjoining
Tracts-A Further Development, 6 NAT. RES. J. 45, 57-58 (1966).
[Vol. 34:14731546
IMPLIED COVENANTS
How broadly this duty to disclose should apply in the adminis-
trative context is the next question. The issue is whether the
lessee, who has determined that it is too costly or too risky to pur-
sue an administrative action which would be likely to benefit the
lessor, should be obligated to tell his lessor about the potential
benefits available or injuries to be averted so that the lessor can
use a self-help remedy. Imposing such a duty would put the lessee
in the uncomfortable position of either going forward with an un-
profitable venture or-if he decides not to pursue the mat-
ter-inviting his lessor to sue him for breach of an implied cove-
nant.2 80 A lessee, after careful consideration, may determine that it
would be unprofitable to seek administrative action. If such a
lessee were required to disclose this fact to the lessor for the pur-
pose of allowing the lessor to proceed independently and seek ad-
ministrative relief, then the lessor who believes that the lessee has
overestimated the risks and costs of proceeding-or who believes
that the lessee should proceed regardless of these costs-may well
sue under the administrative covenant. If the lessor himself pro-
ceeds to seek the administrative action and succeeds, he undoubt-
edly will sue the lessee for the costs incurred in securing action
that the lessor now firmly believes should have been the lessee's
duty.281 Even though the lessor should lose the lawsuit under the
facts posed, the lessee is nevertheless burdened with the costs of
litigation.282
This discussion suggests that the duty to disclose should be
280. For example, this duty to disclose could result in a reasonably prudent operator
being forced to fasten-or at least hasten-an unprofitable pooling venture on himself. If
pooling would be unprofitable-because of, for example, a statutory requirement that the
lessee contribute his pro rata share of drilling costs and the draining well has a dubious pay
out-this fact normally would bar the lessee's duty to seek pooling. If the lessee, however,
must disclose the fact of drainage to the lessor, then the noncost bearing royalty owner may
well find it advantageous to invoke the pooling statute. The administrative covenant was
never meant to force the lessee to act perversely by ignoring his own vital interests. Of
course, if the lessee in the example is doing the draining, this result is not so perverse.
281. Cf. Fisher v. Superior Oil Co., 390 P.2d 521 (Okla. 1964) (producers alone should
bear the cost of attorney's fees incurred in a successful court action to obtain higher natural
gas prices that benefited both producers and royalty owners).
If the lessee and lessor faced differences in the costs or risks of seeking administrative
action, the lessor might successfully obtain the relief sought; the lessee, however, still could
show that a reasonably prudent operator would not have pursued the action. Of course, the
lessee might be expected to obtain lessor's help voluntarily under these circumstances.
282. In addition, courts have difficulty avoiding the improper use of hindsight to judge
the reasonably prudent operator's actions. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. McCue, 101 F.2d 111
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 564 (1939). Thus, the lessor might succeed in court when
perhaps he should not.
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limited to circumstances in which lessees and lessors have conflict-
ing interests in the general objective of the administrative action
that is sought. When their interests are mutual, the courts should
not impose a duty to disclose, since the lessee's failure to seek the
agency action can be presumed to be the result of the inherent
high costs and risks. To impose such a duty simply would invite
litigation. If the lessee's failure to seek administrative action is due
to incompetence or neglect rather than any conflict in interest,
then the general principles of implied covenant law suffice to pro-
tect the lessor, and no duty to disclose is necessary.2 8
Imposing a duty to disclose in the manner outlined above
would be an extension of existing case law in the implied covenant
area. Thus, courts that follow the equity model of implied cove-
nants are more likely to adopt this duty. The disclosure obligation
proposed in this Article can also be viewed as consonant with the
contract model. The very nature of the oil and gas lease contem-
plates development of the premises to the mutual benefit of both
parties.. A central motivation of lessors in granting a lease is to
transfer the management and operation of the premises to exper-
ienced lessors, including the management of regulatory affairs to
which lessors also may have access.2 " In turn, a principal motiva-
tion of lessees in accepting the contractual burden of paying a cost-
free royalty is to avoid interference from the lessor in running the
business. Thus, a disclosure duty ordinarily should not force the
lessee to invite the lessor to manage leasehold affairs. When the
two interests inevitably diverge over a certain administrative ob-
jective, however, the parties would probably expect that the lessee
would at least tell the lessor to pursue his interests
independently.285
283. Furthermore, to impose a duty to disclose ignorance is obviously unreasonable.
284. See text accompanying notes 285-95 infra (concerning the effect on the adminis-
trative covenant of the lessor's ability to petition for and pursue agency action on his own).
285. One oil company seems to have adopted a disclosure policy concerning litigation
over the crude oil pricing regulations. The Department of Energy (DOE) has made it a
practice to seek refunds for pricing overcharges against the operator of a tract rather than
against all the interest owners, which leaves the operator to seek contribution from the roy-
alty owners and other working interest owners. See Lavenant, Operator's Liability for
Overcharges in the Sale of Production, 31 INST. On. & GAs L. & TAx. 131 (1980). This
practice is a heavy administrative burden for the lessee/operator to bear. In the midst of
lengthy litigation between DOE and Exxon over alleged crude oil pricing violations, Exxon,
the operator, notified more than 2000 working interest and royalty interest owners in the
field that they were included in the lawsuit against DOE, which gave these owners the op-
portunity to participate actively in the lawsuit and defend their individual interests directly
against DOE's claim. Generally, Exxon and the royalty owners have a mutual interest in the
[Vol. 34:1473
1981] IMPLIED COVENANTS 1549
(c) The Ability of the Lessor to Represent Himself and the
Scope of the Administrative Covenant
Many of the implied covenant cases discussed above deal with
the duty to seek a drilling permit. The typical oil and gas lease
vests the lessee with the exclusive right to drill and produce. The
lessor, therefore, often has no right to seek such a permit. The
courts have recognized this fact and generally have refused to al-
low lessees to escape the administrative covenant when a reasona-
bly prudent operator would have sought the drilling permit.2 8 6 In
other contexts, however, the lessor may have equal access to the
administrative or judicial forum. s7 The state jurisdictional agen-
cies that perform NGPA well classifications may allow any inter-
ested person-including royalty owners-to file for well applica-
litigation, and Exxon's defense serves the interests of both parties. If Exxon, however, ar-
gues in court that each interest owner should be individually responsible for paying the
refunds, this position could conflict with the royalty owners' interests by transferring some
of the administrative burden of compliance to them. Exxon's actions simply may have been
a desire to achieve royalty owner unity in its defense, but it also may reflect an effort to
avoid potential conflict of interest problems. Hous. Chronicle, Dec. 19, 1980, § 2, at 12, col.
1. Exxon's attempt to withhold payment to royalty owners of the amount of the alleged
overcharge provoked a lawsuit by some royalty owners. Jarvis Christian College v. Exxon
Corp., No. TY-80-432 (E.D. Tex., filed Nov. 19, 1980). For additional background on the
conflict, see United States v. Exxon, [1981] 4 ENERGY MNGM'T (CCH) 26,269.
286. Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. App. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (1957); U.V. Indus., Inc.
v. Danielson, 602 P.2d 571, 581 (Mont. 1979) (lessors had no right to obtain a drilling per-
mit, since the lease gave lessees the sole and exclusive right to drill). Similarly, in Railroad
Comm'n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 101 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 133 Tex. 330, 128 S.W.2d 9 (1939), the court's recognition of lessee's role as a
representative of lessor clearly was predicated on the consideration that lessors did not have
an in kind royalty clause and lacked title to any natural gas.
The legislative wisdom of allowing only lessees to petition for compulsory unitization
under a state statute was upheld in Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204 Okla.
543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951), in which the court stated,
The royalty owners are those who have committed to lessees their right to produce in
exchange for a definite share in the production .... By reason of [lessees'] knowledge
of the problems they, necessarily, are in a better position than the royalty owners to
appraise the practicability and hence the wisdom of unification.... The royalty own-
ers, who by their own acts have completely divorced themselves from the activity, are
often not conveniently accessible and could afford little if any helpful information if
available, but they are granted the right of an appeal from the action of the Commis-
sion ....
Id. at 550, 231 P.2d at 1005.
The legislative rationale for denying lessors access to the unitization petition makes it
all the more important that courts recognize the administrative covenant and that state
commissions are staffed with independent and competent personnel.
287. For example, royalty interest owners may apply for compulsory pooling under
many state statutes. See, e.g., TEx. RES. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 102.012 (Vernon 1978). Lessors
who own in kind oil or gas royalties can market it themselves-if they so desire-and make
their own sales contracts.
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tions.25 s Whether the courts will still impose the administrative
covenant on the lessee in this situation is the next question. In
several cases, the answer clearly was yes,289 but not all courts are
certain to agree.290
The availability of self-help to the lessor should not affect the
scope of the administrative covenant. It certainly should not bar
an action for breach of an implied covenant, nor should it consti-
tute an absolute defense to such a breach. The reasoning for this
proposition is the same as under the implied covenant to market
when the lessor owns in kind royalty oil or gas and theoretically
has a self-help remedy in marketing it.2 91 Under the typical oil and
gas lease, the lessor neither desires the burden of day-to-day oper-
ations of the lease nor is qualified to carry such a burden. 2
288. FERC regulations permit the state jurisdictional agencies that perform NGPA
well classifications to determine who can make the well applications. Many states once re-
quired that only the operator could make the application, while other states permitted "any
interested person" to file. Still others required the operator to file, but permitted a nonoper-
ator/seller to file by making reference to the operator. Address by Eaton, Houston Law
Review Energy Symposium on Oil and Gas: Impact of the Federal Regulatory System
(March 8, 1979). Many state agencies have since revised their rules after gaining experience
with the well application process, but the procedures still vary from state to state.
289. Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 934 (1971); U.V. Indus., Inc. v. Danielson, 602 P.2d 571 (Mont. 1979); Sinclair Oil &
Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436 (Okla. 1967); Fisher v. Superior Oil Co., 390 P.2d 521 (Okla.
1964); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 594 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), aff'd, 24 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981).
290. See note 264 supra and cases cited therein (appearing to bar the administrative
covenant). In holding for the lessee, courts have specifically pointed to the following consid-
erations, among others: That lessor had access to the information that lessee allegedly con-
cealed, Mims v. Hilliard, 125 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 1960); that lessor had equal access to the
administrative process, Chenoweth v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 314 F.2d 63 (10th Cir.
1963); that lessor should have known the nature of agency orders, Simmons v. Pure Oil Co.,
241 La. 592, 129 So. 2d 786 (1961); and that lessor both was equally bound by state statutes
requiring direct review of agency orders and had equal access to the courts to challenge
these orders, Savoy v. Tidewater Oil Co., 218 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. La. 1963), aff'd per
curiam, 326 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1964).
291. See text accompanying notes 199-214 supra (discussing effects of in kind royalty
clauses).
292. This reasoning has been adopted in the following cases: Williams v. Humble Oil
& Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165, 173 n.9 (5th Cir. 1970); U.V. Indus., Inc. v. Danielson, 602 P.2d
571, 581 (Mont. 1979); Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436, 447 (Okla. 1967)
("Although both the lessor and the lessee had access to the Corporation Commission for
relief, we feel the greater responsibility was with the lessee."); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexan-
der, 594 S.W.2d 467, 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) ("Under the leases in question Amoco had
the exclusive right to drill and otherwise operate the premises. It would know almost exclu-
sively whether and when to apply for relief from the Commission, armed as it was with all of
the relevant data."), afl'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981). But see 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 50, § 861.4. Williams and Meyers suggest that the lessor's ability to challenge a
regulation could relieve the lessee of this duty.
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Similarly, the availability of self-help to the lessor in the ad-
ministrative arena should be irrelevant to the standard that the
courts use to judge a lessee's conduct. The courts should not im-
pose a less rigorous standard on the lessee than that of the reason-
ably prudent operator simply because the lessor also has access to
the administrative forum.2 9 3 Conversely, if the lessor lacks this ac-
cess, this impediment should not elevate the lessee to the standard
of a fiduciary.294 The lessor's ability to contest administrative rul-
ings himself may be one factor among many that courts should
consider in determining whether, in the given circumstances, the
lessee has acted as a reasonably prudent operator. This ability,
however, should be irrelevant to a court's decision whether, as a
matter of law, the administrative covenant is recognizable. It
should also be irrelevant to a court's determination of the legal
standard to use in measuring the lessee's conduct under this
covenant. 5
(d) Application of the Administrative Covenant Under the
Federal Pricing Regulations
Recognition of the administrative covenant is particularly ap-
propriate in the federal pricing context. Clear injury to a lessor
often results from a lessee whose negligence, timidity, or lack of
diligence causes the royalty owner's share of off and gas to be
priced at less than the maximum allowable under the regulations
and the prevailing market conditions. The lessee's duty to secure
the best possible price under federal regulations is viewed correctly
as an obligation that is incidental to the traditionally recognized
Cline makes the curious argument that because the lessee has a duty to represent the
lessor in some types of administrative actions, the lessor has a duty not to interfere with the
lessee's bona fide presentation; in other words, the lessor has no right to this self-help rem-
edy, but only to damages as a remedy for breach. This argument is unsound, however, and
begs the question whether Cline would deprive the lessor of the right to market his own in
kind oil or gas just because the lessee has a duty to market it in the absence of the lessor's
exercise of this power. Cline, supra note 235, at 491-93.
293. See text accompanying notes 163-66 supra and cases cited therein (discussing the
inappropriateness of a good faith standard). See also text accompanying notes 209-12 supra
(discussing effect of lessor's self-help remedy on the marketing covenant).
294. See notes 193-94 supra and accompanying text (discussing the inappropriateness
of a fiduciary standard in implied covenants). If the statutes or regulations deny the lessor
access to the administrative forum, he may have to enforce his right to procedural due pro-
cess through the courts. Cf. Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204 Okla. 543, 231
P.2d 997 (1951) (acknowledging the lessor's right to appeal the agency's action).
295. Under the proper circumstances, either estoppel or laches could apply against a
lessor who has the ability to seek administrative action for himself.
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implied covenant to market with diligence. The lessee's duty often
requires compliance with standard regulations to obtain a higher
price rather than the more complex process of obtaining an indi-
vidual variance or exception. In general, the lessee's and lessor's
interests are mutual under this covenant-both would benefit from
the increase in price; thus, the possibility of conflicting objectives
that would bar the lessee's duty to represent the lessor does not
exist.29 6 A dispute between the lessee and lessor that leads to alle-
gations of breach of the implied covenant normally derives from
the same sources of conflict that cause other implied covenant
suits: The high costs and risks that the lessee alone must bear, or
the lessee's negligence.
To succeed in a cause of action for breach of the administra-
tive covenant, the lessor must prove that the lessee, if diligent,
probably would have succeeded in achieving the administrative re-
sult that the lessor seeks."" Such proof requires examining the reg-
ulatory environment that confronted the lessee.2 98 This environ-
ment includes the following elements: The cost of securing
information that is necessary to meet the filing requirements of the
pricing rules;299 the complexity of the regulations;300 the regulatory
uncertainty of ambiguously defined terms and rules;301 the length
296. When conflict arises between the two parties over the objective of a judicial or
administrative hearing, the lessee need not represent the lessor's position, but he may have
a duty to disclose his opposing participation in the hearings and advise the lessor to seek his
own representation. See text accompanying notes 265-85 supra.
297. Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1966); Bruce v.
Ohio Oil Co., 169 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1948); Baldwin v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. App. 2d 937, 307
P.2d 1005 (1957); Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Crews, 448 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1968); Amoco Prod. Co.
v. Alexander, 594 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), aff'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981).
See also Sword v. Rains, 575 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1978); Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Co., 308
F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 375 U.S. 160 (1963).
Hindsight is irrelevant to a judgment on the probability of success. McDonald v.
Grande Corp., 214 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 1968); Crocker v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 419 P.2d
265 (Okla. 1965). Furthermore, if no probability of success exists, the lessee's lack of dili-
gence in seeking administrative relief is irrelevant. See note 153 supra.
298. See notes 4-49 supra and accompanying text. The highly political and complex
legislation on federal oil and gas pricing provides a very different framework for the opera-
tion of the administrative covenant than the state conservation laws that Merrill used to
illustrate the operation of this covenant. Certainly, to seek a rule 37 spacing exception, see
note 232 supra, is quite different from seeking an exception to the crude oil pricing rules,
which requires a showing of gross hardship or inequity and three levels of administrative
review before exhaustion of all administrative remedies. Lang, supra note 5, at 144. In addi-
tion, the federal exception process-even if successful-does not always benefit the lessor.
See note 305 infra.
299. See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
300. See text accompanying notes 41, 44-45 supra.
301. See notes 19-20 & 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
1552
19811 IMPLIED COVENANTS 1553
of agency and court delays in resolving legal issues that are rele-
vant to determining whether a particular price would be applica-
ble; 02 the risks of enforcement actions against the lessee for ignor-
ing what he considers to be invalid regulations; 03 the risks
imposed on the lessee for violating the oath required in filing for
certain price classifications;30 4 evidence of the procedures that are
necessary to obtain variances or exceptions, and whether the ex-
ceptions would benefit royalty owners;305 and evidence that market
conditions would support the higher price.308
The court also typically inquires into the lessee's diligence
within this regulatory environment, considering these factors: The
efforts that the lessee made to keep abreast of the regulations, in-
cluding seeking legal advice or accounting expertise;307 whether the
lessee actually considered the applicability of the price regulations
to the lease at hand; whether the lessee reasonably relied on others
to seek the administrative action under consideration;30 8 and
302. See note 20 supra. For another example of the effects of regulatory delay, see
Gillespie v. Simpson, 41 Colo. App. 577, 588 P.2d 890 (1978), in which the Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission's three year delay in issuing geothermal regulations required for
well drilling allowed lessee to suspend paying delay rentals under the force majeure clause of
the lease.
303. See notes 39-47 supra and accompanying text.
304. At least one court has recognized the relevance of the lessee's oath requirements
in seeking administrative action. See Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d
84, 99 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 594 S.W.2d 467, 475 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979), aff'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981).
305. See text accompanying notes 245-48 supra. The DOE's Office of Hearings and
Appeals generally limits the price incentives that are granted in exceptions cases to the
working interest share of production because it believes that economic incentives to keep
properties in production do not affect royalty owners who do not bear the costs of produc-
tion. See, e.g., Osro Cobb, [1979 Transfer Binder] 3 DOE DEc. (CCH) 1 81,055 (1979).
306. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
307. Sword v. Rains, 575 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1978); Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,
53 F.R.D. 694, 696 (E.D. La. 1971) ("To determine what a prudent person would do in any
given situation, it is indispensable to ascertain what information he actually had available
and what additional information he might have obtained had he exercised reasonable dili-
gence in making efforts to learn the facts.") (emphasis in original); Shaw v. Henry, 216 Kan.
96, 531 P.2d 128 (1975); Tate v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 351, 240 P.2d 465 (1952);
Continental Inv. Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 156 Kan. 858, 137 P.2d 166 (1943). See also
Dupree v. Relco Exploration Co., 354 So. 2d 1083 (La. App. 1978) (lessee's continuing efforts
to gather and study geological information that was relevant to determining the profitability
of a deep well test sufficed to defend against a breach of the implied covenant to develop);
Crocker v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 419 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1965) (act of negotiating for water
flooding operation was reasonable excuse for delay in sandfracing).
308. For example, if lessors or other lessees or trade associations had access to the
administrative forum, this might be an indication that the lessee was relying on others. If
the lessee can show that he reasonably expected others to pursue the administrative actions
sought, and that their actions, if successful, would have benefitted him, he may well be
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whether the lessee actually sought a variance, exception, or inter-
pretative ruling from the agency in pursuit of the higher price.
Evidence of what other similarly situated lessees have done is also
relevant to many of these matters.30 9
Lessors also must prove that the benefits of seeking the ad-
ministrative action outweigh the costs and risks of doing so; the
reasonably prudent operator need not undertake unprofitable pur-
suits. The lessee's refusal to sell at a higher price because of legal
ambiguities in the federal regulations may be justified, even
though a court subsequently might find that, as a matter of law,
the oil or gas in question could have been sold at the higher price.
If high risks warranted the lessee's refusal to sell at the higher
price, or if high costs justified his failure to seek a judicial or ad-
ministrative interpretation of the right to do so, then the court
should find no breach.3 10
All of these factors are relevant to determining whether the
lessee, under the particular circumstances in question, acted as a
reasonably prudent operator. If they justify a delay in seeking or a
failure to seek a higher price, judgment is awarded for the lessee.
Likewise, when injury to the lessor is speculative, courts should
find for the lessee. The remedy typically is damages, which are cal-
culated as the loss in royalty that the lessee's failure to secure or
delay in securing the maximum possible price caused. Immediate
forfeiture or a conditional decree that requires the lessee to seek
the highest price allowed within a fixed period or forfeit the lease
is also possible.311
excused for failing to enter the hearing room or courthouse himself.
309. Newell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 144 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1944) (about 90% of the
producers in the field acted as defendant/lessee had acted); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander,
594 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), aft'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981). But see Sinclair
Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441 P.2d 436 (Okla. 1967).
310. In Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981), the court stated
that "there is no duty unless such an amount of oil can be recovered to equal the cost of
administrative expenses .... and yield to the lessee a reasonable expectation of profits."
Id. at 583. But see 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 50, § 861.4. Williams and Meyers state
in their discussion of the administrative covenant that the lessee is bound to know the law
at his peril. The implication that the lessee has an absolute duty to challenge the regulations
or disobey them regardless of costs and risks is not in accord with the prudent operator
standard and is unsound, particularly in the federal pricing context.
311. The issues of the effect of express clauses on the administrative covenant and the
remedies available for breach should be analyzed largely as described under the implied
covenant to market. See text accompanying notes 215-26 supra. Damages would be the nor-
real remedy-including punitive damages, if appropriate. See note 259 supra. See also
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 581 (1981) (breach of the implied cove-
nant to protect against drainage is an action sounding in contract and will not support re-
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The burden of proof is on the lessor to show that if the lessee
had acted as a reasonably prudent operator, a higher price would
have been achieved.-12 Because lessees normally can be expected to
seek the best possible price, no reason exists to shift this burden to
the lessee. Nor should the duty to account to the lessor for royal-
ties be used to rationalize a transfer of the burdens to the lessee.
The duty to account and to market with diligence in this new regu-
latory context, however, undoubtedly will require lessees to keep
careful records and information systems to ascertain those charac-
teristics of wells that are relevant to the federal pricing
classifications.3 13
The scope of the lessee's duty should not vary with the lack or
availability of a self-help remedy for the lessor. No greater duty
should exist because of the lessor's inability to seek a higher price,
and a muted duty should not suffice simply because the lessor
could have taken action of his own.
(e) The Advisability of a More Relaxed Standard for Small
Producers
Operators in the oil and gas industry unquestionably confront
a difficult task in attempting to chart a course between the Scylla
of pricing above the legal maximum, and facing a government en-
forcement action, and the Charybdis of pricing below the maxi-
mum, and risking a lawsuit by a lessor that alleges breach of the
implied covenant to market with diligence. The peril is especially
acute for small independent gas producers, some of whom had
never been under federal price regulation before the NGPA was
passed. The national policy for years has been to foster and main-
tain competition in the petroleum industry.3 14 This policy has re-
covery of exemplary damages absent proof of an independent tort). Forfeiture of the lease is
possible when the lessee seems hopelessly inept or opposed to the lessor's interest. Baldwin
v. Kubetz, 148 Cal. App. 2d 937, 307 P.2d 1005 (1957). The remedy of ordering the lessee to
appear before the agency and to take the appropriate action to correct the breach might be
possible under some circumstances-mainly when the lessee's breach is due to negli-
gence-but not when it would jeopardize the lessee under perjury statutes. See Sunray DX
Oil Co. v. Crews, 448 P.2d 840 (Okla. 1968).
312. See text accompanying notes 174-98 supra.
313. See text accompanying notes 187-98 supra.
314. The federal crude oil pricing and allocation statutes were to be administered with
this policy specifically in mind. Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,
Congress directed the federal energy agency to promulgate regulations that provided for
"preservation of an economically sound and competitive petroleum industry; including the
priority needs to restore and foster competition in the producing, refining, distribution, mar-
keting, and petrochemical sectors . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1)(D) (1976).
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sulted in a history of special legislative and regulatory provisions
for small producers, ranging from tax relief sI5 to price advan-
tages.318 In addition, courts have recognized the special importance
of small producers. s17 Thus, the question arises whether this public
policy justifies a reduction in the scope or standard of the small
producers' implied obligations to their lessors.
For several reasons, courts should eschew this approach when
resolving conflicts between lessees and lessors in implied covenant
cases. First, the use of an amorphously defined public policy factor
in judging implied covenant cases should be disfavored."' 8 Second,
if fostering competition in oil and gas production is a worthwhile
public goal, then the public, rather than individual royalty owners,
should bear the cost of this goal. Last, the reasonably prudent op-
erator standard is flexible enough to prevent undue hardship to
small operators. 19 This standard is not based on the best operator
in the field or the one with the most capital, most highly skilled
labor force, and most experienced attorneys and accountants. °
The implied covenant doctrine looks at the trade usages and busi-
ness customs in the field, and evidence of what other similarly situ-
ated lessees are doing is relevant to the facts and circumstances of
the case.3 21 In addition, most of the factors that enforcement offi-
315. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 501(a), 89 Stat. 26 (codified
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), which virtually eliminated the favorable percentage de-
pletion tax allowance for major integrated firms in the petroleum industry, exempted cer-
tain independent producers. I.R.C. § 613A(c). The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 1, 94 Stat. 229 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) also
allows lower tax rates for independent producers. I.R.C. §§ 4987(b)(2), 4992.
316. The Federal Power Commission allowed gas producers selling less than ten mil-
lion cubic feet of natural gas per year to charge 130% of the maximum price permitted large
producers. 18 C.F.R. § 157.40(c) (1980). See generally Comment, supra note 28.
317. The court in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), stated,
Although the resources of the small producers are ordinarily more limited, their activi-
ties are characteristically financially more hazardous. It appears that they drill a dis-
proportionately large number of exploratory wells, and that these are frequently in ar-
eas in which relatively little exploration has previously occurred. Their contribution to
the search for gas reserves is therefore significant, but it is made at correspondingly
greater financial risks and at higher unit costs.
Id. at 784-85 (citations omitted).
318. See text accompanying notes 60-74 supra.
319. Actually, some question exists about how much special protection from undue
hardship "small" producers need. The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 accords
favorable tax treatment to an independent producer's first 1000 barrels per day of produc-
tion. At an unregulated price, this producer's revenues may amount to $33,000 per day or
over $12 million a year-hardly a "mom and pop" operation.
320. M. MERRILL, supra note 50, §§ 81 & 121.
321. Id. See also text accompanying notes 167-69 & 309 supra.
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cials examine to determine whether a violation of the federal regu-
lations has occurred are the same factors that a court considers to
ascertain whether the lessee has acted as a reasonably prudent op-
erator in implied covenant cases.32 2 A lessee, therefore, is not apt
to face a double standard.
Nevertheless, the increased regulation of the oil and gas indus-
try may well force small operators out of business, or at least fore-
close certain opportunities from them.322 If this problem is serious,
Congress should correct it through appropriate legislation.3 24
Courts, however, should not alter the tenets of implied covenant
law to achieve this result.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed the impact of federal energy pric-
ing policies and regulations on the doctrine of implied covenants
in oil and gas law. The framework of federal energy regulations in
crude oil and natural gas pricing and taxation offers much oppor-
tunity for profit to alert lessees, but not without significant costs
and risks arising from the complexity, ambiguity, and politically
sensitive nature of the pricing laws. The doctrine of implied cove-
nants arose in oil and gas law because of the unique relationship
322. See Trowbridge, supra note 17, at 209-10 n.57.
323. According to the Independent Petroleum Association of America,
It would be difficult to imagine a law more filled with traps so certain to lead to litiga-
tion, delay, confusion and turmoil. The result surely will be to send independent ex-
plorers, their expertise and their dollars fleeing from natural gas exploration and devel-
opment into alternative enterprises of less risk and regulatory burden.
C1TIZEN/LABOR ENERGY CoALITION, FACTBOOK ON THE PROPOSED NATURAL GAS BILL (1978),
reprinted in NGPA Impact Hearings, supra note 33, at 82.
324. One commentator has made the argument that the FERC should establish higher
incentive prices that reflect risk premiums for classes of small producers under the authority
of § 107 of the NGPA. Note, supra note 114.
The new Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164, 5
U.S.C.A. §§ 601-612 (Supp. 1981), which amends the Administrative Procedure Act by
adding a new chapter six, may spur efforts to relieve small producers of the regulatory bur-
den. In promulgating the Act, Congress found that "uniform Federal regulatory and report-
ing requirements have in numerous instances imposed unnecessary and disproportionately
burdensome demands including legal, accounting and consulting costs upon small busi-
nesses" and declared a new "principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor,
consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and
informational requirements to the scale of the businesses." Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 2, 94 Stat.
1164, 1164 (1980). The Act requires that federal agencies prepare "regulatory flexibility
analyses" of the impact Qf proposed rules on small businesses, 5 U.S.C.A. § 603 (West 1981),
and a plan for periodic review of already existing rules that have a significant economic
impact on small businesses. The planned review is specifically based on the rule's complex-
ity and the nature of complaints about it. Id. § 610.
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between the lessee and lessor that an oil and gas lease creates. This
relational basis of implied covenant law, whether founded mainly
in law or in fact, is a principle that should be applied to resolve
disputes between lessees and lessors which may arise from the new
context of federal pricing legislation. Courts should avoid infusing
broad notions of public policy into the lessee/lessor relationship,
since this practice inevitably would make implied covenant law as
unpredictable and inconsistent as the energy policy it ostensibly
mirrors. This unpredictability and inconsistency in policy is never-
theless an important factor in assessing the actions of a lessee as a
reasonably prudent operator under the federal regulations.
Many important issues can be expected to arise from the
lessee/lessor relationship under federal energy price regulation that
the doctrine of implied covenants will be called on to resolve. In
actions to enforce the drilling covenants, the doctrine of implied
covenants-if applied with the proper focus on expected profitabil-
ity and a clear recognition that delayed development may be both
profitable and prudent in the new pricing context-can protect les-
sors' interests without forcing premature or wasteful drilling on
lessees. In the marketing area, the doctrine of implied covenants
can operate to secure for lessors their expectation of receiving the
best price possible and at the same time consider lessees' risk and
costs in obtaining this price. The implied covenant to seek
favorable administrative action is soundly based in the relational
nature of the oil and gas lease and should be judicially recognized
and given the scope and operation described above.
This Article has explored many issues that are likely to arise
in the new pricing context. The courts have yet to resolve these
issues, and the case law that does exist is often inapposite. Even
without the use of the public policy model of implied covenant law,
the courts' choice between the contract model and the equity
model may well determine the ultimate resolution of the issue.
Given these sources of uncertainty in the law, both lessees and les-
sors may want to negotiate express clauses that deal with the im-
portant issues, even though such clauses have not been common in
the past. An express clause, for example, might address one or
more of the following matters: The timing of drilling wells; royalty
payments or delay rentals that are designed to assure minimum
levels of cash flow to the lessor; stipulations that the lessee's good
faith efforts in marketing will suffice; detailed drilling and market-
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ing provisions that are keyed to NGPA pricing categories; 2 5 and
recognition of the lessee's duty to seek favorable administrative
action in accordance with the reasonably prudent operator
standard. 26
When express provisions are either lacking or too difficult to
negotiate in advance of actual drilling and production, implied cov-
enant law should be used to resolve the conflicts between the lessee
and lessor. In these cases, the doctrine of implied covenants, prop-
erly applied, can serve as an appropriate mechanism for determin-
ing the proper balance between the conflicting interests of the two
parties that arise from the federal energy pricing regulations. The
doctrine can also help to assure that the nation's oil and gas re-
sources are developed with both fairness and efficiency weighing in
the balance.
325. The following paragraph, which was used in a recently negotiated lease, addresses
lessee's drilling and marketing activities under the NGPA:
For so long as any natural gas produced from said land is subject to a maximum
ceiling price under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 ("Act"), and unless and until
such gas is deregulated as to sales price, then for purposes of Paragraph 3 of this lease,
the "market value" at the well or at the plant, as applicable, for the part of such gas
which at that date is not deregulated shall mean the highest ceiling price at that date
produced for which the gas could qualify under the Act. Lessee covenants and agrees to
conduct all drilling and producing activities on said land so that all gas produced there-
from will qualify for the maximum applicable ceiling price at the date produced speci-
fied in Sections 102(b), 107 or 108 of the Act; provided, however, that, if Lessee, acting
as a reasonable and prudent operator, after due investigation and consideration of all
relevant facts and circumstances relating to the qualification of all gas production
under Sections 102(b), 107 and 108 of the Act, determines that it is impractical to
conduct drilling and producing activities which would so qualify all gas so produced for
the maximum applicable ceiling price specified in Sections 102(b), 107 or 108 of the
Act, Lessee may conduct drilling and producing activities on said land so that any gas
produced which would be impractical to produce and qualify for the maximum ceiling
price specified in Sections 102(b), 107 or 108 of the Act, will qualify for the maximum
ceiling price at the date produced specified in Section 103 of the Act. Lessee will not,
without the prior written consent of Lessor, permit or conduct any drilling and produc-
ing activities on said land which would result in any gas so produced qualifying for a
maximum ceiling price under the Act other than a maximum ceiling price specified in
Sections 102(b), 103, 107 or 108 of the Act. If the Act is superseded or modified by
subsequent federal legislation, rule, or order which prolongs or extends price regulation
of any natural gas produced from said land, then in such event it is the intent of the
parties, and they hereby agree, that the provisions of this Paragraph 4(b) shall con-
tinue to apply for the duration of such extended period of price regulation under such
subsequent federal legislation, with the Section references to the Act as above con-
tained being revised as necessary to effectuate the parties' intent.
326. See Bruce v. Ohio Oil Co., 169 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1948) (a rare example of an
express provision to seek administrative action).
Environmental regulation of oil and gas activity is another important and growing area
that requires the lessee's administrative diligence. See Shaw v. Henry, 216 Kan. 96, 531 P.2d
128 (1975).

